10. The Structure of the Act of Faith
15. The Notion of the Act of Faith
Once we are sure that God is teaching us something, we can make it ours and believe it through an act of faith.
The act of faith is a supernatural assent of the intellect through which a truth revealed by God is believed on the authority of God who reveals it. It is certain and free at the same time.
Faith is the assent of the human intellect, not mysterious religious sentiment. The intellect is our only faculty or power that can know things beyond the scope of the senses, beyond the material appearance. Still, this assent is subject to the will. The truth is not accepted because it appears self-evident to the intellect, since, as we have seen, it is not self-evident; the act of faith is free.
The act of knowing a self-evident truth (for instance, that two and two make four) is also free, for the intellect may or may not be commanded by the will to consider a truth. However, once considered, the intellect admits the truth of a proposition by itself without any need for the will’s command. On the other hand, a truth of faith cannot be admitted without the will’s mandate, because it is not self-evident. Thus, the act of faith has a greater degree of freedom. In other words, it depends more closely on the decision of the will.
Moreover, the act of faith is supernatural, that is, it requires the help of grace from the start, because the motive for believing is always supernatural, and, in many instances, so are the truths to be believed.
The act of faith is most certain for two reasons: because its formal object is the authority of God—the source of the revelation, who can neither deceive nor be deceived—and because the will orders the intellect to assent fully under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This certitude is much stronger than that of natural knowledge.
We can summarize all this with the First Vatican Council’s definition of the virtue of faith, already quoted in the introduction. It focuses on the act of faith, since virtues are defined by their acts: “Faith … is a supernatural virtue. By faith, with God’s inspiration and the help of his grace, we believe that what he has revealed is true, not because its intrinsic truth is seen with the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God who reveals it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.”1
16. Faith, Science, and Opinion
We can determine that knowledge through faith is superior by comparing it with knowledge that is obtained through other means.
We speak of science, or the knowledge of something (scientia, plainly “knowledge”), when we know it with certitude, with the same natural evidence that something known is present in our intellect. Science admits several degrees, which affect this knowledge’s perfection more than its certainty. Its highest degree is the knowledge of something through its causes (not only the efficient cause, but all causes: material, formal, efficient, and final).
Opinion, on the other hand, is imperfect knowledge of something; the intellect adheres to such a truth after pondering several reasons, not ruling out the possibility of being mistaken. The truth is accepted provisionally, just until more evidence is available.
Knowledge by faith (we do not refer here to supernatural faith) is based not on the known truth’s being manifest to our intellect, but on the testimony of another. The very word faith (fides in Latin) refers to the fact that the formal motive for accepting such knowledge is confidence in the source. The amount of trust we place in the source’s wisdom and truthfulness will determine the strength and certainty of our intellect’s assent. Although the intellect does not perceive the truth in question as evident, that confidence can reasonably warrant certainty ranging from a mere opinion to profound certainty. In fact, knowledge by faith is how we acquire the bulk of our natural knowledge.
In the case of faith based on God’s authority (supernatural faith), it is clear that our confidence cannot be better justified: God cannot deceive himself or deceive us. Thus, it is not the same to say “I believe,” referring to this faith founded on God’s testimony (“I believe in everlasting life”), as it is to say it as an opinion (“I believe it is so”). The word believe is used here in an equivocal sense. In the second case, belief is opposed to certitude. The first refers to knowing by divine authority and, therefore, with absolute certainty. Christian beliefs are not subjective opinions.
17. The Process of the Supernatural Act of Faith
The analysis of the logical steps involved in the act of faith is rather complex.2
The act of faith is preceded by some speculative credibility judgments, which show, at a merely theoretical level, that “this is believable because God reveals it.” These judgments are based on the above-mentioned motives of credibility.
These are followed by a speculative-practical judgment of credence, credendum judgment (credendum being the Latin for “it must be believed”). The intellect concludes that “this has to be believed because it is revealed by God.” Both credibility and credence judgments are necessary preparation for the act of faith.
The following step consists of another judgment of credence that is practical: “I want to believe,” “I have to believe this here and now.” This judgment requires the help of supernatural grace. Therefore, the act of faith cannot simply be a consequence of human reasoning, since it leads to supernatural action.
The last step is the act of faith proper: “I believe this.”
We can summarize the four steps as follows:
i) Speculative credibility judgment: “This is believable,” “I can believe,” “It is reasonable to believe this.”
ii) Speculative-practical judgment of credence: “This has to be believed,” “This must be believed.”
iii) Practical judgment of credence: “I want to believe this.” The will’s decision and its command to the intellect take place in this step.
iv) Intellect’s final assent: “I believe,” which is the act of faith proper.
18. Motive and Object of the Act of Faith
The motive of the act of faith, the reason why one believes, is the authority of God who reveals and who can neither deceive nor be deceived. It is, therefore, a supernatural motive, belonging to a higher level than any creature, real or possible.
The object of faith—that which is believed—is everything revealed by God.
The object of faith is:
· God himself, considered as God--sub ratione deitatis. He is the object of faith, not as cause of the creatures, but in himself, as God. It is according to his innermost life, which most exceeds the natural knowledge of any possible created intellect, and which can be known only through divine revelation;
· all the truths that can be known only through revelation, except those pertaining to the innermost life of God. These are the mysteries of the Incarnation, Redemption, grace, Holy Eucharist and the other sacraments, the supernatural virtues, beatific vision, etc. All these derive from, and are ordained to, the innermost life of God;
· all the natural truths specially revealed by God. They are revealed in order to confirm and strengthen our knowledge of them. Among these are all the truths related to our natural knowledge of God and the existence and immortality of the soul.
19. Modernist Errors on Faith and Revelation
As stated in the “Oath against Modernism” prescribed by St. Pius X in 1910, the modernist errors regarding faith and revelation consist in understanding faith as “a blind sentiment of religion welling up from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and the motion of a will trained to morality.” According to modernists, the external proofs of revelation, miracles, and prophecies are not the surest signs of the divine origin of Christian religion, nor are they well-adapted to the understanding of all people and of all times, including ours.3 The Holy Office, in its 1907 decree Lamentabili, condemned some modernist propositions, among them one stating that any assent of faith would ultimately be founded on a sum of probabilities. The decree also condemns other related errors denounced in St. Pius X’s encyclical Pascendi.4
Footnotes:
1. DS 3008.
2. Cf. CCC, 154–156.
3. Cf. DS 3537–3542.
4. Cf. DS 3475–3500, especially 3475, 3499–3500.
Once we are sure that God is teaching us something, we can make it ours and believe it through an act of faith.
The act of faith is a supernatural assent of the intellect through which a truth revealed by God is believed on the authority of God who reveals it. It is certain and free at the same time.
Faith is the assent of the human intellect, not mysterious religious sentiment. The intellect is our only faculty or power that can know things beyond the scope of the senses, beyond the material appearance. Still, this assent is subject to the will. The truth is not accepted because it appears self-evident to the intellect, since, as we have seen, it is not self-evident; the act of faith is free.
The act of knowing a self-evident truth (for instance, that two and two make four) is also free, for the intellect may or may not be commanded by the will to consider a truth. However, once considered, the intellect admits the truth of a proposition by itself without any need for the will’s command. On the other hand, a truth of faith cannot be admitted without the will’s mandate, because it is not self-evident. Thus, the act of faith has a greater degree of freedom. In other words, it depends more closely on the decision of the will.
Moreover, the act of faith is supernatural, that is, it requires the help of grace from the start, because the motive for believing is always supernatural, and, in many instances, so are the truths to be believed.
The act of faith is most certain for two reasons: because its formal object is the authority of God—the source of the revelation, who can neither deceive nor be deceived—and because the will orders the intellect to assent fully under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This certitude is much stronger than that of natural knowledge.
We can summarize all this with the First Vatican Council’s definition of the virtue of faith, already quoted in the introduction. It focuses on the act of faith, since virtues are defined by their acts: “Faith … is a supernatural virtue. By faith, with God’s inspiration and the help of his grace, we believe that what he has revealed is true, not because its intrinsic truth is seen with the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God who reveals it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.”1
16. Faith, Science, and Opinion
We can determine that knowledge through faith is superior by comparing it with knowledge that is obtained through other means.
We speak of science, or the knowledge of something (scientia, plainly “knowledge”), when we know it with certitude, with the same natural evidence that something known is present in our intellect. Science admits several degrees, which affect this knowledge’s perfection more than its certainty. Its highest degree is the knowledge of something through its causes (not only the efficient cause, but all causes: material, formal, efficient, and final).
Opinion, on the other hand, is imperfect knowledge of something; the intellect adheres to such a truth after pondering several reasons, not ruling out the possibility of being mistaken. The truth is accepted provisionally, just until more evidence is available.
Knowledge by faith (we do not refer here to supernatural faith) is based not on the known truth’s being manifest to our intellect, but on the testimony of another. The very word faith (fides in Latin) refers to the fact that the formal motive for accepting such knowledge is confidence in the source. The amount of trust we place in the source’s wisdom and truthfulness will determine the strength and certainty of our intellect’s assent. Although the intellect does not perceive the truth in question as evident, that confidence can reasonably warrant certainty ranging from a mere opinion to profound certainty. In fact, knowledge by faith is how we acquire the bulk of our natural knowledge.
In the case of faith based on God’s authority (supernatural faith), it is clear that our confidence cannot be better justified: God cannot deceive himself or deceive us. Thus, it is not the same to say “I believe,” referring to this faith founded on God’s testimony (“I believe in everlasting life”), as it is to say it as an opinion (“I believe it is so”). The word believe is used here in an equivocal sense. In the second case, belief is opposed to certitude. The first refers to knowing by divine authority and, therefore, with absolute certainty. Christian beliefs are not subjective opinions.
17. The Process of the Supernatural Act of Faith
The analysis of the logical steps involved in the act of faith is rather complex.2
The act of faith is preceded by some speculative credibility judgments, which show, at a merely theoretical level, that “this is believable because God reveals it.” These judgments are based on the above-mentioned motives of credibility.
These are followed by a speculative-practical judgment of credence, credendum judgment (credendum being the Latin for “it must be believed”). The intellect concludes that “this has to be believed because it is revealed by God.” Both credibility and credence judgments are necessary preparation for the act of faith.
The following step consists of another judgment of credence that is practical: “I want to believe,” “I have to believe this here and now.” This judgment requires the help of supernatural grace. Therefore, the act of faith cannot simply be a consequence of human reasoning, since it leads to supernatural action.
The last step is the act of faith proper: “I believe this.”
We can summarize the four steps as follows:
i) Speculative credibility judgment: “This is believable,” “I can believe,” “It is reasonable to believe this.”
ii) Speculative-practical judgment of credence: “This has to be believed,” “This must be believed.”
iii) Practical judgment of credence: “I want to believe this.” The will’s decision and its command to the intellect take place in this step.
iv) Intellect’s final assent: “I believe,” which is the act of faith proper.
18. Motive and Object of the Act of Faith
The motive of the act of faith, the reason why one believes, is the authority of God who reveals and who can neither deceive nor be deceived. It is, therefore, a supernatural motive, belonging to a higher level than any creature, real or possible.
The object of faith—that which is believed—is everything revealed by God.
The object of faith is:
· God himself, considered as God--sub ratione deitatis. He is the object of faith, not as cause of the creatures, but in himself, as God. It is according to his innermost life, which most exceeds the natural knowledge of any possible created intellect, and which can be known only through divine revelation;
· all the truths that can be known only through revelation, except those pertaining to the innermost life of God. These are the mysteries of the Incarnation, Redemption, grace, Holy Eucharist and the other sacraments, the supernatural virtues, beatific vision, etc. All these derive from, and are ordained to, the innermost life of God;
· all the natural truths specially revealed by God. They are revealed in order to confirm and strengthen our knowledge of them. Among these are all the truths related to our natural knowledge of God and the existence and immortality of the soul.
19. Modernist Errors on Faith and Revelation
As stated in the “Oath against Modernism” prescribed by St. Pius X in 1910, the modernist errors regarding faith and revelation consist in understanding faith as “a blind sentiment of religion welling up from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and the motion of a will trained to morality.” According to modernists, the external proofs of revelation, miracles, and prophecies are not the surest signs of the divine origin of Christian religion, nor are they well-adapted to the understanding of all people and of all times, including ours.3 The Holy Office, in its 1907 decree Lamentabili, condemned some modernist propositions, among them one stating that any assent of faith would ultimately be founded on a sum of probabilities. The decree also condemns other related errors denounced in St. Pius X’s encyclical Pascendi.4
Footnotes:
1. DS 3008.
2. Cf. CCC, 154–156.
3. Cf. DS 3537–3542.
4. Cf. DS 3475–3500, especially 3475, 3499–3500.