14. The Rights to Life, Truth, and Work
Duties toward One’s Own Body
Man has a useful or indirect ownership of his own body, but not absolute ownership. In other words, he owns his body under the Law of God (cf. Rom 14:7–8; Wis 16:13).1
Suicide is the voluntary taking of one’s life. Direct suicide, that is, directly wanted suicide caused by a free and deliberate action, is always a most grievous sin. Usually, there is no time to repent and ask forgiveness from God. It violates charity toward oneself and justice toward God and society.2
Suicide, when not caused by temporal or permanent mental derangement, is mainly due to lack of faith. Otherwise, the certitude of going to hell would surely check the suicidal impulse.
Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself and by intention causes death with the purpose of eliminating suffering. It is equated to suicide when the individual concerned freely requests it.
Indirect suicide is not directly wanted, but is foreseen as a possible or certain consequence of a dangerous action. It is lawful only for a proportionately serious cause, as in a risky but necessary operation or in a legitimate war.
Organ transplants conform to the moral law and can be meritorious if the physical and psychological dangers and risks that are incurred by the donor are proportionate to the good that is sought for the recipient. Insofar as limbs and organs are parts of the whole body, they can be removed when the life or health of the whole body requires it.3 It cannot be done, however, for other immoral purposes, such as contraception.4 The moral qualification of mutilation is similar to that of suicide.
The Right to Life and Bodily Integrity
The right to life and bodily integrity is especially protected by the fifth commandment. It has many implications, which can be summed up in two principles:
i) The life of the innocent is inviolable. Thus, homicide, abortion, and euthanasia are illicit.
ii) The life of a guilty person can be taken only in case of legitimate self-defense, just war, or death penalty imposed by the legitimate authority.
We will study each of these cases separately.
Homicide
Homicide is the direct killing of an innocent person. It is called parricide when the victim is a close relative; this circumstance aggravates the crime.
It is never licit for anybody to directly kill an innocent person (cf. Ex 23:7; Gn 4:10).5
Nevertheless, an action or omission that is in itself indifferent, from which the unwanted death of an innocent may follow, can be justified for a proportionately serious cause. This is another instance of indirectly voluntary actions. For example, bombing a military target in time of war, which may cause innocent deaths, could be classified as such.
Abortion
Abortion is the expulsion from the womb of an immature, non-viable fetus.6 This immaturity determines the essential trait of abortion: the death of the fetus. Basically, there are two kinds of abortion:
i) Miscarriage, or spontaneous abortion, is due to causes that are beyond human control. We will not discuss it here since, being involuntary, it has no moral qualification.
ii) Induced abortion is due to voluntary and effective human intervention. It is sought as an end or as a means. In the first case, the main purpose is getting rid of the baby. The second seeks other effects, such as—in the so-called therapeutic abortion—the health of the mother.
The right to life does not come from the parents, society, nor any human authority; it comes directly from God. Therefore, nobody may dispose of another’s life, neither as an end nor as a means. Induced abortion is thus intrinsically evil, and must be qualified as homicide.
The direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral, even when it is performed as a means to a good end.7
In order to highlight its moral evil, ecclesiastical law expressly punishes abortion. All the participants, including the mother, automatically incur excommunication. The Magisterium of the Church has consistently condemned abortion throughout history, even when the exact moment of the fetus’s animation was being disputed.8
Respect for human life and radical condemnation of abortion as intrinsically evil is not an exclusive position of Catholics. All people of upright judgment share this view, which is based on what a person is and should be. In some persons, however, this moral stance has been obscured by the alleged negative consequences of rejecting abortion (medical, eugenic, economic, or social evils). All these false reasons violate the basic principle of human life: Life is sacred from the very first moment of conception. Moreover, life is a good of a higher nature than those alleged in defense of abortion.
An entirely different thing is indirect abortion, or indirectly provoked abortion. This is an unwanted and unavoidable consequence of a good action. It is foreseen, but not wanted—just tolerated. The good action must be necessary for reasons that are serious enough to balance the evil effect of abortion. The latter, we must insist, is never wanted and would be avoided if it were possible. Indirect abortion is another case of double effect, or indirectly voluntary, actions. It is lawful when all the conditions required in these cases are fulfilled.
Dueling
A duel is a fight between two or several persons in which the time, place, and weapons have been previously agreed upon. The latter are lethal or at least able to inflict serious wounds.
Duels are always illicit. In the past, duels were so common that the Church had to impose special penalties in order to curb them.9 Nowadays, dueling as a social custom is practically unheard of.
Respect for the Person and Scientific Research
Research or experimentation on the human being cannot legitimize acts that are in themselves contrary to the dignity of persons and to the moral law.10 The subject’s potential consent does not justify such acts. Organ transplants are not morally acceptable if the donor or those who legitimately speak for him have not given their informed consent. It is morally inadmissible to directly bring about the disabling mutilation or death of a human being, even in order to delay the death of other persons.
Respect for Health
Life and physical health are precious gifts that are entrusted to us by God.11 We must take reasonable care of them, taking into account the needs of others and the common good.
Concern for the health of its members requires that society help with the attainment of living conditions that allow them to grow and reach maturity: food and clothing, housing, health care, basic education, employment, and social assistance.
Though morality requires respect for the life of the body, it does not make it an absolute value. It rejects a neo-pagan notion that promotes the cult of the body.
As we shall see in the study of the virtue of temperance, one must avoid every kind of excess: the abuse of food, alcohol, tobacco, or medicine. The use of drugs, and endangering one’s own and others’ safety on the road, sea, or air by drunkenness or a love of speed are also grave offenses.
Respect for Bodily Integrity
Kidnapping and hostage taking are morally wrong. Terrorism is gravely against justice and charity. Torture is contrary to respect for the person and human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations that are performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.12
Sexual Offenses
As far as justice is concerned, sexually assaulting somebody against his will is morally wrong. The author of the violence is bound to make restitution for any resulting damage, as will be studied later under the virtue of temperance.
Homicide in Self-Defense
Self-defense is a natural right that can go as far as killing an unjust aggressor. One has the right and duty to protect oneself.13 However, it must be exercised with extreme caution, fulfilling all the conditions that are demanded by moral law. A violent and unjust aggressor who is attempting to inflict serious harm on others loses his right to life. The sad outcome of the death of the aggressor is attributable to the aggressor, because it is his action that brought it about. However, his death is still an evil and must be avoided by all possible and just means.
Among the conditions that are required for the lawful use of self-defense, the most important are the following:
· There must be an actual unjust aggression in the present. Suspicions or even threats of a future attack are not enough. Violence for a past aggression is not self-defense, but plain vengeance.
· There must be some proportion between the good to be protected and the damage that is caused to the aggressor.
· The damage that is caused must be limited to what is needed to avert the unjust attack.
War
Given the destructive power of modern arsenals, it is extremely difficult to justify the starting of a war. It is no longer a matter of military and civilian casualties in the belligerent countries; the whole of humanity could eventually be wiped out.14 The conditions for the legitimate authority to lawfully declare war (what the scholars call “ius ad bellum” or “war-decision law”) are as follows:
· There must be an extremely serious and just cause. In today’s international context, “just cause” includes the defense of freedom (especially religious freedom), and the defense of a minimum of order in international affairs.
· The contemplated action must be “proportionate” to the goal (or just cause) pursued; thus, the good to be accomplished must be greater than the evil that would be suffered if nothing were done. There should be a reasonable chance of success. All peaceful solutions must have been exhausted.15
· There must be rectitude of intention, that is, the avowed cause must not be a pretext for other hidden motives. This, among other things, precludes acts of vengeance or reprisal.16
Once started, war must be waged according to the established international agreements (i.e., the Geneva Convention) and the ius gentium. Generally speaking, the following criteria (what scholars call “ius in bello” or “war-conduct law) must be followed:
· War is not waged against private persons, but against a state or similar organization (like a terrorist network) as a public person; this is the “non-combatant immunity.”
· No more force than necessary should be used to vindicate the just cause; thus, there should be certain “proportionality” also in the means used. It is lawful to use all the means that are needed to crush the strength of the enemy, as long as these are not intrinsically evil.
“It is one thing,” says the Second Vatican Council, “to wage a war of self-defense; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties.”17
Capital Punishment
Catholic doctrine recognizes the right of the legitimate civil authorities to take the life of a criminal. This is part of their ordinary attributions, but it must be exercised only for very serious reasons and with due judicial process (cf. Rom 13:4).18 Thus, Sacred Scripture records that God established capital punishment among the people of Israel for certain crimes (cf. Ex 21:12–17; 22:18).
The Magisterium of the Church declares that capital punishment does not go against natural law, but is not a direct consequence of it either. It is rather a matter of convenience, which depends on the circumstances. Thus, in particular cases, Catholics may stand for or against the death penalty; it depends on their assessment of the particular cultural and social circumstances.
Nevertheless, if, in a certain society, the good effects of the death penalty—prevention of grievous crimes and preservation of peace and order—could be achieved by lesser penalties, capital punishment would become difficult to justify. This is the case in most countries of the world in the present age.
In any case, death penalty is lawful only when it is demanded by the common good and applied by the legitimate authority after a fair trial.
Euthanasia
Human life is sacred “up to the last moment of its natural existence in time.”19 The dignity with which God has invested life demands that all ordinary means be used to protect it in case of sickness or old age. No effort should be spared for fear of inconvenience or sacrifice.
Euthanasia—directly killing the aged, the terminally ill, or the crippled in order to end their sufferings or even to avoid expenses and inconveniences—is as illicit as any other homicide. It is murder when it is imposed on an unwilling or unconscious person by physicians, relatives, or legislators. Even voluntary omission of the logical and available means of protecting human life is illicit. Narcotics, analgesics, and other drugs that alleviate pain, however, are perfectly lawful, even if they indirectly shorten life. Furthermore, there is no obligation to use extraordinary artificial means to maintain vegetative life when there is no hope of recovery.
Respect for the Dead
The dying should be given attention and care to help them live their last moments in dignity and peace. They will be helped by the prayers of their relatives, who must see to it that the sick receive at the proper time the sacraments, which prepare them to meet the living God.
The bodies of the dead must be treated with respect and charity, in faith and hope of the Resurrection. The burial of the dead is a corporal work of mercy (cf. Tb 1:16–18); it honors the children of God, who are temples of the Holy Spirit.
Autopsies can be morally permitted for legal inquests or scientific research. The free gift of organs after death is legitimate.
The Church permits cremation provided that it does not demonstrate a denial of faith in the resurrection of the body.20
The Virtue of Sincerity
The Old Testament attests that God is the source of all truth; his word is truth; his Law is truth. Since God is “true,” the members of his people are called to live in the truth.
Sincerity, or truthfulness, is a virtue that inclines man to appear in his life and words as he really is.21 This definition highlights the necessary correspondence between what man is inside and what is externally shown. “The Christian must show himself to be genuine, truthful, sincere in all that he undertakes.”22 “Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil” (Mt 5:37). Sincerity thus appears as a basic condition of all human and Christian actions.
Sincerity can also be described as the virtue that inclines man to say the truth in the right place, at the right time, and in the right way. This second definition is especially useful for determining which actions are sincere and which are not.
Sincerity resembles justice in its being directed toward another and in establishing a certain equality. But there is a difference in the reason for their acts, which, in justice, stem from a strict right, while in sincerity, there is only a moral right, based on honesty. Thus, lack of sincerity in itself does not violate a strict right of one’s neighbor, and does not require restitution. Sincerity is therefore said to be a potential part of justice.23
The virtue of simplicity could be reduced to sincerity. It inclines man to conform his external actions to his internal reality.24 Its contrary vice is duplicity, by which one manifests something different from what is being thought.
In a certain way, the virtue of fidelity also can be reduced to sincerity. Fidelity inclines one to fulfill what was pledged, in such a way that what is done corresponds to what was freely promised. One should not work out of enthusiasm, but love, duty, and self-denial. Sincerity, therefore, has the following manifestations:
· Love for the truth in words and in deeds
· Conformity of words and external actions with the internal thoughts, insofar as possible, according to the circumstances (Sincerity does not require revealing one’s thoughts always and in all places—at times, justice even requires their concealment)
· Faithful fulfillment of promises
Generally speaking, all the vices forbidden by the eighth commandment are opposed to sincerity. Lies and broken promises violate sincerity by defect; revealing secrets does so by excess. We will study some of these sins more in detail.
Lies
A lie can be defined as saying the opposite of what is being thought (locutio contra mentem).25 This definition also extends to writing and other external manifestations that convey thought (e.g., facial expressions and gestures).
Authors still dispute whether the intention of deceiving is an essential part of a lie. The different positions can be harmonized and summarized as follows: Lies always carry an implicit intention of deceiving. When the intention is explicit, the lie simply becomes more grievous.
Two other vices are associated with lies: simulation, which is showing with gestures and deeds something that is different from the reality, and hypocrisy, which is feigning good actions in order to be well thought of.
There are several kinds of lies. They can be classified according to the intention of the author and the effect of the lie:
· Jocular lies are those that are told merely to give amusement or pleasure, as a tall tale. There is no lie at all when the fiction is plain and patent. Thus, actors on the stage, novels, or fairy tales do not commit a sin.
· Profitable lies are said in order to gain some benefit. These should not be confused with the polite expressions that are used to avoid frictions in daily conversation, whether conventional or not. Everybody knows that, “He is busy at the moment,” may mean, “He doesn’t want to talk to you;” “I don’t know,” may also mean, “I don’t want to tell you,” “It’s none of your business,” or “I’m not at liberty to tell,” and so on.
· Harmful lies cause damage to the listener, such as giving the wrong time so that the other will miss the train. This term harmful lies is sometimes reserved for malicious lies that are meant only to harm another, without seeking any profit from it. In this case, the lie is more grievous.
Regarding the moral evil of lies, the following principles can be established:
· Every real lie is intrinsically evil, and no circumstance may make it licit (cf. Ex 23:1; Lv 19:11; Col 3:9; Prv 12:22; Sir 20:23–25). Lying is contrary to the natural purpose of language, natural human relationships, the good of the listener, and also the good of the liar himself, who may end up living in an unreal world of lies. Properly speaking, there is no such a thing as a “white lie.”
· Lying, as opposed to the virtue of sincerity, is a venial sin. But it is a mortal sin ex genere suo (admitting slight matter) if it also violates justice by causing injury, or religion by lying under oath, or other virtues by causing scandal.26
Secrets
We will consider here secret in the sense of knowing a hidden fact with the obligation of not revealing it.27 Secrets are usually classified into three groups:
i) A natural secret is a fact whose publication would be reasonably opposed by the concerned person.
ii) A promised secret is a fact that a person has promised to keep hidden but was already known before making the promise.
iii) An entrusted secret is a fact that was known only after having promised not to reveal it, and with that explicit condition. The promise may be explicit and private (“If you promise not to tell anybody, I’ll tell you a secret”), or implicit, because of one’s position. The latter is called silence of office, and applies to lawyers and doctors. In the case of confessors, it is called sacramental secret or seal of confession, and cannot be revealed under any circumstances.
Society has a right to information based on truth, freedom, and justice. One should practice moderation and discipline in the use of the social communications media. By the very nature of their profession, journalists have an obligation to serve the truth and not offend against charity in disseminating information. They should not stoop to defamation. Civil authorities should defend the rights of the individuals to their reputation and privacy. On the other hand, nothing can justify recourse to disinformation for manipulating public opinion through the media.28
Violation of Secrets
These are the principles governing the revelation of secrets:
· Generally speaking, prying into another’s secrets or private life is not lawful. It is licit when there is a just cause, provided that the means that are used are also just. Everyone should observe an appropriate reserve concerning people’s private lives. Those who are in charge of communications should maintain a fair balance between the requirements of the common good and respect for individual rights.
· In itself, a natural secret binds under grave sin.
· A promised secret binds under venial sin (unless it is also a natural secret). There is, however, a serious obligation if its revelation would cause serious harm.
· In itself, an entrusted secret binds under grave sin. The obligation is stricter than for natural secrets.
· As a general rule, we can say that the obligation to keep a secret is proportional to the damage its revelation would cause to common or private good.
Lawful Revelation of Secrets
A secret may be rightfully revealed in the following cases:
· It is urgently necessary for the common good.29 Thus, a doctor is bound to report a sickness that may cause an epidemic.
· The keeper of the secret needs it, provided that the evil to be avoided is considerable and greater than the harm that the revelation would cause to the concerned person. It must not jeopardize common good.30
· It is necessary for the welfare of a third party, who could otherwise suffer great harm. “The car this fellow is trying to sell you is a stolen car,” would be an example.
· It is necessary for the welfare of the person who told the secret, and whom it concerns. In this case, it is presumed that his opposition to the revelation is not reasonable. For example, if a person who told us that he is already married attempts to marry again, we can reveal it in order to prevent the bigamy.
Honor and its Violation
Here, we understand honor as the external recognition of someone’s excellence, which may be manifested in words, deeds, or other external signs.
The violation of honor is called contumely, which may be defined as unjustly dishonoring somebody in his presence. It is similar to what, in common language, is called insult or affront.
Contumely is in itself a mortal sin. It may be—and often is—venial because of imperfection of the act or the intention. The act is frequently imperfect because the offense is done in a fit of anger or passion. And there is often no real intention to offend, because the insult is not that serious or is said half-jokingly.
Contumely requires reparation, which must be public if the affront was public.
Reputation and its Violation
We can define reputation as the common opinion about the goodness of somebody.
Defamation means unjustly tarnishing another’s reputation. It is also called denigration, from denigrare, “to blacken.” Thus, any action that unjustly sullies or detracts from the reputation that somebody has enjoyed until then is defamation. If the defamation is done in the presence of the victim, there is a contumely as well.
The definition includes the term unjust, referring to the lack of just reasons that would make that action necessary. Thus, there is no defamation in revealing a hidden crime so that the culprit may be prosecuted.
Types of Defamation
When the defamation consists in revealing hidden but true defects, we have a simple defamation or detraction (from detrahere, “to withdraw from”).
If defamation involves a lie, by telling false defects or sins, we have a slander or calumny. Contrary to what the definitions might suggest, these two sins are quite similar, as we shall see.
The terms gossip and rumor-mongering are sometimes applied to one of these types of defamation and sometimes to both.
The Moral Evil of Defamation
Both kinds of defamation are mortal sins ex genere suo (admitting slight matter) against justice and charity. All persons are entitled to a good reputation, without which life becomes extremely difficult (cf. Prv 22:1; Sir 41:15).
It is plain that slander violates justice, but simple defamation is also contrary to justice. By definition, defamation implies that there is no just cause to reveal the neighbor’s defects, and without just cause, the detractor has no right at all to tarnish another’s good reputation, even if such is not deserved. The detractor infringes on the rights of God, who alone can judge. The hatred, grudges, and disputes that are caused by defamation also disturb the social order. Every offense committed against justice and truth entails the duty of reparation, even if its author has been forgiven.31
It is also plain that both kinds of defamation are contrary to charity. Even simple defamation causes an unnecessary damage.
Slander and simple defamation have the same effect: tarnishing another’s reputation. Therefore, their moral qualification is the same, at least when they are serious. The additional lie that is associated to slander is in itself a mere venial sin. The falsehood of the imputations, however, must be mentioned in Confession, since it greatly affects the manner of reparation.
The similarity of these sins does not mean that slander is unimportant. On the contrary, even the more minor of them, simple defamation, is seriously evil.
The kind of vice that is imputed—laziness, dishonesty—does not change the moral evil of defamation. The seriousness of the imputation, however, may change it: Charges of laziness are not the same as charges of adultery. Additional listeners do not mean additional sins; it is still one sin, but more serious.
Defamation is a mortal sin that can become venial if the act is not perfect or the matter is slight, that is, the damage caused is small. The seriousness of the sin depends on the following elements:
· The defamator: Imputations by a highly regarded person—like a cabinet minister—cause more harm than those of a superficial busybody whom no one takes seriously.
· The victim: A prominent person may receive more harm than an ordinary citizen.
· The audience: Whether there are many or few listeners and whether they are discreet or gossipers are important considerations.
· The motive of the defamation: In the case of a slander, the motive can never be good.
Revealing hidden faults may be lawful—and even obligatory—when demanded by the common good, the good of others, or the good of the offender. If is also lawful when the speaker needs it in order to defend himself.
Public crimes—those that are known to many people—should not be further spread without serious cause. Doing so is always an imperfection, serves no useful purpose, and often causes many evils. It is, besides, a sin against charity.
Cooperation in Defamation
The following people cooperate in defamation:
· Those who induce another to commit defamation (for example, by asking questions) commit a sin. If others are present, the one who induces is jointly liable to make reparation.
· Those who approvingly listen sin against charity and, in a certain way, against justice; they approve and rejoice in an injustice. Their sin is often venial, though, since they usually act out of curiosity rather than hatred of their neighbor.
· The superior who allows his subordinates to defame others is also guilty.
· Any private person who fails to prevent it without just cause commits a sin. Usually, the sin is only venial.
Rash Judgment
Rash judgment is the firm assent of the mind to the guilt of another without sufficient reason. Rash doubts, rash suspicions, and rash opinions belong to the same species, but are less grievous insofar as they are not so firm. Lacking any external effect, this sin does not require external reparation.
The rash judgment does not stem from the objective consideration of reality, but from ill will that moves the intellect to assent without sufficient evidence (cf. Eccl 10:3).32 Therein lies the evil of this sin. All rash judgments deserve the same moral qualification, since they all violate the same good: the right to good reputation (cf. Lk 6:37; Mt 7:1ff; Rom 2:1; Jas 2:4).
Strictly speaking, rash judgment is a mortal sin ex genere suo (admitting slight matter). It is a mortal sin when it is (1) perfectly deliberate, (2) without solid basis, and (3) about a serious sin. If the rash judgment is not externally manifested, it is seldom a mortal sin, since, in that case, the three conditions are difficult to meet.
Rash judgments and suspicions are not licit. But this does not imply that we are bound to hold others as positively good. We may foresee the damage that somebody could cause, and take measures to prevent it (e.g., lock the doors, install window bars).
Other Offenses against Truth
False witness and perjury are offenses against truth. When it is made publicly, a statement that is contrary to the truth takes on a particular gravity. In court, it becomes false witness. When it is under oath, it is perjury.
Flattery, adulation, or complaisance consists of words or attitudes that encourage and confirm another in malicious acts and perverse conduct. Adulation is a grave fault if it makes one an accomplice in another’s vices or grave sins. Neither the desire to be of service nor friendship justifies duplicitous speech. Adulation is a venial sin when it seeks only to be agreeable, avoid evil, meet a need, or obtain legitimate advantages.
Boasting or bragging can be an offense against truth if what is claimed is false. Another such sin is irony that is aimed at disparaging someone by maliciously caricaturing an aspect of his behavior or character.33
The Natural Meaning of Work
In the narrative of the creation of man, Sacred Scripture states that God said to himself: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth” (Gn 1:26). It goes on saying that God created man to his image and likeness, and gave him the explicit command to increase and multiply, filling the earth, subduing it and exercising his dominion over the rest of creation (cf. Gn 1:27–28).
From the very beginning, therefore, man appears as an image of God, both in his being and in his operation. Man is naturally similar to God in his spiritual intellect and will—the faculties that enable him to be lord and master of the creatures that God has placed at his service.
The second chapter of Genesis also describes the creation of man. The earth is said to be barren because “there was no man to till the ground” (Gn 2:5). God then shaped man out of the clay of the earth, breathed life into him, and placed him in a fertile paradise, which God had purposely prepared. Man was destined to enjoy the paradise, but not in a passive way: “The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it” (Gn 2:15). Man would enjoy the garden by working in it.
Man would till paradise with his hands, his intellect indicating what should be done, and his will commanding it. In other words, man would master and enjoy creation through the constant exercise of his physical powers under the direction of his mental powers.
The whole man, matter and spirit, thus cooperates with God in the government of the universe. Man humanizes material things by mastering them and using them for the purposes that are intended by God. Through his work, man participates in the power of God to the limited extent that is allowed by his created nature. He transforms what God created out of nothing and destined for him to enjoy through work. God’s government of the creatures is partially exercised through man’s action. This shows the greater perfection with which God endowed man: God acted as “a master who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.”34
Work is a magnificent reality, and it has been imposed on us as an inexorable law that, one way or another, binds everyone, even though some may try to seek exemption from it. Man’s duty to work is not a consequence of original sin, nor is it just a discovery of modern times. It is an indispensable means that God has entrusted to us here on earth. It is meant to fill out our days and make us sharers of God’s creative power. It enables us to earn our living and, at the same time, reap “the fruits of eternal life,” for “man is born to work as the birds are born to fly.”35
Man’s work has several functions that blend with the characteristic harmony of God’s plans. These functions can be summarized as follows:
· Humanizing the universe. Man projects his being in what he does; he leaves in his works the seal of his spirit. This humanization must respect the nature of the creatures; it consists in keeping and tilling, not in exploiting and destroying.
· Reaping a personal profit. This is twofold:
i) Personal support in its widest sense (food, clothing, and housing). This is included in Genesis’s simplified reference to food (cf. Gn 2:15ff).
ii) Development of one’s personality. Man has been created to master the earth. In so doing, he uses his energies according to the divine plan for creation and, consequently, according to the deepest aspirations that are engraved in his being.
· Helping others. This applies to material transformation and intellectual work (teaching, and other activities). The social aspect of work—its contribution to the common good—becomes all the more patent as society grows in complexity.
The Supernatural Meaning of Work
Grace does not destroy nature; it assumes, perfects, and elevates it. The same applies to work, a natural reality: The supernatural order assumes, perfects, and elevates all the natural functions of work. The last end of natural work, as of any human act, is the glory of God. This is assumed into its supernatural last end, and thus work becomes a means for supernaturally knowing, loving, and serving God.36
In this regard, the words of St. Josemaría Escrivá are especially enlightening. Men and women, he declares, “must sanctify themselves with their work, must sanctify their work and sanctify others through their work.”37 The correspondence between the natural and the supernatural ends is due to the elevation to the supernatural order, which conserves and uplifts the former. We can thus list the supernatural ends of work in parallel with the natural ones:
· Sanctifying the creatures—the temporal realities—through one’s work. While respecting their nature, these must be directed to God in the light of the supernatural last end.
· Sanctifying oneself through work.
· Sanctifying others. “As we work at our job, side by side with our colleagues, friends, and relatives, and sharing their interests, we can help them come closer to Christ.”38
Through revelation, we get to know about two capital events that have left their imprint on man’s work. The first is original sin. As part of the punishment for that sin, God cursed the earth: “Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread” (Gn 3:17–19). The sin-provoked curse on the earth makes work inefficient, arduous, and partly sterile, to the extent that things that are difficult and unpleasant are often called work.
The second great event is the redemption. Before his public life and his Passion and death, Christ wanted to devote many years to ordinary manual work, thus making it a redeeming activity (cf. Mt 13:54–55; Mk 6:3). God associated people to his work of redemption, making them co-redeemers. Human work, then, if done well and offered up to God, acquires a co-redeeming value. In addition, the strenuous effort that it often implies is suitable for being offered as expiation for sin.
Work as a Right and Duty
Work is a natural necessity for man.39 He needs it to support his life—material and spiritual, natural and supernatural—and to develop his personality. Consequently, man has a natural right to work. On the other hand, the duties of self-support, personality development, and contribution to the common good imply the duty of working.
The duty of contributing to the common good also requires a just reciprocation for the benefits that are received from others. Man receives spiritual and material benefits from his fellow men throughout childhood and even in adult life, since nobody is completely self-reliant. This debt must be repaid by contributing with his work to the common pool of goods, giving to his fellow men something equivalent to what he received and continues to receive from them (cf. 1 Thes 4:11; 2 Thes 3:6–14).
Because of all this, work is a universal duty. But, of course, this cannot be applied to any specific type of work, or only to manual work.
It follows from the above that everybody is bound to be competent in his own professional work. Any kind of work requires some technical skills that must be responsibly acquired and continually improved and updated. This obligation is easily forgotten during remote preparation, whose connection with the future work is less obvious.
Aside from technical preparation and dedication, the fulfillment of professional duties requires moral formation. Any professional must have the moral criteria that are needed to solve the specific problems that arise in his field. Doctors, druggists, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, businessmen, traders, judges, supervisors, taxicab drivers—all professionals have to face problems that are specific to their job. These are studied by the corresponding branch of deontology or professional ethics.
The Virtue of Industriousness
Industriousness can be defined as the virtue that inclines man to apply himself dutifully to work according to the dictates of right reason (human virtue) or of right reason enlightened by faith (supernatural virtue).
Since virtues are defined by their acts, the definition and its precise contents can be easily grasped from what has already been said about work.
Moral Problems of Work Organization
The primary function of work—though not the only or the most important one—is to provide for one’s support and other basic needs. This is achieved by ordering and transforming the material universe. This profitable activity is not carried out in isolation, but in society. Even the most rudimentary societies acquire a certain degree of internal differentiation, which ensures that the diverse tasks that are needed to obtain goods are distributed among their members. This gives rise to specialization and division of work. This phenomenon grows more evident as society becomes more complex. It has been present from the most remote antiquity, and is acquiring special characteristics in our own times.
A certain pattern of work division and organization may be more or less fortunate, from the point of view of efficiency and technical perfection. It may also be more or less satisfactory from the moral point of view. That these patterns often are technically and morally objectionable is attested by the extensive literature on the subject.
Profitable work is carried out by people in order to obtain goods for themselves and others. Any just work organization must first and foremost respect the rights of these persons. We cannot enter a detailed discussion, which would require a whole treatise. In a very succinct way we will try to outline the conditions for this organization to be just:
· The organizers—from the highest level down to individual enterprises—must respect the rights of both the workers and the beneficiaries of that work.
· Those who carry out the work—at all levels: businessmen, managers, technicians, supervisors, skilled and unskilled workers—must respect the rights of those who collaborate with them and of those who will benefit from their work.
The problems that stem from the division of labor became more pressing—or at least more widely known—at the onset of the industrial revolution. The Church reacted, issuing guidelines so that solutions could be found to eradicate the glaring socio-economic injustices stemming from industrialization.40 The Second Vatican Council has also treated this subject.41
Generally speaking, these Church documents focus on the problems that are caused by a division of labor that ignores the worker’s rights. More recently, John Paul II issued another document on this topic. He first studies the meaning of work in itself, going on afterwards with the consideration of its organization.42
Slavery
The seventh commandment forbids acts or enterprises that for any reason—selfish or ideological, commercial or totalitarian—lead to the enslavement of human beings, to their being bought, sold, and exchanged like merchandise, in blatant disregard for their personal dignity. It is a sin against the dignity of persons and their fundamental rights to reduce them by violence to their reproductive value or to a source of profit.43
Footnotes:
1. Cf. CCC, 2259–2283; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 66.
2. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; CCC, 2280–2283.
3. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 65, a. 1; CCC, 2292–2298; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 15.
4. Cf. DS 3722–23.
5. Cf. CCC, 2268–2269; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 9, 57; Catechism of the Council of Trent, 3.5.8.
6. Cf. CCC, 2270–2275; 57ff.
7. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 57.
8. Cf. CIC, 1398; DS 2134.
9. Cf. DS 1830.
10. Cf. CCC, 2292-2296; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 63.
11. Cf. CCC, 2288–2291; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 46, 47.
12. Cf. CCC, 2297–2298.
13. Cf. Ibid., 2263–2267; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 56.
14. Cf. GS, 79, 80; CCC, 2266, 2307–2317; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 10, 12, 17.
15. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1.
16. Cf. Ibid.
17. GS, 79.
18. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 3; DS 795; CCC, 2266; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 56.
19. Paul VI, Address of Dec. 8, 1976; cf. CCC, 2276–2279; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 64.
20. Cf. CCC, 2299–2301.
21. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 109, a. 3 ad 3; CCC, 2464–2513.
22. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 141.
23. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 109, a. 3.
24. Cf. Ibid., a. 2 ad 4.
25. Cf. CCC, 2482–2486.
26. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 110, a. 4.
27. Cf. CCC, 2488–2492.
28. Cf. Ibid., 2493–2499.
29. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 68, a. 1 ad 3.
30. Cf. Ibid., q. 70, a. 1 ad 2.
31. Cf. CCC, 2487.
32. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 60, a. 3.
33. Cf. CCC, 2476, 2480, 2481.
34. ST, I, q. 103, a. 6.
35. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 57.
36. Cf. CCC, 2427.
37. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Conversations with Msgr. Escrivá de Balaguer (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1968), 70.
38. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 264.
39. Cf. CCC, 2429–2433.
40. Cf. Leo XIII, Enc. Rerum Novarum; Pius XI, Enc. Quadragesimo Anno; John XXIII, Enc. Mater et Magistra; Paul VI, Enc. Populorum Progressio.
41. Cf. GS, 33.
42. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Laborem Exercens.
43. Cf. CCC, 2414.
Man has a useful or indirect ownership of his own body, but not absolute ownership. In other words, he owns his body under the Law of God (cf. Rom 14:7–8; Wis 16:13).1
Suicide is the voluntary taking of one’s life. Direct suicide, that is, directly wanted suicide caused by a free and deliberate action, is always a most grievous sin. Usually, there is no time to repent and ask forgiveness from God. It violates charity toward oneself and justice toward God and society.2
Suicide, when not caused by temporal or permanent mental derangement, is mainly due to lack of faith. Otherwise, the certitude of going to hell would surely check the suicidal impulse.
Euthanasia is an action or omission that of itself and by intention causes death with the purpose of eliminating suffering. It is equated to suicide when the individual concerned freely requests it.
Indirect suicide is not directly wanted, but is foreseen as a possible or certain consequence of a dangerous action. It is lawful only for a proportionately serious cause, as in a risky but necessary operation or in a legitimate war.
Organ transplants conform to the moral law and can be meritorious if the physical and psychological dangers and risks that are incurred by the donor are proportionate to the good that is sought for the recipient. Insofar as limbs and organs are parts of the whole body, they can be removed when the life or health of the whole body requires it.3 It cannot be done, however, for other immoral purposes, such as contraception.4 The moral qualification of mutilation is similar to that of suicide.
The Right to Life and Bodily Integrity
The right to life and bodily integrity is especially protected by the fifth commandment. It has many implications, which can be summed up in two principles:
i) The life of the innocent is inviolable. Thus, homicide, abortion, and euthanasia are illicit.
ii) The life of a guilty person can be taken only in case of legitimate self-defense, just war, or death penalty imposed by the legitimate authority.
We will study each of these cases separately.
Homicide
Homicide is the direct killing of an innocent person. It is called parricide when the victim is a close relative; this circumstance aggravates the crime.
It is never licit for anybody to directly kill an innocent person (cf. Ex 23:7; Gn 4:10).5
Nevertheless, an action or omission that is in itself indifferent, from which the unwanted death of an innocent may follow, can be justified for a proportionately serious cause. This is another instance of indirectly voluntary actions. For example, bombing a military target in time of war, which may cause innocent deaths, could be classified as such.
Abortion
Abortion is the expulsion from the womb of an immature, non-viable fetus.6 This immaturity determines the essential trait of abortion: the death of the fetus. Basically, there are two kinds of abortion:
i) Miscarriage, or spontaneous abortion, is due to causes that are beyond human control. We will not discuss it here since, being involuntary, it has no moral qualification.
ii) Induced abortion is due to voluntary and effective human intervention. It is sought as an end or as a means. In the first case, the main purpose is getting rid of the baby. The second seeks other effects, such as—in the so-called therapeutic abortion—the health of the mother.
The right to life does not come from the parents, society, nor any human authority; it comes directly from God. Therefore, nobody may dispose of another’s life, neither as an end nor as a means. Induced abortion is thus intrinsically evil, and must be qualified as homicide.
The direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral, even when it is performed as a means to a good end.7
In order to highlight its moral evil, ecclesiastical law expressly punishes abortion. All the participants, including the mother, automatically incur excommunication. The Magisterium of the Church has consistently condemned abortion throughout history, even when the exact moment of the fetus’s animation was being disputed.8
Respect for human life and radical condemnation of abortion as intrinsically evil is not an exclusive position of Catholics. All people of upright judgment share this view, which is based on what a person is and should be. In some persons, however, this moral stance has been obscured by the alleged negative consequences of rejecting abortion (medical, eugenic, economic, or social evils). All these false reasons violate the basic principle of human life: Life is sacred from the very first moment of conception. Moreover, life is a good of a higher nature than those alleged in defense of abortion.
An entirely different thing is indirect abortion, or indirectly provoked abortion. This is an unwanted and unavoidable consequence of a good action. It is foreseen, but not wanted—just tolerated. The good action must be necessary for reasons that are serious enough to balance the evil effect of abortion. The latter, we must insist, is never wanted and would be avoided if it were possible. Indirect abortion is another case of double effect, or indirectly voluntary, actions. It is lawful when all the conditions required in these cases are fulfilled.
Dueling
A duel is a fight between two or several persons in which the time, place, and weapons have been previously agreed upon. The latter are lethal or at least able to inflict serious wounds.
Duels are always illicit. In the past, duels were so common that the Church had to impose special penalties in order to curb them.9 Nowadays, dueling as a social custom is practically unheard of.
Respect for the Person and Scientific Research
Research or experimentation on the human being cannot legitimize acts that are in themselves contrary to the dignity of persons and to the moral law.10 The subject’s potential consent does not justify such acts. Organ transplants are not morally acceptable if the donor or those who legitimately speak for him have not given their informed consent. It is morally inadmissible to directly bring about the disabling mutilation or death of a human being, even in order to delay the death of other persons.
Respect for Health
Life and physical health are precious gifts that are entrusted to us by God.11 We must take reasonable care of them, taking into account the needs of others and the common good.
Concern for the health of its members requires that society help with the attainment of living conditions that allow them to grow and reach maturity: food and clothing, housing, health care, basic education, employment, and social assistance.
Though morality requires respect for the life of the body, it does not make it an absolute value. It rejects a neo-pagan notion that promotes the cult of the body.
As we shall see in the study of the virtue of temperance, one must avoid every kind of excess: the abuse of food, alcohol, tobacco, or medicine. The use of drugs, and endangering one’s own and others’ safety on the road, sea, or air by drunkenness or a love of speed are also grave offenses.
Respect for Bodily Integrity
Kidnapping and hostage taking are morally wrong. Terrorism is gravely against justice and charity. Torture is contrary to respect for the person and human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations that are performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.12
Sexual Offenses
As far as justice is concerned, sexually assaulting somebody against his will is morally wrong. The author of the violence is bound to make restitution for any resulting damage, as will be studied later under the virtue of temperance.
Homicide in Self-Defense
Self-defense is a natural right that can go as far as killing an unjust aggressor. One has the right and duty to protect oneself.13 However, it must be exercised with extreme caution, fulfilling all the conditions that are demanded by moral law. A violent and unjust aggressor who is attempting to inflict serious harm on others loses his right to life. The sad outcome of the death of the aggressor is attributable to the aggressor, because it is his action that brought it about. However, his death is still an evil and must be avoided by all possible and just means.
Among the conditions that are required for the lawful use of self-defense, the most important are the following:
· There must be an actual unjust aggression in the present. Suspicions or even threats of a future attack are not enough. Violence for a past aggression is not self-defense, but plain vengeance.
· There must be some proportion between the good to be protected and the damage that is caused to the aggressor.
· The damage that is caused must be limited to what is needed to avert the unjust attack.
War
Given the destructive power of modern arsenals, it is extremely difficult to justify the starting of a war. It is no longer a matter of military and civilian casualties in the belligerent countries; the whole of humanity could eventually be wiped out.14 The conditions for the legitimate authority to lawfully declare war (what the scholars call “ius ad bellum” or “war-decision law”) are as follows:
· There must be an extremely serious and just cause. In today’s international context, “just cause” includes the defense of freedom (especially religious freedom), and the defense of a minimum of order in international affairs.
· The contemplated action must be “proportionate” to the goal (or just cause) pursued; thus, the good to be accomplished must be greater than the evil that would be suffered if nothing were done. There should be a reasonable chance of success. All peaceful solutions must have been exhausted.15
· There must be rectitude of intention, that is, the avowed cause must not be a pretext for other hidden motives. This, among other things, precludes acts of vengeance or reprisal.16
Once started, war must be waged according to the established international agreements (i.e., the Geneva Convention) and the ius gentium. Generally speaking, the following criteria (what scholars call “ius in bello” or “war-conduct law) must be followed:
· War is not waged against private persons, but against a state or similar organization (like a terrorist network) as a public person; this is the “non-combatant immunity.”
· No more force than necessary should be used to vindicate the just cause; thus, there should be certain “proportionality” also in the means used. It is lawful to use all the means that are needed to crush the strength of the enemy, as long as these are not intrinsically evil.
“It is one thing,” says the Second Vatican Council, “to wage a war of self-defense; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties.”17
Capital Punishment
Catholic doctrine recognizes the right of the legitimate civil authorities to take the life of a criminal. This is part of their ordinary attributions, but it must be exercised only for very serious reasons and with due judicial process (cf. Rom 13:4).18 Thus, Sacred Scripture records that God established capital punishment among the people of Israel for certain crimes (cf. Ex 21:12–17; 22:18).
The Magisterium of the Church declares that capital punishment does not go against natural law, but is not a direct consequence of it either. It is rather a matter of convenience, which depends on the circumstances. Thus, in particular cases, Catholics may stand for or against the death penalty; it depends on their assessment of the particular cultural and social circumstances.
Nevertheless, if, in a certain society, the good effects of the death penalty—prevention of grievous crimes and preservation of peace and order—could be achieved by lesser penalties, capital punishment would become difficult to justify. This is the case in most countries of the world in the present age.
In any case, death penalty is lawful only when it is demanded by the common good and applied by the legitimate authority after a fair trial.
Euthanasia
Human life is sacred “up to the last moment of its natural existence in time.”19 The dignity with which God has invested life demands that all ordinary means be used to protect it in case of sickness or old age. No effort should be spared for fear of inconvenience or sacrifice.
Euthanasia—directly killing the aged, the terminally ill, or the crippled in order to end their sufferings or even to avoid expenses and inconveniences—is as illicit as any other homicide. It is murder when it is imposed on an unwilling or unconscious person by physicians, relatives, or legislators. Even voluntary omission of the logical and available means of protecting human life is illicit. Narcotics, analgesics, and other drugs that alleviate pain, however, are perfectly lawful, even if they indirectly shorten life. Furthermore, there is no obligation to use extraordinary artificial means to maintain vegetative life when there is no hope of recovery.
Respect for the Dead
The dying should be given attention and care to help them live their last moments in dignity and peace. They will be helped by the prayers of their relatives, who must see to it that the sick receive at the proper time the sacraments, which prepare them to meet the living God.
The bodies of the dead must be treated with respect and charity, in faith and hope of the Resurrection. The burial of the dead is a corporal work of mercy (cf. Tb 1:16–18); it honors the children of God, who are temples of the Holy Spirit.
Autopsies can be morally permitted for legal inquests or scientific research. The free gift of organs after death is legitimate.
The Church permits cremation provided that it does not demonstrate a denial of faith in the resurrection of the body.20
The Virtue of Sincerity
The Old Testament attests that God is the source of all truth; his word is truth; his Law is truth. Since God is “true,” the members of his people are called to live in the truth.
Sincerity, or truthfulness, is a virtue that inclines man to appear in his life and words as he really is.21 This definition highlights the necessary correspondence between what man is inside and what is externally shown. “The Christian must show himself to be genuine, truthful, sincere in all that he undertakes.”22 “Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil” (Mt 5:37). Sincerity thus appears as a basic condition of all human and Christian actions.
Sincerity can also be described as the virtue that inclines man to say the truth in the right place, at the right time, and in the right way. This second definition is especially useful for determining which actions are sincere and which are not.
Sincerity resembles justice in its being directed toward another and in establishing a certain equality. But there is a difference in the reason for their acts, which, in justice, stem from a strict right, while in sincerity, there is only a moral right, based on honesty. Thus, lack of sincerity in itself does not violate a strict right of one’s neighbor, and does not require restitution. Sincerity is therefore said to be a potential part of justice.23
The virtue of simplicity could be reduced to sincerity. It inclines man to conform his external actions to his internal reality.24 Its contrary vice is duplicity, by which one manifests something different from what is being thought.
In a certain way, the virtue of fidelity also can be reduced to sincerity. Fidelity inclines one to fulfill what was pledged, in such a way that what is done corresponds to what was freely promised. One should not work out of enthusiasm, but love, duty, and self-denial. Sincerity, therefore, has the following manifestations:
· Love for the truth in words and in deeds
· Conformity of words and external actions with the internal thoughts, insofar as possible, according to the circumstances (Sincerity does not require revealing one’s thoughts always and in all places—at times, justice even requires their concealment)
· Faithful fulfillment of promises
Generally speaking, all the vices forbidden by the eighth commandment are opposed to sincerity. Lies and broken promises violate sincerity by defect; revealing secrets does so by excess. We will study some of these sins more in detail.
Lies
A lie can be defined as saying the opposite of what is being thought (locutio contra mentem).25 This definition also extends to writing and other external manifestations that convey thought (e.g., facial expressions and gestures).
Authors still dispute whether the intention of deceiving is an essential part of a lie. The different positions can be harmonized and summarized as follows: Lies always carry an implicit intention of deceiving. When the intention is explicit, the lie simply becomes more grievous.
Two other vices are associated with lies: simulation, which is showing with gestures and deeds something that is different from the reality, and hypocrisy, which is feigning good actions in order to be well thought of.
There are several kinds of lies. They can be classified according to the intention of the author and the effect of the lie:
· Jocular lies are those that are told merely to give amusement or pleasure, as a tall tale. There is no lie at all when the fiction is plain and patent. Thus, actors on the stage, novels, or fairy tales do not commit a sin.
· Profitable lies are said in order to gain some benefit. These should not be confused with the polite expressions that are used to avoid frictions in daily conversation, whether conventional or not. Everybody knows that, “He is busy at the moment,” may mean, “He doesn’t want to talk to you;” “I don’t know,” may also mean, “I don’t want to tell you,” “It’s none of your business,” or “I’m not at liberty to tell,” and so on.
· Harmful lies cause damage to the listener, such as giving the wrong time so that the other will miss the train. This term harmful lies is sometimes reserved for malicious lies that are meant only to harm another, without seeking any profit from it. In this case, the lie is more grievous.
Regarding the moral evil of lies, the following principles can be established:
· Every real lie is intrinsically evil, and no circumstance may make it licit (cf. Ex 23:1; Lv 19:11; Col 3:9; Prv 12:22; Sir 20:23–25). Lying is contrary to the natural purpose of language, natural human relationships, the good of the listener, and also the good of the liar himself, who may end up living in an unreal world of lies. Properly speaking, there is no such a thing as a “white lie.”
· Lying, as opposed to the virtue of sincerity, is a venial sin. But it is a mortal sin ex genere suo (admitting slight matter) if it also violates justice by causing injury, or religion by lying under oath, or other virtues by causing scandal.26
Secrets
We will consider here secret in the sense of knowing a hidden fact with the obligation of not revealing it.27 Secrets are usually classified into three groups:
i) A natural secret is a fact whose publication would be reasonably opposed by the concerned person.
ii) A promised secret is a fact that a person has promised to keep hidden but was already known before making the promise.
iii) An entrusted secret is a fact that was known only after having promised not to reveal it, and with that explicit condition. The promise may be explicit and private (“If you promise not to tell anybody, I’ll tell you a secret”), or implicit, because of one’s position. The latter is called silence of office, and applies to lawyers and doctors. In the case of confessors, it is called sacramental secret or seal of confession, and cannot be revealed under any circumstances.
Society has a right to information based on truth, freedom, and justice. One should practice moderation and discipline in the use of the social communications media. By the very nature of their profession, journalists have an obligation to serve the truth and not offend against charity in disseminating information. They should not stoop to defamation. Civil authorities should defend the rights of the individuals to their reputation and privacy. On the other hand, nothing can justify recourse to disinformation for manipulating public opinion through the media.28
Violation of Secrets
These are the principles governing the revelation of secrets:
· Generally speaking, prying into another’s secrets or private life is not lawful. It is licit when there is a just cause, provided that the means that are used are also just. Everyone should observe an appropriate reserve concerning people’s private lives. Those who are in charge of communications should maintain a fair balance between the requirements of the common good and respect for individual rights.
· In itself, a natural secret binds under grave sin.
· A promised secret binds under venial sin (unless it is also a natural secret). There is, however, a serious obligation if its revelation would cause serious harm.
· In itself, an entrusted secret binds under grave sin. The obligation is stricter than for natural secrets.
· As a general rule, we can say that the obligation to keep a secret is proportional to the damage its revelation would cause to common or private good.
Lawful Revelation of Secrets
A secret may be rightfully revealed in the following cases:
· It is urgently necessary for the common good.29 Thus, a doctor is bound to report a sickness that may cause an epidemic.
· The keeper of the secret needs it, provided that the evil to be avoided is considerable and greater than the harm that the revelation would cause to the concerned person. It must not jeopardize common good.30
· It is necessary for the welfare of a third party, who could otherwise suffer great harm. “The car this fellow is trying to sell you is a stolen car,” would be an example.
· It is necessary for the welfare of the person who told the secret, and whom it concerns. In this case, it is presumed that his opposition to the revelation is not reasonable. For example, if a person who told us that he is already married attempts to marry again, we can reveal it in order to prevent the bigamy.
Honor and its Violation
Here, we understand honor as the external recognition of someone’s excellence, which may be manifested in words, deeds, or other external signs.
The violation of honor is called contumely, which may be defined as unjustly dishonoring somebody in his presence. It is similar to what, in common language, is called insult or affront.
Contumely is in itself a mortal sin. It may be—and often is—venial because of imperfection of the act or the intention. The act is frequently imperfect because the offense is done in a fit of anger or passion. And there is often no real intention to offend, because the insult is not that serious or is said half-jokingly.
Contumely requires reparation, which must be public if the affront was public.
Reputation and its Violation
We can define reputation as the common opinion about the goodness of somebody.
Defamation means unjustly tarnishing another’s reputation. It is also called denigration, from denigrare, “to blacken.” Thus, any action that unjustly sullies or detracts from the reputation that somebody has enjoyed until then is defamation. If the defamation is done in the presence of the victim, there is a contumely as well.
The definition includes the term unjust, referring to the lack of just reasons that would make that action necessary. Thus, there is no defamation in revealing a hidden crime so that the culprit may be prosecuted.
Types of Defamation
When the defamation consists in revealing hidden but true defects, we have a simple defamation or detraction (from detrahere, “to withdraw from”).
If defamation involves a lie, by telling false defects or sins, we have a slander or calumny. Contrary to what the definitions might suggest, these two sins are quite similar, as we shall see.
The terms gossip and rumor-mongering are sometimes applied to one of these types of defamation and sometimes to both.
The Moral Evil of Defamation
Both kinds of defamation are mortal sins ex genere suo (admitting slight matter) against justice and charity. All persons are entitled to a good reputation, without which life becomes extremely difficult (cf. Prv 22:1; Sir 41:15).
It is plain that slander violates justice, but simple defamation is also contrary to justice. By definition, defamation implies that there is no just cause to reveal the neighbor’s defects, and without just cause, the detractor has no right at all to tarnish another’s good reputation, even if such is not deserved. The detractor infringes on the rights of God, who alone can judge. The hatred, grudges, and disputes that are caused by defamation also disturb the social order. Every offense committed against justice and truth entails the duty of reparation, even if its author has been forgiven.31
It is also plain that both kinds of defamation are contrary to charity. Even simple defamation causes an unnecessary damage.
Slander and simple defamation have the same effect: tarnishing another’s reputation. Therefore, their moral qualification is the same, at least when they are serious. The additional lie that is associated to slander is in itself a mere venial sin. The falsehood of the imputations, however, must be mentioned in Confession, since it greatly affects the manner of reparation.
The similarity of these sins does not mean that slander is unimportant. On the contrary, even the more minor of them, simple defamation, is seriously evil.
The kind of vice that is imputed—laziness, dishonesty—does not change the moral evil of defamation. The seriousness of the imputation, however, may change it: Charges of laziness are not the same as charges of adultery. Additional listeners do not mean additional sins; it is still one sin, but more serious.
Defamation is a mortal sin that can become venial if the act is not perfect or the matter is slight, that is, the damage caused is small. The seriousness of the sin depends on the following elements:
· The defamator: Imputations by a highly regarded person—like a cabinet minister—cause more harm than those of a superficial busybody whom no one takes seriously.
· The victim: A prominent person may receive more harm than an ordinary citizen.
· The audience: Whether there are many or few listeners and whether they are discreet or gossipers are important considerations.
· The motive of the defamation: In the case of a slander, the motive can never be good.
Revealing hidden faults may be lawful—and even obligatory—when demanded by the common good, the good of others, or the good of the offender. If is also lawful when the speaker needs it in order to defend himself.
Public crimes—those that are known to many people—should not be further spread without serious cause. Doing so is always an imperfection, serves no useful purpose, and often causes many evils. It is, besides, a sin against charity.
Cooperation in Defamation
The following people cooperate in defamation:
· Those who induce another to commit defamation (for example, by asking questions) commit a sin. If others are present, the one who induces is jointly liable to make reparation.
· Those who approvingly listen sin against charity and, in a certain way, against justice; they approve and rejoice in an injustice. Their sin is often venial, though, since they usually act out of curiosity rather than hatred of their neighbor.
· The superior who allows his subordinates to defame others is also guilty.
· Any private person who fails to prevent it without just cause commits a sin. Usually, the sin is only venial.
Rash Judgment
Rash judgment is the firm assent of the mind to the guilt of another without sufficient reason. Rash doubts, rash suspicions, and rash opinions belong to the same species, but are less grievous insofar as they are not so firm. Lacking any external effect, this sin does not require external reparation.
The rash judgment does not stem from the objective consideration of reality, but from ill will that moves the intellect to assent without sufficient evidence (cf. Eccl 10:3).32 Therein lies the evil of this sin. All rash judgments deserve the same moral qualification, since they all violate the same good: the right to good reputation (cf. Lk 6:37; Mt 7:1ff; Rom 2:1; Jas 2:4).
Strictly speaking, rash judgment is a mortal sin ex genere suo (admitting slight matter). It is a mortal sin when it is (1) perfectly deliberate, (2) without solid basis, and (3) about a serious sin. If the rash judgment is not externally manifested, it is seldom a mortal sin, since, in that case, the three conditions are difficult to meet.
Rash judgments and suspicions are not licit. But this does not imply that we are bound to hold others as positively good. We may foresee the damage that somebody could cause, and take measures to prevent it (e.g., lock the doors, install window bars).
Other Offenses against Truth
False witness and perjury are offenses against truth. When it is made publicly, a statement that is contrary to the truth takes on a particular gravity. In court, it becomes false witness. When it is under oath, it is perjury.
Flattery, adulation, or complaisance consists of words or attitudes that encourage and confirm another in malicious acts and perverse conduct. Adulation is a grave fault if it makes one an accomplice in another’s vices or grave sins. Neither the desire to be of service nor friendship justifies duplicitous speech. Adulation is a venial sin when it seeks only to be agreeable, avoid evil, meet a need, or obtain legitimate advantages.
Boasting or bragging can be an offense against truth if what is claimed is false. Another such sin is irony that is aimed at disparaging someone by maliciously caricaturing an aspect of his behavior or character.33
The Natural Meaning of Work
In the narrative of the creation of man, Sacred Scripture states that God said to himself: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth” (Gn 1:26). It goes on saying that God created man to his image and likeness, and gave him the explicit command to increase and multiply, filling the earth, subduing it and exercising his dominion over the rest of creation (cf. Gn 1:27–28).
From the very beginning, therefore, man appears as an image of God, both in his being and in his operation. Man is naturally similar to God in his spiritual intellect and will—the faculties that enable him to be lord and master of the creatures that God has placed at his service.
The second chapter of Genesis also describes the creation of man. The earth is said to be barren because “there was no man to till the ground” (Gn 2:5). God then shaped man out of the clay of the earth, breathed life into him, and placed him in a fertile paradise, which God had purposely prepared. Man was destined to enjoy the paradise, but not in a passive way: “The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it” (Gn 2:15). Man would enjoy the garden by working in it.
Man would till paradise with his hands, his intellect indicating what should be done, and his will commanding it. In other words, man would master and enjoy creation through the constant exercise of his physical powers under the direction of his mental powers.
The whole man, matter and spirit, thus cooperates with God in the government of the universe. Man humanizes material things by mastering them and using them for the purposes that are intended by God. Through his work, man participates in the power of God to the limited extent that is allowed by his created nature. He transforms what God created out of nothing and destined for him to enjoy through work. God’s government of the creatures is partially exercised through man’s action. This shows the greater perfection with which God endowed man: God acted as “a master who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.”34
Work is a magnificent reality, and it has been imposed on us as an inexorable law that, one way or another, binds everyone, even though some may try to seek exemption from it. Man’s duty to work is not a consequence of original sin, nor is it just a discovery of modern times. It is an indispensable means that God has entrusted to us here on earth. It is meant to fill out our days and make us sharers of God’s creative power. It enables us to earn our living and, at the same time, reap “the fruits of eternal life,” for “man is born to work as the birds are born to fly.”35
Man’s work has several functions that blend with the characteristic harmony of God’s plans. These functions can be summarized as follows:
· Humanizing the universe. Man projects his being in what he does; he leaves in his works the seal of his spirit. This humanization must respect the nature of the creatures; it consists in keeping and tilling, not in exploiting and destroying.
· Reaping a personal profit. This is twofold:
i) Personal support in its widest sense (food, clothing, and housing). This is included in Genesis’s simplified reference to food (cf. Gn 2:15ff).
ii) Development of one’s personality. Man has been created to master the earth. In so doing, he uses his energies according to the divine plan for creation and, consequently, according to the deepest aspirations that are engraved in his being.
· Helping others. This applies to material transformation and intellectual work (teaching, and other activities). The social aspect of work—its contribution to the common good—becomes all the more patent as society grows in complexity.
The Supernatural Meaning of Work
Grace does not destroy nature; it assumes, perfects, and elevates it. The same applies to work, a natural reality: The supernatural order assumes, perfects, and elevates all the natural functions of work. The last end of natural work, as of any human act, is the glory of God. This is assumed into its supernatural last end, and thus work becomes a means for supernaturally knowing, loving, and serving God.36
In this regard, the words of St. Josemaría Escrivá are especially enlightening. Men and women, he declares, “must sanctify themselves with their work, must sanctify their work and sanctify others through their work.”37 The correspondence between the natural and the supernatural ends is due to the elevation to the supernatural order, which conserves and uplifts the former. We can thus list the supernatural ends of work in parallel with the natural ones:
· Sanctifying the creatures—the temporal realities—through one’s work. While respecting their nature, these must be directed to God in the light of the supernatural last end.
· Sanctifying oneself through work.
· Sanctifying others. “As we work at our job, side by side with our colleagues, friends, and relatives, and sharing their interests, we can help them come closer to Christ.”38
Through revelation, we get to know about two capital events that have left their imprint on man’s work. The first is original sin. As part of the punishment for that sin, God cursed the earth: “Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread” (Gn 3:17–19). The sin-provoked curse on the earth makes work inefficient, arduous, and partly sterile, to the extent that things that are difficult and unpleasant are often called work.
The second great event is the redemption. Before his public life and his Passion and death, Christ wanted to devote many years to ordinary manual work, thus making it a redeeming activity (cf. Mt 13:54–55; Mk 6:3). God associated people to his work of redemption, making them co-redeemers. Human work, then, if done well and offered up to God, acquires a co-redeeming value. In addition, the strenuous effort that it often implies is suitable for being offered as expiation for sin.
Work as a Right and Duty
Work is a natural necessity for man.39 He needs it to support his life—material and spiritual, natural and supernatural—and to develop his personality. Consequently, man has a natural right to work. On the other hand, the duties of self-support, personality development, and contribution to the common good imply the duty of working.
The duty of contributing to the common good also requires a just reciprocation for the benefits that are received from others. Man receives spiritual and material benefits from his fellow men throughout childhood and even in adult life, since nobody is completely self-reliant. This debt must be repaid by contributing with his work to the common pool of goods, giving to his fellow men something equivalent to what he received and continues to receive from them (cf. 1 Thes 4:11; 2 Thes 3:6–14).
Because of all this, work is a universal duty. But, of course, this cannot be applied to any specific type of work, or only to manual work.
It follows from the above that everybody is bound to be competent in his own professional work. Any kind of work requires some technical skills that must be responsibly acquired and continually improved and updated. This obligation is easily forgotten during remote preparation, whose connection with the future work is less obvious.
Aside from technical preparation and dedication, the fulfillment of professional duties requires moral formation. Any professional must have the moral criteria that are needed to solve the specific problems that arise in his field. Doctors, druggists, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, businessmen, traders, judges, supervisors, taxicab drivers—all professionals have to face problems that are specific to their job. These are studied by the corresponding branch of deontology or professional ethics.
The Virtue of Industriousness
Industriousness can be defined as the virtue that inclines man to apply himself dutifully to work according to the dictates of right reason (human virtue) or of right reason enlightened by faith (supernatural virtue).
Since virtues are defined by their acts, the definition and its precise contents can be easily grasped from what has already been said about work.
Moral Problems of Work Organization
The primary function of work—though not the only or the most important one—is to provide for one’s support and other basic needs. This is achieved by ordering and transforming the material universe. This profitable activity is not carried out in isolation, but in society. Even the most rudimentary societies acquire a certain degree of internal differentiation, which ensures that the diverse tasks that are needed to obtain goods are distributed among their members. This gives rise to specialization and division of work. This phenomenon grows more evident as society becomes more complex. It has been present from the most remote antiquity, and is acquiring special characteristics in our own times.
A certain pattern of work division and organization may be more or less fortunate, from the point of view of efficiency and technical perfection. It may also be more or less satisfactory from the moral point of view. That these patterns often are technically and morally objectionable is attested by the extensive literature on the subject.
Profitable work is carried out by people in order to obtain goods for themselves and others. Any just work organization must first and foremost respect the rights of these persons. We cannot enter a detailed discussion, which would require a whole treatise. In a very succinct way we will try to outline the conditions for this organization to be just:
· The organizers—from the highest level down to individual enterprises—must respect the rights of both the workers and the beneficiaries of that work.
· Those who carry out the work—at all levels: businessmen, managers, technicians, supervisors, skilled and unskilled workers—must respect the rights of those who collaborate with them and of those who will benefit from their work.
The problems that stem from the division of labor became more pressing—or at least more widely known—at the onset of the industrial revolution. The Church reacted, issuing guidelines so that solutions could be found to eradicate the glaring socio-economic injustices stemming from industrialization.40 The Second Vatican Council has also treated this subject.41
Generally speaking, these Church documents focus on the problems that are caused by a division of labor that ignores the worker’s rights. More recently, John Paul II issued another document on this topic. He first studies the meaning of work in itself, going on afterwards with the consideration of its organization.42
Slavery
The seventh commandment forbids acts or enterprises that for any reason—selfish or ideological, commercial or totalitarian—lead to the enslavement of human beings, to their being bought, sold, and exchanged like merchandise, in blatant disregard for their personal dignity. It is a sin against the dignity of persons and their fundamental rights to reduce them by violence to their reproductive value or to a source of profit.43
Footnotes:
1. Cf. CCC, 2259–2283; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 66.
2. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 5; CCC, 2280–2283.
3. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 65, a. 1; CCC, 2292–2298; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 15.
4. Cf. DS 3722–23.
5. Cf. CCC, 2268–2269; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 9, 57; Catechism of the Council of Trent, 3.5.8.
6. Cf. CCC, 2270–2275; 57ff.
7. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 57.
8. Cf. CIC, 1398; DS 2134.
9. Cf. DS 1830.
10. Cf. CCC, 2292-2296; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 63.
11. Cf. CCC, 2288–2291; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 46, 47.
12. Cf. CCC, 2297–2298.
13. Cf. Ibid., 2263–2267; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 56.
14. Cf. GS, 79, 80; CCC, 2266, 2307–2317; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 10, 12, 17.
15. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1.
16. Cf. Ibid.
17. GS, 79.
18. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 3; DS 795; CCC, 2266; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 56.
19. Paul VI, Address of Dec. 8, 1976; cf. CCC, 2276–2279; John Paul II, Enc. Evangelium Vitae, 64.
20. Cf. CCC, 2299–2301.
21. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 109, a. 3 ad 3; CCC, 2464–2513.
22. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 141.
23. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 109, a. 3.
24. Cf. Ibid., a. 2 ad 4.
25. Cf. CCC, 2482–2486.
26. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 110, a. 4.
27. Cf. CCC, 2488–2492.
28. Cf. Ibid., 2493–2499.
29. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 68, a. 1 ad 3.
30. Cf. Ibid., q. 70, a. 1 ad 2.
31. Cf. CCC, 2487.
32. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 60, a. 3.
33. Cf. CCC, 2476, 2480, 2481.
34. ST, I, q. 103, a. 6.
35. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 57.
36. Cf. CCC, 2427.
37. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Conversations with Msgr. Escrivá de Balaguer (Shannon, Ireland: Ecclesia Press, 1968), 70.
38. St. Josemaría Escrivá, Friends of God, 264.
39. Cf. CCC, 2429–2433.
40. Cf. Leo XIII, Enc. Rerum Novarum; Pius XI, Enc. Quadragesimo Anno; John XXIII, Enc. Mater et Magistra; Paul VI, Enc. Populorum Progressio.
41. Cf. GS, 33.
42. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Laborem Exercens.
43. Cf. CCC, 2414.