6. Good Acts and Virtues
Man performs human acts through his potencies. As we have seen, all acts proceed from the intellect and the will. When these potencies act repeatedly in a certain way, they acquire inclinations that will substantially influence successive acts. These inclinations are called habits. Habits caused by morally good actions are also good and are called virtues. Habits caused by bad actions are called vices. Supernatural good acts are also related to their corresponding habits, the supernatural virtues. But this relation is different and narrower, up to the point that, without supernatural habits, it would not be possible to perform supernatural acts.
In this chapter, we will study first the natural virtues, passing later to the more complex supernatural virtues.
43. Habits
A habit, in the sense used in our study, is a stable quality of a human faculty that enables man to act easily, promptly, and pleasantly. This stable quality modifies the faculty, giving it a disposition, inclination, or tendency to act in a certain way.
A pianist, for example, has a habitual disposition to read a musical score and translate it into nimble movements of his fingers on the keyboard. Obviously, this disposition is something real; only pianists have it, and it cannot be acquired or lost in a moment. In fact, its acquisition requires a long, persevering, painstaking, and intent repetition of suitable acts on the part of the pianist.
A faculty can acquire habits only when it is naturally oriented to produce different effects or the same effect in different ways. If a faculty is in itself directed to a single effect, it is already fully and exclusively inclined to that effect. We cannot talk about habits in this case; it would not make any sense. The intellect and the imagination, on the other hand, can acquire habits in the interpretation of eyesight input. They can concentrate on and give more weight to some details perceived by the eyes than to others.
Therefore, there are no habits in the vegetative faculties or the external senses. The faculties that can be modified by habits are, among others, the intellect, the will, the concupiscible appetite, and the irascible appetite.
44. Kinds of Habits
Some habits are inherent to our nature (habits a natura), like the natural inclination of the intellect to immediately accept the speculative general principles (“The whole is greater than any of its parts” and a few others), and the natural inclination of the will to want the good. These habits are natural in an especially strict sense. They are also called innate habits, since they accompany nature from its origin.
The other natural habits are acquired. These habits are acquired and perfected through the repetition of acts, and specifically of internal acts. These habits can, however, also diminish and be lost:
· by performing contrary acts, especially if these are intense and repeated,
· by halting the performance of the acts proper to the habit,
· accidentally, through the corruption of the organ executing them (for example, a hand injury or a brain tumor in the pianist).
Generally speaking (we will clarify the terms later), habits that improve the operation of a faculty are called virtues (from the Latin virtus, “strength”). Those preventing the improvement or actually impairing the operation are called vices (from the Latin vitium, “lack” or “fault”) or defects (from the Latin deficere, “to be deficient” or “not to achieve what one ought to be”). Vices will be studied, when necessary, under the virtues to which they are opposed.
We have been talking so far about operative habits, which inhere in a faculty. There are also entitative habits, stable qualities inhering not in a faculty, but in the nature itself, such as health or beauty in man. As we will see later, sanctifying grace is an entitative supernatural habit.
As a summary, the different habits can be classified as follows:
· According to their origin:
o Innate habits
o Acquired habits
o Infused habits (This is an advance of what will be studied in connection with the supernatural virtues; these habits are directly infused by God in man.)
· According to their goodness:
o Good habits
o Bad habits
· According to the subject in which they inhere:
o Operative habits, which inhere in a faculty
o Entitative habits, which inhere in the nature itself
45. Natural Virtues
A person is determined by his choices. A life full of morally good choices makes one an integrally good person, a person with a good character. The different aspects of such a person’s good character are called virtues.
A natural virtue can be defined as “a good habit of the mind which always inclines to do well.”1 Natural virtues are classified into intellectual virtues and moral virtues.
45a) Intellectual Virtues
Intellectual virtues produce specific inclinations in the human intellect in relation to the knowledge of the truth. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes five of them:2
i) Understanding: the inclination to know the first intellectual principles clearly and intimately
ii) Science: the inclination to relate effects to causes and to deduce logical conclusions from known principles
iii) Wisdom: the inclination to consider every object known in relation to its deepest cause
iv) Prudence: the inclination to pronounce the right judgment on the proper human behavior (recta ratio agibilium)
v) Art or technique: the inclination to find the best way of actually performing specific human actions (recta ratio factibilium), like playing the piano, carving a statue, pruning a tree, tuning up a car, or making a logical conclusion
These virtues incline the intellect to act properly, without errors, but they do not have direct moral implications. In themselves, they are not morally good but indifferent. Art and science can be used for good or evil. The same applies to the other intellectual virtues, with the exception of prudence in its most proper sense, which will be studied in the next section.
45b) Moral Virtues
Moral virtues refer to human behavior and are in themselves morally good. The moral virtues are the inclinations of the human faculties that tend toward the right behavior in what refers to the means to reach the objective last end.
In classical times, some pagan philosophers had already reduced them to four main virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. St Ambrose called them cardinal (fundamental) virtues, from cardo, “hinge.”3
These virtues refer to the most important moral subjects: the rule of reason (prudence), relations with others (justice), the control of irascible passions (fortitude), and of concupiscible passions (temperance). They respectively perfect the intellect, the will, the irascible appetite, and the concupiscible appetite. Prudence as a moral virtue adds to intellectual prudence the ordination to the objective last end, which implies an involvement of the will.
All the other moral virtues are related to these four in one way or another.
(1) Integral parts
The integral parts of a cardinal virtue (in the sense of “constitutive”) are those acts or inclinations that are required for a perfect act of that virtue. Thus, the ability to recall similar situations (experience) and the careful consideration of all circumstances (circumspection) are integral parts of the virtue of prudence.4
(2) Essential or subjective parts
The essential or subjective parts are the different species into which a cardinal virtue is subdivided according to the material division of its object. For example, the essential or subjective parts of prudence are prudence with regard to oneself (personal prudence) and prudence in the government of the community (political prudence). Political prudence may be further subdivided into military, economic, and legislative prudence, etc.5
(3) Potential parts
Potential parts of a cardinal virtue are annexed (derived) virtues that are concerned with secondary acts or secondary matters. Thus, good sense (synesis), which inclines to the right judgment about what is possible in practice, is a potential part of prudence; it resembles prudence, but still lacks something to be properly considered as prudence. Likewise, eubulia is a kind of derived prudence, the habit of seeking right counsel.6
It is important to keep this terminology in mind, because it is quite common in treatises of moral theology.
46. Properties of the Moral Virtues
We will concentrate on three properties that are common to all moral virtues.
46a) The Mean of Virtue
Virtue is found in the mean between two extremes; “In medio virtus.”
This well-known maxim is not very useful, though, since virtue is not a matter of finding a physical mean. If a man’s maximum intake of wine in a meal is four liters and the minimum is zero (extremes), virtue would not lie in drinking two liters (mean), but perhaps two glasses, or one, or none at all. Nevertheless, some people misunderstand the mean of virtue in this way, and stretch the extremes until they think they have justified their own position.
The mean we are referring to is a mean of reason, what reason considers as the right ordination to the end. Aristotle defined the mean of reason as what prudent persons consider, in a specific set of circumstances, as virtuous. Thus, the mean may at times be very close to one of the extremes, or even coincide with it.
There is no danger of exaggeration within a virtue. Strictly speaking, one cannot be too brave, or too steadfast. We can say, however, that virtue lies in the mean, between vices by excess and by defect. A courageous act is opposed both to a cowardly act (by defect in the action) and to a foolhardy act (by excess in the action). Steadfastness, similarly, is opposed both to stubbornness and to fickleness.
It should also be noted that, at times, deviations from a virtue in one direction are more common or dangerous than in the other. It is thus proper to stress one of these corruptions of virtue more than the other. Disobedience, for example, is much more common than servility; both are deviations of obedience but in opposite directions. In some countries, working too little is more common than working too much, both being habits opposed to the virtue of industriousness.
46b) The Moral Virtues are Interrelated
All moral virtues are interrelated. Their intimate connection is their union with the virtue of prudence, which governs them all, hence it is often called the “guide of the virtues” (auriga virtutum).
Therefore, if one virtue is perfectly possessed, all the others are perfectly possessed as well. And if one is not perfectly developed, the others cannot be perfectly developed either. A person cannot be perfectly just, for example, if he has the vice of lust.
46c) Some Virtues are More Important than Others
The cardinal virtues are the most important among moral virtues. Their order of importance is the same as the order in which they are usually listed: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Thus, prudence is the principal virtue because it governs the others. Although not included among the cardinal virtues, humility is also a main virtue, insofar as it is opposed to the main obstacle of moral life: pride.
According to their object, however, the most important of all moral virtues, cardinal or not, is religion, which is connected with justice. The object of religion is giving due worship to God.
47. Moral Virtues and Merit
When a person has acquired a virtue, good acts become easier, more pleasant, and more perfect.
Nevertheless, they are morally better, precisely because they are the result of a habitual inclination to good, which has been acquired with effort. It is not true that isolated acts, done without the help of the corresponding virtue, are more authentic and better because they are more spontaneous. They have only the will of the moment and lack the accumulated voluntariness of the efforts that went into acquiring the virtue.
48. Supernatural Virtues
In principle, what we have said so far applies to natural habits and virtues. Natural law morality and Christian morality involve the same principles: Pursuing authentic human goods through one’s human acts to reach the ideal of integral human fulfillment.
Immorality is an arbitrary selectivity in loving human goods and human persons. In contrast, moral goodness, rooted in the ideal of integral human fulfillment, means loving every possible instance of every basic human good in every person, just as God does.
As we already know, man has been elevated to the supernatural order. However, one cannot be a good Christian without being a decent human being. Thus, these natural principles and the norms derived from them are as relevant for Christians as for anyone else. Christian morality does not permit Christians to act contrary to the ideal of integral human fulfillment, to our responsibilities as humans (which are parallel to each one of the beatitudes and the corresponding virtues), or to the norms of natural law. Nevertheless, there are specifically Christian norms. As a result of faith, it occurs to Christians to do things that do not occur to people who lack faith: Christians are called, first, to cooperate in the redemptive act of Christ, and second, to accept their personal vocations.
God elevates man to the supernatural order through the infusion of sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace makes us children of God. It is a supernatural entitative habit, a supernatural manner of being, which inheres in our nature. It is therefore called habitual grace as well.
This supernatural entitative habit brings along operative habits that are also supernatural and inhere in the natural human powers. These are the supernatural or infused virtues, which are infused by God together with sanctifying grace (cf. Rom 5:5; 2 Tm 1:7). This is the only way for man to acquire them, for they, being supernatural, cannot be obtained through merely human efforts.
Supernatural virtues also differ from natural operative habits in another important aspect. Natural habits incline a natural power to perform with ease and perfection an act that the power could do on its own, but with more difficulty and less perfection. Supernatural virtues, on the other hand, radically enable the power to perform the corresponding supernatural act. Thus, faith enables the natural intellect to supernaturally assent to a truth. Without faith, the intellect could not give a supernatural assent, since it is a natural power that, by itself, can perform only natural acts.
Infused virtues do not make their corresponding acts easier or pleasant. This ease can be acquired extrinsically, as we will see later. But they do give an inclination or disposition, similar to the intellect’s inclination to the act of knowing.
As to the development of the infused virtues, Sacred Scripture attests that they can grow (cf. Rom 15:13; 2 Cor 10:14–15; Phil 1:9). They grow with sanctifying grace, to the extent that grace takes possession of the soul. In itself, repetition of acts, even of supernatural acts, cannot increase one’s infused virtues. Their growth, their greater or lesser insertion in the soul, is given by God.7 Indirectly, however, they can be promoted by the repetition of acts, whether natural or supernatural. This is due to the following reasons:
· The acts are meritorious. By meriting an increase of supernatural grace, they also merit an increase of the accompanying infused virtues.
· The acts facilitate the removal of the natural obstacles to the exercise of the infused virtues.
Infused virtues cannot diminish like the acquired virtues, since they are not acquired in the same way. Their natural capacity to remove obstacles may diminish, though. Infused virtues can be lost only through the loss of sanctifying grace, and then they are absolutely lost (with the exception of faith and hope). This happens when a mortal sin is committed (cf. 1 Cor 13:2; Jas 2:14).
It is thus important to realize that the term virtue is not univocally but analogically applied to natural and infused virtues.
49. Kinds of Supernatural Virtues
Supernatural virtues are classified into theological and moral virtues.
49a) Theological Virtues
Theological virtues have God himself for their direct object. There are three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.
i) Faith elevates the natural intellect in its speculative function, so that man can assent to the truths that are supernaturally revealed by God.8
ii) Hope elevates the natural will so that man can be confident that he will reach—with the help of God—his supernatural end, and that God will give him the necessary means to do so.
iii) Charity elevates the natural will so that man can love God above all things and his neighbor as himself, with a supernatural love.
Of these three, the most important is charity. Without it, the other two, if present at all, are formless or dead and are insufficient to reach the supernatural end (cf. 1 Cor 13:1–13).
The principle “In medio virtus” does not apply to the theological virtues, since it is not possible to properly sin against them by excess. They have God as their direct object, and one can never love God too much, believe in God too much, or hope in God too much. However, we also talk about sins by excess against these virtues, although here excess is taken in a specially improper sense. Thus, presumption (hoping to be saved without effort) and superstition are said to be vices opposed respectively to hope and faith by excess. It is clear, however, that these are not properly excesses of hope or faith.
49b) Supernatural Moral Virtues
The supernatural moral virtues incline man toward the means for reaching God supernaturally. Their objects are the same as those of the corresponding natural virtues. These virtues do not make acts easier, but do provide a radical capacity to perform the corresponding supernatural acts. The extrinsic facility to exercise a specific supernatural moral virtue comes from the corresponding natural virtue, insofar as it removes the natural obstacles for the exercise of the supernatural moral virtue.
Therefore, natural and supernatural moral virtues will be studied together. The only difference is that the acts of the natural virtues are directed by reason, while those of the supernatural virtues are directed by reason enlightened by faith (that is, right reason with all its natural knowledge, plus the truths revealed by God). We can thus say that, if the acts of natural virtues (also of the so-called human virtues) are done with a supernatural outlook, they are already acts of the corresponding supernatural virtue.
50. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are supernatural habits that God infuses in the soul together with sanctifying grace. They dispose the faculties of the soul to receive well the enlightenments (in the case of the intellect) and motions (in the case of the will) of the Holy Spirit.9
The gifts of the Holy Spirit differ from the infused virtues in the following points:
· The gifts dispose the subject to be moved by God, while the virtues dispose the faculties to be moved by reason enlightened by faith.
· The gifts move the subject more efficiently than the virtues do. Although not adopting a merely passive attitude, the subject can be said to be acted upon rather than to act.
· The virtues incline man to do what is necessary for salvation. The gifts dispose man to do not only what is necessary, but also what is merely advisable, and even heroic.
Virtues and gifts have the same object: the human acts that they direct. But the gifts are superior because of their motive or directive cause, which is the Holy Spirit himself through an actual grace. This actual grace is a supernatural motion coming from God. In the supernatural virtues, on the other hand, the moving cause is man through his will, although also aided by actual grace.
Authors of spiritual books sometimes compare the supernatural virtues to the oars of a boat, and the gifts to the sail. One can move the boat at will with the oars, but it goes slowly and requires effort. Under sail, the boat moves faster and without effort, but the wind must be blowing.
Sacred Scripture lists seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (cf. Is 11:2–3). Of these, three act on the will (fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord), while the other four (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) act on the intellect.10 The gifts are the following:
i) The gift of wisdom, which is the most important of the seven (cf. Ps 118:100).11 Through wisdom, the intellect is disposed to be easily moved by the Holy Spirit to the contemplation of divine truths, and to judge both divine and human affairs according to supernatural reasons. It is especially related to a supernatural outlook, and is based on charity.
ii) The gift of understanding, through which the intellect is disposed to probe deeply, under the action of the Holy Spirit, the theoretical and practical truths that are revealed by God. It reinforces the virtue of faith.
iii) The gift of counsel, by which the intellect is disposed, under the action of the Holy Spirit, to decide rightly on the specific acts to be done. It helps and perfects the virtue of prudence.
iv) The gift of fortitude, through which the will is disposed to be strengthened by the Holy Spirit with a special confidence that it will not succumb to any temporal evil, and thus be victorious at the end of the fight. It corresponds to the virtue of fortitude.
v) The gift of knowledge, through which the intellect, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, is disposed to (1) distinguish clearly what must be believed and what should not, (2) hold firmly that revelation does not contradict sound reason, and (3) in general, judge rightly about divine and human matters in relation to the supernatural end. It also perfects the virtue of faith.
vi) The gift of piety, through which the will is disposed to receive the motions of the Holy Spirit, to revere God as Father, and to love men as children of God. It corresponds to the virtue of justice.
vii) The gift of fear of the Lord, by which the will is prepared to receive the motions of the Holy Spirit so as to show due reverence for the majesty of God. This is not a servile fear, but a filial and reverential fear of the majesty of God, before whom the angels fall on their faces (cf. Rv 7:11). It corresponds to the virtue of temperance, because, like this virtue, it restrains the disorderly desire for pleasure and one’s own excellence.
Humility and docility to the inspirations of the Paraclete are virtues that are indispensable to develop the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
50a) The Fruits of the Holy Spirit
The fruits of the Holy Spirit are perfections that the Holy Spirit produces in those receptive to his presence. They are the outward fruits of the interior life, the external product of the indwelling Spirit. They are also pledges and harbingers of the eternal glory. They are charity, joy, peace, patience, long-suffering, goodness, kindness, mildness, fidelity, modesty, continence, and chastity (cf. Gal 5:22–23).12
51. Unity of Life
Human conduct is not a discordant accumulation of virtues and gifts. Christian life should be an open road for the person who—under the influence of grace—becomes increasingly united to God. This life is animated by charity (love of God) that gives life to all the other virtues. Thus, the Christian is “divinized” by committing to God all his actions and capabilities (hence the multiplicity of virtues and gifts), but all of these are united in that most fundamental operation that a person performs, which is to love God. The Christian seeks to please God in everything he does.
Moreover, there is a close connection between the practice of the supernatural virtues and ordinary work, between interior life and the perfection with which one must perform one’s own social and professional obligations. In sum, no one can say that he acts correctly and that he is good if he does not fulfill his professional duties; and no one fulfills them with perfection if he does not practice the virtues.13
Footnotes:
1. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 55, a. 4; cf. CCC, 1804.
2. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 57, aa. 2–4.
3. Cf. St. Ambrose, Expos. evang. sec. Luc., 1. 62; CCC, 1805–1811.
4. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 49, aa. 1, 7.
5. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 50.
6. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 51, a. 3.
7. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 24, a. 5, ad 3.
8. Cf. DS 3008; CCC, 1812–1828.
9. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 68, aa. 1–3; CCC, 1830–1832.
10. Cf. D.M. Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis, 446–453.
11. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 7.
12. Cf. CCC, 1832.
13. Cf. R. García de Haro, et al., La Vita Cristiana (Milan: Pontificia Universitá Lateranense, Ares, 1995), 511–513.
In this chapter, we will study first the natural virtues, passing later to the more complex supernatural virtues.
43. Habits
A habit, in the sense used in our study, is a stable quality of a human faculty that enables man to act easily, promptly, and pleasantly. This stable quality modifies the faculty, giving it a disposition, inclination, or tendency to act in a certain way.
A pianist, for example, has a habitual disposition to read a musical score and translate it into nimble movements of his fingers on the keyboard. Obviously, this disposition is something real; only pianists have it, and it cannot be acquired or lost in a moment. In fact, its acquisition requires a long, persevering, painstaking, and intent repetition of suitable acts on the part of the pianist.
A faculty can acquire habits only when it is naturally oriented to produce different effects or the same effect in different ways. If a faculty is in itself directed to a single effect, it is already fully and exclusively inclined to that effect. We cannot talk about habits in this case; it would not make any sense. The intellect and the imagination, on the other hand, can acquire habits in the interpretation of eyesight input. They can concentrate on and give more weight to some details perceived by the eyes than to others.
Therefore, there are no habits in the vegetative faculties or the external senses. The faculties that can be modified by habits are, among others, the intellect, the will, the concupiscible appetite, and the irascible appetite.
44. Kinds of Habits
Some habits are inherent to our nature (habits a natura), like the natural inclination of the intellect to immediately accept the speculative general principles (“The whole is greater than any of its parts” and a few others), and the natural inclination of the will to want the good. These habits are natural in an especially strict sense. They are also called innate habits, since they accompany nature from its origin.
The other natural habits are acquired. These habits are acquired and perfected through the repetition of acts, and specifically of internal acts. These habits can, however, also diminish and be lost:
· by performing contrary acts, especially if these are intense and repeated,
· by halting the performance of the acts proper to the habit,
· accidentally, through the corruption of the organ executing them (for example, a hand injury or a brain tumor in the pianist).
Generally speaking (we will clarify the terms later), habits that improve the operation of a faculty are called virtues (from the Latin virtus, “strength”). Those preventing the improvement or actually impairing the operation are called vices (from the Latin vitium, “lack” or “fault”) or defects (from the Latin deficere, “to be deficient” or “not to achieve what one ought to be”). Vices will be studied, when necessary, under the virtues to which they are opposed.
We have been talking so far about operative habits, which inhere in a faculty. There are also entitative habits, stable qualities inhering not in a faculty, but in the nature itself, such as health or beauty in man. As we will see later, sanctifying grace is an entitative supernatural habit.
As a summary, the different habits can be classified as follows:
· According to their origin:
o Innate habits
o Acquired habits
o Infused habits (This is an advance of what will be studied in connection with the supernatural virtues; these habits are directly infused by God in man.)
· According to their goodness:
o Good habits
o Bad habits
· According to the subject in which they inhere:
o Operative habits, which inhere in a faculty
o Entitative habits, which inhere in the nature itself
45. Natural Virtues
A person is determined by his choices. A life full of morally good choices makes one an integrally good person, a person with a good character. The different aspects of such a person’s good character are called virtues.
A natural virtue can be defined as “a good habit of the mind which always inclines to do well.”1 Natural virtues are classified into intellectual virtues and moral virtues.
45a) Intellectual Virtues
Intellectual virtues produce specific inclinations in the human intellect in relation to the knowledge of the truth. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes five of them:2
i) Understanding: the inclination to know the first intellectual principles clearly and intimately
ii) Science: the inclination to relate effects to causes and to deduce logical conclusions from known principles
iii) Wisdom: the inclination to consider every object known in relation to its deepest cause
iv) Prudence: the inclination to pronounce the right judgment on the proper human behavior (recta ratio agibilium)
v) Art or technique: the inclination to find the best way of actually performing specific human actions (recta ratio factibilium), like playing the piano, carving a statue, pruning a tree, tuning up a car, or making a logical conclusion
These virtues incline the intellect to act properly, without errors, but they do not have direct moral implications. In themselves, they are not morally good but indifferent. Art and science can be used for good or evil. The same applies to the other intellectual virtues, with the exception of prudence in its most proper sense, which will be studied in the next section.
45b) Moral Virtues
Moral virtues refer to human behavior and are in themselves morally good. The moral virtues are the inclinations of the human faculties that tend toward the right behavior in what refers to the means to reach the objective last end.
In classical times, some pagan philosophers had already reduced them to four main virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. St Ambrose called them cardinal (fundamental) virtues, from cardo, “hinge.”3
These virtues refer to the most important moral subjects: the rule of reason (prudence), relations with others (justice), the control of irascible passions (fortitude), and of concupiscible passions (temperance). They respectively perfect the intellect, the will, the irascible appetite, and the concupiscible appetite. Prudence as a moral virtue adds to intellectual prudence the ordination to the objective last end, which implies an involvement of the will.
All the other moral virtues are related to these four in one way or another.
(1) Integral parts
The integral parts of a cardinal virtue (in the sense of “constitutive”) are those acts or inclinations that are required for a perfect act of that virtue. Thus, the ability to recall similar situations (experience) and the careful consideration of all circumstances (circumspection) are integral parts of the virtue of prudence.4
(2) Essential or subjective parts
The essential or subjective parts are the different species into which a cardinal virtue is subdivided according to the material division of its object. For example, the essential or subjective parts of prudence are prudence with regard to oneself (personal prudence) and prudence in the government of the community (political prudence). Political prudence may be further subdivided into military, economic, and legislative prudence, etc.5
(3) Potential parts
Potential parts of a cardinal virtue are annexed (derived) virtues that are concerned with secondary acts or secondary matters. Thus, good sense (synesis), which inclines to the right judgment about what is possible in practice, is a potential part of prudence; it resembles prudence, but still lacks something to be properly considered as prudence. Likewise, eubulia is a kind of derived prudence, the habit of seeking right counsel.6
It is important to keep this terminology in mind, because it is quite common in treatises of moral theology.
46. Properties of the Moral Virtues
We will concentrate on three properties that are common to all moral virtues.
46a) The Mean of Virtue
Virtue is found in the mean between two extremes; “In medio virtus.”
This well-known maxim is not very useful, though, since virtue is not a matter of finding a physical mean. If a man’s maximum intake of wine in a meal is four liters and the minimum is zero (extremes), virtue would not lie in drinking two liters (mean), but perhaps two glasses, or one, or none at all. Nevertheless, some people misunderstand the mean of virtue in this way, and stretch the extremes until they think they have justified their own position.
The mean we are referring to is a mean of reason, what reason considers as the right ordination to the end. Aristotle defined the mean of reason as what prudent persons consider, in a specific set of circumstances, as virtuous. Thus, the mean may at times be very close to one of the extremes, or even coincide with it.
There is no danger of exaggeration within a virtue. Strictly speaking, one cannot be too brave, or too steadfast. We can say, however, that virtue lies in the mean, between vices by excess and by defect. A courageous act is opposed both to a cowardly act (by defect in the action) and to a foolhardy act (by excess in the action). Steadfastness, similarly, is opposed both to stubbornness and to fickleness.
It should also be noted that, at times, deviations from a virtue in one direction are more common or dangerous than in the other. It is thus proper to stress one of these corruptions of virtue more than the other. Disobedience, for example, is much more common than servility; both are deviations of obedience but in opposite directions. In some countries, working too little is more common than working too much, both being habits opposed to the virtue of industriousness.
46b) The Moral Virtues are Interrelated
All moral virtues are interrelated. Their intimate connection is their union with the virtue of prudence, which governs them all, hence it is often called the “guide of the virtues” (auriga virtutum).
Therefore, if one virtue is perfectly possessed, all the others are perfectly possessed as well. And if one is not perfectly developed, the others cannot be perfectly developed either. A person cannot be perfectly just, for example, if he has the vice of lust.
46c) Some Virtues are More Important than Others
The cardinal virtues are the most important among moral virtues. Their order of importance is the same as the order in which they are usually listed: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Thus, prudence is the principal virtue because it governs the others. Although not included among the cardinal virtues, humility is also a main virtue, insofar as it is opposed to the main obstacle of moral life: pride.
According to their object, however, the most important of all moral virtues, cardinal or not, is religion, which is connected with justice. The object of religion is giving due worship to God.
47. Moral Virtues and Merit
When a person has acquired a virtue, good acts become easier, more pleasant, and more perfect.
Nevertheless, they are morally better, precisely because they are the result of a habitual inclination to good, which has been acquired with effort. It is not true that isolated acts, done without the help of the corresponding virtue, are more authentic and better because they are more spontaneous. They have only the will of the moment and lack the accumulated voluntariness of the efforts that went into acquiring the virtue.
48. Supernatural Virtues
In principle, what we have said so far applies to natural habits and virtues. Natural law morality and Christian morality involve the same principles: Pursuing authentic human goods through one’s human acts to reach the ideal of integral human fulfillment.
Immorality is an arbitrary selectivity in loving human goods and human persons. In contrast, moral goodness, rooted in the ideal of integral human fulfillment, means loving every possible instance of every basic human good in every person, just as God does.
As we already know, man has been elevated to the supernatural order. However, one cannot be a good Christian without being a decent human being. Thus, these natural principles and the norms derived from them are as relevant for Christians as for anyone else. Christian morality does not permit Christians to act contrary to the ideal of integral human fulfillment, to our responsibilities as humans (which are parallel to each one of the beatitudes and the corresponding virtues), or to the norms of natural law. Nevertheless, there are specifically Christian norms. As a result of faith, it occurs to Christians to do things that do not occur to people who lack faith: Christians are called, first, to cooperate in the redemptive act of Christ, and second, to accept their personal vocations.
God elevates man to the supernatural order through the infusion of sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace makes us children of God. It is a supernatural entitative habit, a supernatural manner of being, which inheres in our nature. It is therefore called habitual grace as well.
This supernatural entitative habit brings along operative habits that are also supernatural and inhere in the natural human powers. These are the supernatural or infused virtues, which are infused by God together with sanctifying grace (cf. Rom 5:5; 2 Tm 1:7). This is the only way for man to acquire them, for they, being supernatural, cannot be obtained through merely human efforts.
Supernatural virtues also differ from natural operative habits in another important aspect. Natural habits incline a natural power to perform with ease and perfection an act that the power could do on its own, but with more difficulty and less perfection. Supernatural virtues, on the other hand, radically enable the power to perform the corresponding supernatural act. Thus, faith enables the natural intellect to supernaturally assent to a truth. Without faith, the intellect could not give a supernatural assent, since it is a natural power that, by itself, can perform only natural acts.
Infused virtues do not make their corresponding acts easier or pleasant. This ease can be acquired extrinsically, as we will see later. But they do give an inclination or disposition, similar to the intellect’s inclination to the act of knowing.
As to the development of the infused virtues, Sacred Scripture attests that they can grow (cf. Rom 15:13; 2 Cor 10:14–15; Phil 1:9). They grow with sanctifying grace, to the extent that grace takes possession of the soul. In itself, repetition of acts, even of supernatural acts, cannot increase one’s infused virtues. Their growth, their greater or lesser insertion in the soul, is given by God.7 Indirectly, however, they can be promoted by the repetition of acts, whether natural or supernatural. This is due to the following reasons:
· The acts are meritorious. By meriting an increase of supernatural grace, they also merit an increase of the accompanying infused virtues.
· The acts facilitate the removal of the natural obstacles to the exercise of the infused virtues.
Infused virtues cannot diminish like the acquired virtues, since they are not acquired in the same way. Their natural capacity to remove obstacles may diminish, though. Infused virtues can be lost only through the loss of sanctifying grace, and then they are absolutely lost (with the exception of faith and hope). This happens when a mortal sin is committed (cf. 1 Cor 13:2; Jas 2:14).
It is thus important to realize that the term virtue is not univocally but analogically applied to natural and infused virtues.
49. Kinds of Supernatural Virtues
Supernatural virtues are classified into theological and moral virtues.
49a) Theological Virtues
Theological virtues have God himself for their direct object. There are three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.
i) Faith elevates the natural intellect in its speculative function, so that man can assent to the truths that are supernaturally revealed by God.8
ii) Hope elevates the natural will so that man can be confident that he will reach—with the help of God—his supernatural end, and that God will give him the necessary means to do so.
iii) Charity elevates the natural will so that man can love God above all things and his neighbor as himself, with a supernatural love.
Of these three, the most important is charity. Without it, the other two, if present at all, are formless or dead and are insufficient to reach the supernatural end (cf. 1 Cor 13:1–13).
The principle “In medio virtus” does not apply to the theological virtues, since it is not possible to properly sin against them by excess. They have God as their direct object, and one can never love God too much, believe in God too much, or hope in God too much. However, we also talk about sins by excess against these virtues, although here excess is taken in a specially improper sense. Thus, presumption (hoping to be saved without effort) and superstition are said to be vices opposed respectively to hope and faith by excess. It is clear, however, that these are not properly excesses of hope or faith.
49b) Supernatural Moral Virtues
The supernatural moral virtues incline man toward the means for reaching God supernaturally. Their objects are the same as those of the corresponding natural virtues. These virtues do not make acts easier, but do provide a radical capacity to perform the corresponding supernatural acts. The extrinsic facility to exercise a specific supernatural moral virtue comes from the corresponding natural virtue, insofar as it removes the natural obstacles for the exercise of the supernatural moral virtue.
Therefore, natural and supernatural moral virtues will be studied together. The only difference is that the acts of the natural virtues are directed by reason, while those of the supernatural virtues are directed by reason enlightened by faith (that is, right reason with all its natural knowledge, plus the truths revealed by God). We can thus say that, if the acts of natural virtues (also of the so-called human virtues) are done with a supernatural outlook, they are already acts of the corresponding supernatural virtue.
50. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are supernatural habits that God infuses in the soul together with sanctifying grace. They dispose the faculties of the soul to receive well the enlightenments (in the case of the intellect) and motions (in the case of the will) of the Holy Spirit.9
The gifts of the Holy Spirit differ from the infused virtues in the following points:
· The gifts dispose the subject to be moved by God, while the virtues dispose the faculties to be moved by reason enlightened by faith.
· The gifts move the subject more efficiently than the virtues do. Although not adopting a merely passive attitude, the subject can be said to be acted upon rather than to act.
· The virtues incline man to do what is necessary for salvation. The gifts dispose man to do not only what is necessary, but also what is merely advisable, and even heroic.
Virtues and gifts have the same object: the human acts that they direct. But the gifts are superior because of their motive or directive cause, which is the Holy Spirit himself through an actual grace. This actual grace is a supernatural motion coming from God. In the supernatural virtues, on the other hand, the moving cause is man through his will, although also aided by actual grace.
Authors of spiritual books sometimes compare the supernatural virtues to the oars of a boat, and the gifts to the sail. One can move the boat at will with the oars, but it goes slowly and requires effort. Under sail, the boat moves faster and without effort, but the wind must be blowing.
Sacred Scripture lists seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (cf. Is 11:2–3). Of these, three act on the will (fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord), while the other four (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) act on the intellect.10 The gifts are the following:
i) The gift of wisdom, which is the most important of the seven (cf. Ps 118:100).11 Through wisdom, the intellect is disposed to be easily moved by the Holy Spirit to the contemplation of divine truths, and to judge both divine and human affairs according to supernatural reasons. It is especially related to a supernatural outlook, and is based on charity.
ii) The gift of understanding, through which the intellect is disposed to probe deeply, under the action of the Holy Spirit, the theoretical and practical truths that are revealed by God. It reinforces the virtue of faith.
iii) The gift of counsel, by which the intellect is disposed, under the action of the Holy Spirit, to decide rightly on the specific acts to be done. It helps and perfects the virtue of prudence.
iv) The gift of fortitude, through which the will is disposed to be strengthened by the Holy Spirit with a special confidence that it will not succumb to any temporal evil, and thus be victorious at the end of the fight. It corresponds to the virtue of fortitude.
v) The gift of knowledge, through which the intellect, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, is disposed to (1) distinguish clearly what must be believed and what should not, (2) hold firmly that revelation does not contradict sound reason, and (3) in general, judge rightly about divine and human matters in relation to the supernatural end. It also perfects the virtue of faith.
vi) The gift of piety, through which the will is disposed to receive the motions of the Holy Spirit, to revere God as Father, and to love men as children of God. It corresponds to the virtue of justice.
vii) The gift of fear of the Lord, by which the will is prepared to receive the motions of the Holy Spirit so as to show due reverence for the majesty of God. This is not a servile fear, but a filial and reverential fear of the majesty of God, before whom the angels fall on their faces (cf. Rv 7:11). It corresponds to the virtue of temperance, because, like this virtue, it restrains the disorderly desire for pleasure and one’s own excellence.
Humility and docility to the inspirations of the Paraclete are virtues that are indispensable to develop the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
50a) The Fruits of the Holy Spirit
The fruits of the Holy Spirit are perfections that the Holy Spirit produces in those receptive to his presence. They are the outward fruits of the interior life, the external product of the indwelling Spirit. They are also pledges and harbingers of the eternal glory. They are charity, joy, peace, patience, long-suffering, goodness, kindness, mildness, fidelity, modesty, continence, and chastity (cf. Gal 5:22–23).12
51. Unity of Life
Human conduct is not a discordant accumulation of virtues and gifts. Christian life should be an open road for the person who—under the influence of grace—becomes increasingly united to God. This life is animated by charity (love of God) that gives life to all the other virtues. Thus, the Christian is “divinized” by committing to God all his actions and capabilities (hence the multiplicity of virtues and gifts), but all of these are united in that most fundamental operation that a person performs, which is to love God. The Christian seeks to please God in everything he does.
Moreover, there is a close connection between the practice of the supernatural virtues and ordinary work, between interior life and the perfection with which one must perform one’s own social and professional obligations. In sum, no one can say that he acts correctly and that he is good if he does not fulfill his professional duties; and no one fulfills them with perfection if he does not practice the virtues.13
Footnotes:
1. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 55, a. 4; cf. CCC, 1804.
2. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 57, aa. 2–4.
3. Cf. St. Ambrose, Expos. evang. sec. Luc., 1. 62; CCC, 1805–1811.
4. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 49, aa. 1, 7.
5. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 50.
6. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 51, a. 3.
7. Cf. Ibid., II-II, q. 24, a. 5, ad 3.
8. Cf. DS 3008; CCC, 1812–1828.
9. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 68, aa. 1–3; CCC, 1830–1832.
10. Cf. D.M. Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis, 446–453.
11. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 7.
12. Cf. CCC, 1832.
13. Cf. R. García de Haro, et al., La Vita Cristiana (Milan: Pontificia Universitá Lateranense, Ares, 1995), 511–513.