4. The Morality of Human Acts
Morality and its Norms
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, he is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. The morality of a human act is its condition of being good or bad. An act is good or bad depending on whether or not it leads man to his last end—God—and therefore to his happiness.1 As we see, there is more in goodness than conforming to nature. The good also has to do with unfolding a person’s possibilities; it is not static but dynamic. Good signifies being and being more. Bad leads to being less and less.
To accomplish a good act, man makes use of his freedom to pursue an authentic good. This good is established as such by divine wisdom, which orders every being toward its end. This ordination that exists in God’s mind is called eternal law. Eternal law is known to us both by means of man’s natural reason (hence what man knows in this respect is called natural law), and through God’s supernatural revelation.
Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man’s true good and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person toward his ultimate end: God himself, the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect happiness.
The first question in the young man’s conversation with Jesus: “What good must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt 19:6) immediately shows the essential connection between the moral value of an act and man’s final end. Jesus, in his reply, confirms the young man’s conviction: the performance of good acts, commanded by the One who “alone is good,” are the indispensable condition of and the path to eternal blessedness; “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17).2
An act will lead to man’s true good and, ultimately, to his last end if it fulfills the following conditions, called norms of morality:
· It must be in agreement with eternal law (the supreme objective norm of morality).
· It must also agree with the norms derived from eternal law: natural law, divine positive law, and human laws (proximate objective norm of morality).
· These laws must be properly applied to the specific case through the judgment of reason called conscience (subjective norm of morality).
Moral norms are truths that guide us to act in ways that fulfill us, both as individuals and as persons living together in community. On account of these three norms, we can define morality as the conformity or non-conformity of the human act with the norms that determine its ordination to the last end.
Errors about Morality
Errors about morality stem from errors about God, the last end, the different laws, the sources of morality, and conscience. Some of these errors are:
· Epicureanism, which identifies the standard of morality with what leads to the attainment of pleasure,
· Social utilitarianism, a variation of the former, which identifies morality with the attainment of the maximum welfare for the greatest number of people,
· Stoicism, which identifies the standard of morality with right reason so that man must live in accord with right reason without any regard for personal happiness,
· Subjectivism, which, in its different varieties, reduces morality to the good intentions of the agent, judged by subjective criteria,
· The false conception of the fundamental option according to which, once the person has chosen a right “fundamental option” or orientation in his life, he would not be accountable for the mortal sins he commits, as long as he does not change his overall attitude,
· Consequentialism, which claims that the morality of an action depends exclusively on the foreseeable consequences resulting from the choice of action (a technical way of stating that the end can sometimes justify the means),
· Proportionalism, which maintains that the morality of an action can be measured solely by weighing the values and goods being sought by the doer and comparing them with the resulting bad effects (this theory focuses merely on the proportion acknowledged between the good and the bad effects of a given choice.3
The Sources of Morality
The agreement between the action and the norms of morality must take place at two levels. Since the goodness of an action lies in its ordination to the last end, two conditions are required for it to be good:
i) The act itself can be ordained to God.
ii) The will of the agent actually ordains it to God.
Thus the two principal elements of the act, the object and the intention of the agent (the end), must be ordained to the last end. The circumstances, though accidental to the action, must also be ordained to the last end, since they could also be important.
These three elements (object, intention, and circumstances) are called principles or sources of morality of human acts.4 The ordination of human actions to God depends on them, in accordance with the condition of created beings. If the three principles are good, the action is good, because it leads to God and makes the agent better.
The Object of the Action
In a human act, the will chooses a course of action—a moral object—to achieve an end. The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is what the action by its own nature tends to, independently of the intention of the agent and the circumstances that may accompany it.
The object is also called the intrinsic end or “end of the action”--finis operis. In order to avoid confusion with the end of the agent, the latter is also called the extrinsic end or “end of the agent”--finis operantis. We will refer to the former as object and to the latter as end or intention.
It is important to note that we are not referring to the physical object of the action, but to its moral object, insofar as it is subject to the above-mentioned norms of morality. Thus, the object of a robbery is not the stolen money or its transfer from one place to another, but its unjust appropriation.
Since the divine ordination is prior to its knowledge by human reason, human acts have an objective morality, which stems from their object. The objective rules of morality manifest the good or evil character of the object of the action; the agreement between these two (the rules of morality and the present object) is witnessed by the moral conscience of the individual. The morality of the object should be studied separately from the intention of the specific subject who accepts that divine ordination and applies it. Thus, the objective content of moral law must be studied by moral theology without judging the intentions of the subject.
“There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.”5 These actions are incapable of being ordered to God, because they contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are acts (i.e., moral objects) that the Church calls “intrinsically evil” (intrinsice malum); they are such always and per se on account of their very object, without considering the intentions of the doer or the circumstances.6
Therefore, the essential and primary morality of a human act stems from its moral object, and is called objective or substantial morality.
The object of a human act may be good (praying), bad (lying), or indifferent (taking a walk). Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that, besides considering the object in itself, we could also consider it in a subjective or formal way, as perceived by the subject. Thus, there is no offense to God when someone does something bad without realizing that it is bad. As we saw in connection with ignorance, it would not be a formal sin, but a merely material one, and therefore not imputable.7
The Intention of the Agent
The end intended by the agent (or intention) is the second most important source of morality. As we saw earlier, this end is always subordinated to the last end, whether or not the agent is aware of it. If the last end of the agent does not coincide, implicitly at least, with the objective last end (the glory of God, or from a subjective point of view, the attainment of one’s integral human fulfillment—everlasting happiness—in Jesus Christ), the action is vitiated and immoral. Every real action is carried out by an agent, and the agent always acts for a last end, either the objective last end or a different one. Therefore, although their objects may be indifferent, properly speaking there are no indifferent actions; all human actions are either good or bad.
Besides this ordination to the last end, if the action is really human, the agent gives it a conscious ordination to a more immediate end. The action is thus a means for that immediate end. For example, someone may lie in order to give a good impression, to save another person’s life, or to close a good business deal. This immediate end is what we call the end of the agent.
Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose. It can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the intention of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions.
The Fundamental Option
In a person’s life, there may be a fundamental choice that determines his moral life and engages his freedom on a radical level before God. This “fundamental option” is a result of the decision of faith—of the obedience of faith (cf. Rom 16:26)—by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to God, offering the full submission of intellect and will to God.8 This decision of faith—faith works through love (cf. Gal 5:6)—comes from the core of man, from his heart (cf. Rom 10:10), whence it is called to bear fruit in works (cf. Mt 12:33–35; Lk 6:43–45; Rom 8:5–10; Gal 5:22).
This option, which responds to Jesus’ call to “come, follow me,” marks the greatest possible exaltation of human freedom. We find a similar exaltation of human freedom in the words of St. Paul: “You were called to freedom, brethren” (Gal 5:13). But the Apostle immediately adds a grave warning: “Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh.” Thus, Scripture sees the “fundamental option” as a genuine choice of man’s freedom and profoundly links that choice to particular acts and particular choices of specific actions, through which man deliberately conforms himself to God’s will, wisdom, and law.
The “fundamental option” is revoked when man engages his freedom in a conscious decision to the contrary, in a morally grave matter. Even if his general orientation or “fundamental option” remains unchanged, man offends God with every freely committed mortal sin and, as a result, becomes guilty of the entire law (cf. Jas 2:8–11). Even if he perseveres in faith, he loses sanctifying grace, charity, and eternal happiness.9
It is, therefore, an error to reserve the moral assessment of a person to his “fundamental option” exclusively, thinking that his choice of particular actions—the everyday choices—are not to be considered good or evil.10
Object and Intention in the Morality of the Action
The morality of the object and the end (or intention) may not be the same. For example, someone could cheat a client (bad object) in order to pay his employees’ salaries (good intention), or send a gift (good object) in order to bribe an official (bad intention).
For a better understanding of how the morality of the object and the intention affect the morality of the action, we should keep in mind that, in every action, the agent chooses both the end and the means leading to it (object) in the same act of the will. In this single act of the will, we can distinguish two aspects: the volition of intention (the end sought), and the volition of choice (the means chosen to attain that end). The means chosen will determine the objective goodness or evil of the action, but the goodness of the action as a whole depends essentially on the intention and the means.
Therefore, there is a real distinction between the goodness coming from the object chosen by the will, insofar as it has been chosen, and that coming from the will’s intention toward the end. This explains why a good object can be wanted with an evil intention, or with different kinds of good intention. Thus, one may want to give alms out of charity, or out of merely human compassion, or out of vainglory. At the same time, we can see that the actions of the agent have only one moral goodness or evil, which depends both on the intention and on the means. The act of the will is only one, and is always either good or bad. Specifically, for that act of the will to be good, both the intention and the means must be good. If either of these two is bad, the act of the will is also bad.
The object chosen is the first condition for the morality of an act, and what essentially manifests it. The end is first in the intention, but last in the execution. Thus, what first manifests the intention of the agent and, therefore, the morality of the action, is the object chosen. It follows that:
· when the object chosen is in itself seemingly indifferent, a good or bad intention makes the action good or bad, respectively. Therefore, although, abstractly considered, the moral object may be indifferent, there are no indifferent actions for the individual;
· a good intention makes a good object better. If the object is bad, the action becomes less bad, but never completely good. Thus, it is never licit to do something bad for a good end. “The end does not justify the means”;
· a grievously evil intention makes a good object result in a bad action. A bad object becomes a worse action.
Multiple Effect Actions
Quite often, a single action produces several proximate effects, with different degrees of concatenation. Some may be good, some bad. We will study these actions in the light of the principles on the two primary sources of morality established above. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit the analysis to the case of one action with two effects, one good and one bad.
Three conditions are needed to make this action good. The first two refer, as in any action, to the goodness of the object and of the end, but with the complexity caused by the double effect.
i) The first and fundamental condition is that the object of the action considered in itself (finis operis) must be morally good or indifferent.
This is often the most difficult point to ascertain, since the action has two effects. The agent has to determine whether the proper object of the action is the good effect or the bad one. The object is good if the good effect is what follows necessarily and by itself from the action. The bad effect, on the other hand, should follow only accidentally (per accidens)—although at times it may be sure to follow—because of some circumstance that the agent cannot avoid.
In other words, the immediate effect of the action must be the good one. This is certainly not the case when the good effect is a consequence of the bad one. This would be akin to doing something bad for a good end, and we know that the end does not justify the means.
We should not forget that we are referring to the moral object, not to the physical object. Thus, to stab somebody is not “to push a knife” or “to introduce a foreign object into the organism.” It is “to kill” or “to wound.” In the same way, amputating a gangrenous leg in order to save the patient is not just “to amputate a limb,” but “to amputate a sick limb that threatens life.” Otherwise, the immediate effect of the operation—amputation—would be bad, and the good effect—health—would come later as a consequence. As we can see, the application of this principle is not always easy. We cannot apply it indiscriminately to any case without taking all factors into consideration.
ii) Second, the end (or intention) of the agent must also be good. Therefore, the agent must exclusively seek the good effect.
iii) Third, there must be a proportionately serious cause for doing that action and allowing the bad effect to happen. The seriousness of the cause is measured in relation to the importance of the good effect. It should be all the more serious:
· the more serious the indirectly caused evil,
· the closer the influence of the action in the bad effect,
· the more probable the bad effect,
· the greater the obligation, by reason of one’s office, to prevent the evil effect.
The opinion of prudent people and their behavior in similar cases are usually good guides to gauge whether there is a proportionate cause.
The following examples are illustrations of the application of these principles:
· A patient without hope of survival can be given a strong sedative to alleviate his pain, even if it will shorten his life. But he cannot be given a stronger, lethal dose of the same drug in order to cause his death and cut short his agony.
· One can undergo a necessary surgical operation even if sterility may result. But one cannot be sterilized to avoid serious complications or even death arising from a possible future pregnancy.
· One can enter into a risky investment in order to save a fledgling company, even if there is danger of sinking it deeper. But one cannot fraudulently declare bankruptcy, even if it is sure to save the company.
The Circumstances
Circumstances are the accidental moral conditions that contribute to increase or diminish the moral goodness or evil of an already existing action. They may also increase or decrease the responsibility of the person acting (as in the case of one acting out of fear of death).11
Not every physical circumstance is a moral circumstance. Thus, the malice of a blasphemy is the same whether it is said standing or sitting down. But being alone or with other persons would change it, because the others might be scandalized. The merit of alms does not change whether it is given by day or by night, but it will change depending on the effort required.
Moral circumstances are traditionally listed as follows:
· Who: a special quality of the agent; thus, a certain action would become worse if the agent has a special social responsibility
· What: the quality or quantity of the object; stealing a bar of soap is not the same as stealing a ton of soap
· Where: the quality of the place; for example, stealing inside a church
· With what means: for example, robbing by means of threats
· Why: not to be confused with the end of the agent—it refers to additional motives
· How: for example, robbery with personal injury
· When: the timing or duration; for example, hating somebody for a long or a short time
The circumstances influence the morality of the action, increasing (aggravating circumstances) or diminishing (mitigating circumstances) the goodness or evil of the action.
External Execution and its Effects
We will now study the influence of the external implementation and the effects following from it on the morality of the action. The actual implementation of an action decided by the will does not add anything to that decision, either good or bad. The external act does not have a volition of its own, separate from the decision of the will (cf. Gn 22:16; Mt 5:38; Mk 7:21ff).
Nevertheless, the external implementation can accidentally increase the goodness or evil of the action decided by the will—which does not mean that it is unimportant. This is due to the following reasons:
· The actual implementation manifests that the act of the will is intense.
· The duration of the decision increases, since it lasts until the action is completed.
· The implementation may require repeated acts of the will.
The effects of the action, whether necessary or accidental, affect the morality of the act insofar as they have been foreseen or willed. Their acceptance or volition indicate the quality of the inclination of the will.
Supernatural Human Acts
Habitual or sanctifying grace, already mentioned in connection with the supernatural last end, is a supernatural quality freely given by God, which inheres in the soul and truly makes us adopted children of God and partakers of the divine nature.
Good acts performed by those who have sanctifying grace—and hence the supernatural virtues that always accompany it—are supernatural acts.
One can perform good actions without grace, but these are not supernatural acts. Nor can man obtain grace through his own means alone, as we saw when we discussed the elevation of man to the supernatural order.12
Supernatural Merit of Human Acts
Merit is the quality of a good act by which it deserves a reward. Supernatural merit is the quality by which a supernatural act deserves a supernatural reward. A non-supernatural good action does not deserve this reward, but divine mercy may decide to grant it in some cases. Evil acts, on the other hand, warrant demerit and punishment.
In the case of perfect merit (de condigno), there is an equivalence between the value of the act and the reward. In this case, we can say that the reward is nearly a duty of justice, at least by virtue of the promise made. Thus, we can merit an increase of grace and eternal salvation by virtue of the Redemption achieved by Christ.
If merit is not due to that strict equivalence, but to a certain fittingness or to the liberality of the one who rewards, we have imperfect merit (de congruo). Thus, in the supernatural order, the graces one may win for another person are merited de congruo. There is a certain analogy between non-supernatural good actions and this type of merit.
For an act to have merit—assuming always the promise of God—the following conditions must be met:
· The act must be good and voluntary—otherwise it would not be a human act.
· The will must be informed by the supernatural habit of charity or, in other words, the soul must be informed by sanctifying grace. This is evident from what was said above. Actually, if man is in the state of grace, all good actions are supernatural and meritorious; if they are good, they are always informed by charity, at least in an implicit way.
· One can merit only during this life (in statu viatoris).
The degree of merit of an action depends on the greater or lesser charity possessed by the agent. It also depends on the intensity of the act of the will orienting the action to the supernatural end.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. CCC, 1749–1761.
2. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 72.
3. Cf. Ibid., 75.
4. Cf. CCC, 1750.
5. Ibid., 1761.
6. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 78–83.
7. Cf. CCC, 1735.
8. Cf. DV, 5.
9. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65–70; Ap. Ex. Reconciliatio et Poenitentia, 218–223.
10. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65.
11. Cf. CCC, 1754.
12. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 109, aa. 2, 3, 5, 6.
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, he is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. The morality of a human act is its condition of being good or bad. An act is good or bad depending on whether or not it leads man to his last end—God—and therefore to his happiness.1 As we see, there is more in goodness than conforming to nature. The good also has to do with unfolding a person’s possibilities; it is not static but dynamic. Good signifies being and being more. Bad leads to being less and less.
To accomplish a good act, man makes use of his freedom to pursue an authentic good. This good is established as such by divine wisdom, which orders every being toward its end. This ordination that exists in God’s mind is called eternal law. Eternal law is known to us both by means of man’s natural reason (hence what man knows in this respect is called natural law), and through God’s supernatural revelation.
Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man’s true good and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person toward his ultimate end: God himself, the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect happiness.
The first question in the young man’s conversation with Jesus: “What good must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt 19:6) immediately shows the essential connection between the moral value of an act and man’s final end. Jesus, in his reply, confirms the young man’s conviction: the performance of good acts, commanded by the One who “alone is good,” are the indispensable condition of and the path to eternal blessedness; “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17).2
An act will lead to man’s true good and, ultimately, to his last end if it fulfills the following conditions, called norms of morality:
· It must be in agreement with eternal law (the supreme objective norm of morality).
· It must also agree with the norms derived from eternal law: natural law, divine positive law, and human laws (proximate objective norm of morality).
· These laws must be properly applied to the specific case through the judgment of reason called conscience (subjective norm of morality).
Moral norms are truths that guide us to act in ways that fulfill us, both as individuals and as persons living together in community. On account of these three norms, we can define morality as the conformity or non-conformity of the human act with the norms that determine its ordination to the last end.
Errors about Morality
Errors about morality stem from errors about God, the last end, the different laws, the sources of morality, and conscience. Some of these errors are:
· Epicureanism, which identifies the standard of morality with what leads to the attainment of pleasure,
· Social utilitarianism, a variation of the former, which identifies morality with the attainment of the maximum welfare for the greatest number of people,
· Stoicism, which identifies the standard of morality with right reason so that man must live in accord with right reason without any regard for personal happiness,
· Subjectivism, which, in its different varieties, reduces morality to the good intentions of the agent, judged by subjective criteria,
· The false conception of the fundamental option according to which, once the person has chosen a right “fundamental option” or orientation in his life, he would not be accountable for the mortal sins he commits, as long as he does not change his overall attitude,
· Consequentialism, which claims that the morality of an action depends exclusively on the foreseeable consequences resulting from the choice of action (a technical way of stating that the end can sometimes justify the means),
· Proportionalism, which maintains that the morality of an action can be measured solely by weighing the values and goods being sought by the doer and comparing them with the resulting bad effects (this theory focuses merely on the proportion acknowledged between the good and the bad effects of a given choice.3
The Sources of Morality
The agreement between the action and the norms of morality must take place at two levels. Since the goodness of an action lies in its ordination to the last end, two conditions are required for it to be good:
i) The act itself can be ordained to God.
ii) The will of the agent actually ordains it to God.
Thus the two principal elements of the act, the object and the intention of the agent (the end), must be ordained to the last end. The circumstances, though accidental to the action, must also be ordained to the last end, since they could also be important.
These three elements (object, intention, and circumstances) are called principles or sources of morality of human acts.4 The ordination of human actions to God depends on them, in accordance with the condition of created beings. If the three principles are good, the action is good, because it leads to God and makes the agent better.
The Object of the Action
In a human act, the will chooses a course of action—a moral object—to achieve an end. The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is what the action by its own nature tends to, independently of the intention of the agent and the circumstances that may accompany it.
The object is also called the intrinsic end or “end of the action”--finis operis. In order to avoid confusion with the end of the agent, the latter is also called the extrinsic end or “end of the agent”--finis operantis. We will refer to the former as object and to the latter as end or intention.
It is important to note that we are not referring to the physical object of the action, but to its moral object, insofar as it is subject to the above-mentioned norms of morality. Thus, the object of a robbery is not the stolen money or its transfer from one place to another, but its unjust appropriation.
Since the divine ordination is prior to its knowledge by human reason, human acts have an objective morality, which stems from their object. The objective rules of morality manifest the good or evil character of the object of the action; the agreement between these two (the rules of morality and the present object) is witnessed by the moral conscience of the individual. The morality of the object should be studied separately from the intention of the specific subject who accepts that divine ordination and applies it. Thus, the objective content of moral law must be studied by moral theology without judging the intentions of the subject.
“There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.”5 These actions are incapable of being ordered to God, because they contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are acts (i.e., moral objects) that the Church calls “intrinsically evil” (intrinsice malum); they are such always and per se on account of their very object, without considering the intentions of the doer or the circumstances.6
Therefore, the essential and primary morality of a human act stems from its moral object, and is called objective or substantial morality.
The object of a human act may be good (praying), bad (lying), or indifferent (taking a walk). Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that, besides considering the object in itself, we could also consider it in a subjective or formal way, as perceived by the subject. Thus, there is no offense to God when someone does something bad without realizing that it is bad. As we saw in connection with ignorance, it would not be a formal sin, but a merely material one, and therefore not imputable.7
The Intention of the Agent
The end intended by the agent (or intention) is the second most important source of morality. As we saw earlier, this end is always subordinated to the last end, whether or not the agent is aware of it. If the last end of the agent does not coincide, implicitly at least, with the objective last end (the glory of God, or from a subjective point of view, the attainment of one’s integral human fulfillment—everlasting happiness—in Jesus Christ), the action is vitiated and immoral. Every real action is carried out by an agent, and the agent always acts for a last end, either the objective last end or a different one. Therefore, although their objects may be indifferent, properly speaking there are no indifferent actions; all human actions are either good or bad.
Besides this ordination to the last end, if the action is really human, the agent gives it a conscious ordination to a more immediate end. The action is thus a means for that immediate end. For example, someone may lie in order to give a good impression, to save another person’s life, or to close a good business deal. This immediate end is what we call the end of the agent.
Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose. It can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the intention of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions.
The Fundamental Option
In a person’s life, there may be a fundamental choice that determines his moral life and engages his freedom on a radical level before God. This “fundamental option” is a result of the decision of faith—of the obedience of faith (cf. Rom 16:26)—by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to God, offering the full submission of intellect and will to God.8 This decision of faith—faith works through love (cf. Gal 5:6)—comes from the core of man, from his heart (cf. Rom 10:10), whence it is called to bear fruit in works (cf. Mt 12:33–35; Lk 6:43–45; Rom 8:5–10; Gal 5:22).
This option, which responds to Jesus’ call to “come, follow me,” marks the greatest possible exaltation of human freedom. We find a similar exaltation of human freedom in the words of St. Paul: “You were called to freedom, brethren” (Gal 5:13). But the Apostle immediately adds a grave warning: “Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh.” Thus, Scripture sees the “fundamental option” as a genuine choice of man’s freedom and profoundly links that choice to particular acts and particular choices of specific actions, through which man deliberately conforms himself to God’s will, wisdom, and law.
The “fundamental option” is revoked when man engages his freedom in a conscious decision to the contrary, in a morally grave matter. Even if his general orientation or “fundamental option” remains unchanged, man offends God with every freely committed mortal sin and, as a result, becomes guilty of the entire law (cf. Jas 2:8–11). Even if he perseveres in faith, he loses sanctifying grace, charity, and eternal happiness.9
It is, therefore, an error to reserve the moral assessment of a person to his “fundamental option” exclusively, thinking that his choice of particular actions—the everyday choices—are not to be considered good or evil.10
Object and Intention in the Morality of the Action
The morality of the object and the end (or intention) may not be the same. For example, someone could cheat a client (bad object) in order to pay his employees’ salaries (good intention), or send a gift (good object) in order to bribe an official (bad intention).
For a better understanding of how the morality of the object and the intention affect the morality of the action, we should keep in mind that, in every action, the agent chooses both the end and the means leading to it (object) in the same act of the will. In this single act of the will, we can distinguish two aspects: the volition of intention (the end sought), and the volition of choice (the means chosen to attain that end). The means chosen will determine the objective goodness or evil of the action, but the goodness of the action as a whole depends essentially on the intention and the means.
Therefore, there is a real distinction between the goodness coming from the object chosen by the will, insofar as it has been chosen, and that coming from the will’s intention toward the end. This explains why a good object can be wanted with an evil intention, or with different kinds of good intention. Thus, one may want to give alms out of charity, or out of merely human compassion, or out of vainglory. At the same time, we can see that the actions of the agent have only one moral goodness or evil, which depends both on the intention and on the means. The act of the will is only one, and is always either good or bad. Specifically, for that act of the will to be good, both the intention and the means must be good. If either of these two is bad, the act of the will is also bad.
The object chosen is the first condition for the morality of an act, and what essentially manifests it. The end is first in the intention, but last in the execution. Thus, what first manifests the intention of the agent and, therefore, the morality of the action, is the object chosen. It follows that:
· when the object chosen is in itself seemingly indifferent, a good or bad intention makes the action good or bad, respectively. Therefore, although, abstractly considered, the moral object may be indifferent, there are no indifferent actions for the individual;
· a good intention makes a good object better. If the object is bad, the action becomes less bad, but never completely good. Thus, it is never licit to do something bad for a good end. “The end does not justify the means”;
· a grievously evil intention makes a good object result in a bad action. A bad object becomes a worse action.
Multiple Effect Actions
Quite often, a single action produces several proximate effects, with different degrees of concatenation. Some may be good, some bad. We will study these actions in the light of the principles on the two primary sources of morality established above. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit the analysis to the case of one action with two effects, one good and one bad.
Three conditions are needed to make this action good. The first two refer, as in any action, to the goodness of the object and of the end, but with the complexity caused by the double effect.
i) The first and fundamental condition is that the object of the action considered in itself (finis operis) must be morally good or indifferent.
This is often the most difficult point to ascertain, since the action has two effects. The agent has to determine whether the proper object of the action is the good effect or the bad one. The object is good if the good effect is what follows necessarily and by itself from the action. The bad effect, on the other hand, should follow only accidentally (per accidens)—although at times it may be sure to follow—because of some circumstance that the agent cannot avoid.
In other words, the immediate effect of the action must be the good one. This is certainly not the case when the good effect is a consequence of the bad one. This would be akin to doing something bad for a good end, and we know that the end does not justify the means.
We should not forget that we are referring to the moral object, not to the physical object. Thus, to stab somebody is not “to push a knife” or “to introduce a foreign object into the organism.” It is “to kill” or “to wound.” In the same way, amputating a gangrenous leg in order to save the patient is not just “to amputate a limb,” but “to amputate a sick limb that threatens life.” Otherwise, the immediate effect of the operation—amputation—would be bad, and the good effect—health—would come later as a consequence. As we can see, the application of this principle is not always easy. We cannot apply it indiscriminately to any case without taking all factors into consideration.
ii) Second, the end (or intention) of the agent must also be good. Therefore, the agent must exclusively seek the good effect.
iii) Third, there must be a proportionately serious cause for doing that action and allowing the bad effect to happen. The seriousness of the cause is measured in relation to the importance of the good effect. It should be all the more serious:
· the more serious the indirectly caused evil,
· the closer the influence of the action in the bad effect,
· the more probable the bad effect,
· the greater the obligation, by reason of one’s office, to prevent the evil effect.
The opinion of prudent people and their behavior in similar cases are usually good guides to gauge whether there is a proportionate cause.
The following examples are illustrations of the application of these principles:
· A patient without hope of survival can be given a strong sedative to alleviate his pain, even if it will shorten his life. But he cannot be given a stronger, lethal dose of the same drug in order to cause his death and cut short his agony.
· One can undergo a necessary surgical operation even if sterility may result. But one cannot be sterilized to avoid serious complications or even death arising from a possible future pregnancy.
· One can enter into a risky investment in order to save a fledgling company, even if there is danger of sinking it deeper. But one cannot fraudulently declare bankruptcy, even if it is sure to save the company.
The Circumstances
Circumstances are the accidental moral conditions that contribute to increase or diminish the moral goodness or evil of an already existing action. They may also increase or decrease the responsibility of the person acting (as in the case of one acting out of fear of death).11
Not every physical circumstance is a moral circumstance. Thus, the malice of a blasphemy is the same whether it is said standing or sitting down. But being alone or with other persons would change it, because the others might be scandalized. The merit of alms does not change whether it is given by day or by night, but it will change depending on the effort required.
Moral circumstances are traditionally listed as follows:
· Who: a special quality of the agent; thus, a certain action would become worse if the agent has a special social responsibility
· What: the quality or quantity of the object; stealing a bar of soap is not the same as stealing a ton of soap
· Where: the quality of the place; for example, stealing inside a church
· With what means: for example, robbing by means of threats
· Why: not to be confused with the end of the agent—it refers to additional motives
· How: for example, robbery with personal injury
· When: the timing or duration; for example, hating somebody for a long or a short time
The circumstances influence the morality of the action, increasing (aggravating circumstances) or diminishing (mitigating circumstances) the goodness or evil of the action.
External Execution and its Effects
We will now study the influence of the external implementation and the effects following from it on the morality of the action. The actual implementation of an action decided by the will does not add anything to that decision, either good or bad. The external act does not have a volition of its own, separate from the decision of the will (cf. Gn 22:16; Mt 5:38; Mk 7:21ff).
Nevertheless, the external implementation can accidentally increase the goodness or evil of the action decided by the will—which does not mean that it is unimportant. This is due to the following reasons:
· The actual implementation manifests that the act of the will is intense.
· The duration of the decision increases, since it lasts until the action is completed.
· The implementation may require repeated acts of the will.
The effects of the action, whether necessary or accidental, affect the morality of the act insofar as they have been foreseen or willed. Their acceptance or volition indicate the quality of the inclination of the will.
Supernatural Human Acts
Habitual or sanctifying grace, already mentioned in connection with the supernatural last end, is a supernatural quality freely given by God, which inheres in the soul and truly makes us adopted children of God and partakers of the divine nature.
Good acts performed by those who have sanctifying grace—and hence the supernatural virtues that always accompany it—are supernatural acts.
One can perform good actions without grace, but these are not supernatural acts. Nor can man obtain grace through his own means alone, as we saw when we discussed the elevation of man to the supernatural order.12
Supernatural Merit of Human Acts
Merit is the quality of a good act by which it deserves a reward. Supernatural merit is the quality by which a supernatural act deserves a supernatural reward. A non-supernatural good action does not deserve this reward, but divine mercy may decide to grant it in some cases. Evil acts, on the other hand, warrant demerit and punishment.
In the case of perfect merit (de condigno), there is an equivalence between the value of the act and the reward. In this case, we can say that the reward is nearly a duty of justice, at least by virtue of the promise made. Thus, we can merit an increase of grace and eternal salvation by virtue of the Redemption achieved by Christ.
If merit is not due to that strict equivalence, but to a certain fittingness or to the liberality of the one who rewards, we have imperfect merit (de congruo). Thus, in the supernatural order, the graces one may win for another person are merited de congruo. There is a certain analogy between non-supernatural good actions and this type of merit.
For an act to have merit—assuming always the promise of God—the following conditions must be met:
· The act must be good and voluntary—otherwise it would not be a human act.
· The will must be informed by the supernatural habit of charity or, in other words, the soul must be informed by sanctifying grace. This is evident from what was said above. Actually, if man is in the state of grace, all good actions are supernatural and meritorious; if they are good, they are always informed by charity, at least in an implicit way.
· One can merit only during this life (in statu viatoris).
The degree of merit of an action depends on the greater or lesser charity possessed by the agent. It also depends on the intensity of the act of the will orienting the action to the supernatural end.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. CCC, 1749–1761.
2. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 72.
3. Cf. Ibid., 75.
4. Cf. CCC, 1750.
5. Ibid., 1761.
6. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 78–83.
7. Cf. CCC, 1735.
8. Cf. DV, 5.
9. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65–70; Ap. Ex. Reconciliatio et Poenitentia, 218–223.
10. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65.
11. Cf. CCC, 1754.
12. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 109, aa. 2, 3, 5, 6.