3. Human Acts and Freedom
The second aspect of human dignity is that we are intelligent and free persons, capable of determining our own lives by our own free choices. We give this dignity to ourselves (with the help of God’s grace) by freely choosing to shape our lives and actions in accord with the truth; that is, by making good moral choices. Such choices are in turn dependent upon true moral judgments.1 These choices performed as free persons are called human acts.
16. The Structure of the Human Act
Human acts are those acts that man does as a man, that is, of which he is properly master because he does them with full knowledge and of his own will. Human acts are therefore those acts that proceed from a deliberate will.2 In them, the will is properly enlightened by the knowledge supplied by the intellect.
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When man acts in a deliberate manner, he is—so to speak—the father of his acts. Man is thus responsible for those acts; he can acknowledge that he has done them because he wanted to, and he can explain why he decided to do them. These acts can be morally classified; that is, they are either good or evil.
The intervention of the intellect and the will are not two successive acts, but two elements of every human act. It is not the intellect that knows and the will that decides, but man who both knows and decides, through the simultaneous use of his intellect and will. In a human act, the will directs the intellect to know, and the intellect directs the will to want the object that it proposes.
The only object that necessarily attracts the will is the Absolute Good, perfectly known as such. Partial goods, or even God himself imperfectly known, will not attract the will necessarily.
The will is naturally inclined to the good, but man may deliberately choose something that is morally bad. In this case, the will chooses a partial good that the will itself has commanded the intellect to present as such. Because of its fixed inclination to good, the will can choose something bad only when it is presented under its good aspects. This error of appreciation of the intellect is due to a disordered disposition of the will with respect to its last end, and the means leading to it; therein lies the culpability (guilt) of the choice.
17. Acts of Man
Acts of man, as opposed to human acts, are those acts that man performs without being master of them through his intellect and will.3 In principle, acts of man are not the concern of morals, since they are not voluntary. The acts of man include:
· The natural acts of vegetative and sense faculties: digestion, beating of the heart, growth, corporal reactions, and visual or auditive perceptions. However, these acts become human acts when performed under the direction of the will, as when we look at something, or arouse ourselves.
· Acts of persons who lack the use of reason. Such is the case with children or insane persons.
· Acts of people who are asleep or under the influence of hypnosis, alcohol, or other drugs. In this case, however, there may still be some degree of control by the will. Also, there is indirect responsibility if the cause of the loss of control is voluntary, as we shall see later.
· Quick, nearly automatic reactions, called primo-primi acts. These are reflex and nearly instantaneous reactions, such as withdrawing one’s hand after suffering an electric shock, in which the will does not have time to intervene.
· Acts performed under violence or threat of violence. This includes physical or—in some cases—moral violence.
18. Intrinsic Principles of the Human Act
The intrinsic principles of the human act, that is, the intrinsic causes that produce it, are the intellect and the will acting together.
We will now study how the volition of the will and the knowledge of the intellect should be present for the act to be properly human, that is, for man to be really the master of his act and, hence, fully responsible for it.
19. Freedom
God created man as a rational being and conferred on him the dignity of a person endowed with initiative and self dominion of his acts. God “left him in the power of his own inclination” (Sir 15:14) so that man would seek his Creator without coercion. By adhering to him, man could freely reach his full and happy perfection.4
19a) The Existence of Freedom
We must clarify that we refer here to internal or psychological freedom (the freedom to decide), not to external freedom (the freedom to carry out one’s decision). The latter presupposes the former, and would be meaningless without it. Besides, the latter can be easily impeded by external coercion or by lack of ability or means in the agent.
Internal freedom, or free will, exists when the decision of the will is not necessary and unavoidable.5 It consists in choosing the means for an end.6 This includes the freedom to choose between doing an action or not, and of choosing between two possible actions. The end can also be chosen as a means for an ulterior end. This is particularly clear in the case of large choices of a vocational nature. In deciding, for example, to be a lawyer or to get married, an individual sets out on a path that will demand innumerable choices before he reaches its end.
Obviously, there is a general consensus on the existence of free will; “otherwise, counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.”7 And there is consensus because free will does exist. This is proved by many scriptural texts (cf., for example, Sir 15:14–18). It has also been explicitly defined by the Council of Trent, condemning the error of Luther—who denied its existence—and reaffirmed by the recent Magisterium.8
Some people raise a theological objection to free choice: “God causes everything, including free choices; but if God causes choices, they can hardly be said to be free.” This would be quite true if God’s causality were like any other. In that case, it would be absurd to say that something is both created and free. But God’s causality is not like any other. As we do not understand what God is in himself, so we do not understand what it is for him to cause. The seeming contradiction arises from supposing that we understand how God causes, when in fact we do not.9
19b) Freedom and Truth
The foundation of freedom is the will, the spiritual appetite possessed by spiritual beings. In other words, the will is the appetite corresponding to the spiritual cognitive faculty of spiritual beings—the intellect. The intellect “apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good.”10 When the intellect presents to the will a good that is not clearly known as the supreme and Absolute Good, the will is free to choose it or not.
Hence, if man were purely matter, he would not be free. Choice would be merely the result of many complex, not-well-understood material forces. Internal freedom would be just an illusion. Some people maintain this in theory, but nobody does so in practice, as is shown by the widespread use of advice and exhortations.
Freedom implies knowledge; ignorance is an obstacle to the capacity to choose. Thus, freedom depends on truth. Even more, freedom makes man more capable of loving truth and growing in the knowledge of moral values. Truth is not the same as “opinion” or “one’s own judgment,” but rather an objective reality.11
19c) Freedom and Good
Evil can be wanted only by self-delusion, by deliberately seeing only the partial good aspects of that evil. It is thus obvious that the duty of not wanting evil is not a limitation of freedom. Freedom does not consist in the possibility of choosing evil. This possibility is just a sign of freedom and a consequence of the creature’s imperfection. As man does good, he becomes more free. There is no authentic freedom if it is not at the service of goodness and justice. Choosing disobedience to God and evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to the slavery of sin (cf. Rom 6:17).12 Freedom is not based on the “physical capability” of doing evil, but on the “moral duty” of choosing good.
20. Freedom and Voluntary Acts
A free act is always voluntary, since something is chosen through the will (voluntas), according to what the intellect—also led by the will—concludes and presents. However, in some voluntary acts, there is no choice and, according to the definition given above, no freedom either. Thus, God is not free to know and love himself or not; man is not free to want to be happy or not; the blessed who see God in heaven are not free to love him above all things or not. All these acts are intensely voluntary, and their not being free as regards freedom of choice does not imply any limitation of their freedom.
What happens is that, in the great majority of cases, freedom is a necessary condition for acts to be fully voluntary. Specifically, it is necessary as regards external freedom. In fact, because of its practical importance, people are usually concerned with, and talk about, external freedom. Internal freedom is usually taken for granted (even when its existence is denied). This may lead to confusing the terms free and voluntary if one does not realize that freedom is desirable only as a means to be able to do voluntary acts, which is what really matters.
It is not a limitation for God to be unable to choose evil, or to fail to love himself. Neither is it a limitation for man to be unable to want his unhappiness or to fail to love God above all things once in heaven. The strength of the voluntary act does not stem from the possibility of choice, which is often out of the question. The strength with which a mother says, “I love my child,” does not come from the fact that she could also choose not to love him.
Although, in common language, free act and voluntary act are often synonymous, the emphasis here is placed on voluntary rather than free. The importance that is usually ascribed to the concept of freedom corresponds rather to that of voluntariness.
This can also be clarified if by freedom we understand (rather than the choice itself) mastery over one’s acts: self-mastery and self-determination, which allow man to master himself and to act by himself.
20a) Freedom and Responsibility
Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. The way to acquire and develop one’s freedom is to make good use of responsibility.13
21. Freedom and God
Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of one’s own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately, for or against God.14
Because of their importance, we will review these same concepts in connection with the last end. We will now be in a position to understand them better.
Objectively speaking, man cannot select his last end; it is given to him by nature itself. Because of its imperfection, however, the human intellect can present as last end something different from God. This is a mistake, since it really means choosing to be unhappy; it is a culpable mistake and thus a sin. We could say that man is physically or psychologically free to choose or reject God, but morally free only to choose God. This moral limitation is not really a limitation, just as the duty of not choosing self-destruction is not a limitation.
Rejecting God as last end—either directly or through lesser but still serious concrete infractions—is tantamount to voluntarily taking the road to self-destruction. Thus, conceiving the moral norm as a limitation is an aberration; it is precisely our guide to the last end. It is accurate to consider freedom as the ability to choose God as last end and choose the means leading to him. The ability to reject God and choose evil, moreover, can be rightly defined as a defect of freedom, caused by the bent inclination of our will and made possible by the limitation of our intellect. In a certain sense, it can be said that what is proper to freedom is good actions.
Properly speaking, freedom can neither increase nor diminish. Either one can choose or one cannot.15 However, one may remove the obstacles to the exercise of the will, by fostering love for the truth, seeking to dispel ignorance, and striving to master one’s passions. This facilitates the exercise of the will and, in a sense, increases freedom. For the same reason, sin diminishes freedom.
A person who chooses a last end that is different from God is choosing something that is only relatively good. That partial good is absolutized precisely because of its relation to the person. Thus, the person is actually choosing himself as last end. This last end, loving oneself above all things, is ultimately a hopeless love; no creature is worthy of being thus loved. It is bound to end in frustration and even hatred of oneself.
Choosing God as last end means choosing the objective last end. This entails choosing to follow the norms leading to God, and choosing to obey his will and his laws. These norms are not arbitrary decrees, but elements of God’s wise plan, the observance of which provides for our full and authentic well-being. There is no incompatibility here between obedience and freedom, because one freely chooses to obey. The same can be said of one’s fidelity to freely acquired commitments; acquiring or being faithful to such commitments does not diminish freedom in the least.
God respects human freedom even when man refuses his plan of love and abuses the gift. God’s grace does not annul our freedom, but helps us to make better use of our freedom.
22. Freedom and Self-Determination
There is a profound way in which choice determines a person. In choosing, one both accomplishes and limits oneself. Self-determining choices make him to be the kind of person he is. Through the actions that a person freely chooses to do, he gives himself an identity, for weal or for woe. This is how we shape our lives.
Morality is indeed in the heart (cf. Mt 15:10–20; Mk 7:15–23; Lk 6:45); it resides in the goodness or badness of our choices, which are acts of inner self-determination. By choosing, one places oneself in a new relationship to human goods. Human goods here mean the basic, fundamental purposes on behalf of which human beings can act. In this sense, they constitute a kind of outline of human personhood, the sum total of what human beings are capable of becoming by their choices and actions.
As a result of one’s choice, one has a greater affinity for the good that one has chosen than for other goods that are not chosen. Having made certain large choices (fundamental options), we must follow them up by further choices to implement them. By choosing, I make myself.
Thus, if a person chooses to commit adultery, he makes himself to be an adulterer. Furthermore, choices last. He will remain what—or who—he has made himself by an act of self-determination (an adulterer) until he determines himself otherwise by another, radically contrary choice. Even if he repents, he will remain an adulterer, but now a repentant adulterer, one who has given to himself a newer identity, one who repudiates his former choice and wants—with God’s grace—to amend his life, and be a faithful spouse.16 Free choices are not merely particular events or physical processes, but spiritual realities that persist.
Free choices build not only persons, but also moral communities; that is, choice determines their identity. This applies to a family or married couple as well as to a political society or nation.17
23. Freedom and Law
In the Book of Genesis we read: “The Lord God commanded the man, ‘You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die’” (Gn 2:16–17).
Thus Revelation teaches that the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone. Man is certainly free, insofar as he can understand and accept God’s command. And he possesses an extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat “of every tree of the garden.” But this freedom is not unlimited; it must halt before the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil;” it must accept the moral law given by God. In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and complete fulfillment precisely in the acceptance of that law. God, who alone is good, knows perfectly what is good for man, and by virtue of his love proposes this good to man in the commandments.
God’s law does not reduce, much less does away with human freedom; rather, it protects and promotes that freedom.18
24. The Knowledge Required for a Human Act
The knowledge that is required for an act to be “human” extends to the act itself, to its consequences, and to the morality of both. The knowledge can be considered in itself (and then its opposite is ignorance), or as knowledge present in the action (its opposite then is inadvertence).
24a) Ignorance
Ignorance here refers both to erroneous knowledge (error) and to simple lack of knowledge.
The effect of ignorance in human actions can be seen in common expressions like: “I did not have enough data to decide” or “I didn’t know.” In both cases, the implication is that, because of ignorance, one could not do a responsible act, or that the act performed was not a responsible one.
Ignorance may refer to the fact (someone does not know that there is a gas leak in the room, and that lighting a match would cause an explosion), or to the law (somebody thinks that a marriage between non-Catholics can be dissolved, or that he should go to Mass on Monday if he was not able to go on Sunday).
For practical purposes, however, the most useful classification refers to the voluntariness of the ignorance. We can distinguish vincible, invincible, and concomitant ignorance.
(1) Invincible ignorance Invincible ignorance, or antecedent ignorance, is prior to any act of the will to which it refers, and, therefore, it is not under the control of the will. Objectively bad actions done with invincible ignorance are absolutely inculpable.19
(2) Vincible ignorance Vincible ignorance, or consequent ignorance, is posterior to a related act of the will and, therefore, is a direct or indirect consequence of it. It is thus called vincible because it is under the control of the will. There are three types:
i) Simple vincible ignorance. After having doubts about the lawfulness of the intended action, there is some negligence in solving the doubt, or there is a slight negligence in getting to know one’s obligations.
ii) Gross or extreme vincible ignorance. The negligence is serious. Vincible ignorance does not make the action morally involuntary, but it does diminish its voluntariness. Gross vincible ignorance, however, does not diminish the voluntariness enough for a mortal sin to be only venial.
iii) Affected ignorance. Vincible ignorance could also be explicitly wanted, so as not to forego an action in case it happens to be sinful (studied or affected ignorance). Far from excusing, this ignorance accuses the sinner; it stems from the bad will of the agent, who wishes to sin without qualms of conscience, or from his contempt of the law.
(3) Concomitant ignorance Concomitant ignorance (from comitari, “to accompany”) accompanies the action but does not influence it. It is the case of a person who steals a car unaware that it is needed to carry a sick person to the hospital, but who would steal it just the same if he knew. This kind of ignorance does not diminish the voluntariness of the action in any way.
24b) Inadvertence
Inadvertence can be better understood if we compare it with its opposite, advertence. Advertence is the necessary presence of knowledge in the human act. It is necessary because the will cannot move itself unless the light of the intellect is present in it. Forgetfulness is practically equivalent to inadvertence.
Advertence is actual if the light of the intellect is present in the action through an actual consideration of the mind. It is virtual if that light is present because of a previous consideration whose strength (virtus) remains in the action as it is performed. Thus, a priest may be distracted while he says the words of the absolution. Still, it is not the same as saying them in a dream; he actually wants to absolve, and, for this reason, he sat in the confessional.
Virtual advertence is enough for an act to be properly human. Many perfectly voluntary actions are done with virtual advertence. It is enough, for example, to turn a bad action into a sin, or for the valid administration of the sacraments (though, in the latter case, actual advertence would be much better).
Advertence is full if a person with the full use of his reason is completely aware of what he does. It is partial if he only partially realizes what he does or the morality of the act, as happens when one is half-awake.
Advertence is distinct if one is clearly and exactly aware of the act and of its morality. It is confused when the morality of the act is perceived only in an indistinct manner. For example, someone may realize that what he does is wrong without knowing clearly to what extent and which commandment he is violating.
25. The Volition Required for a Human Act
25a) Voluntary Acts
The voluntary act is the fruit of the decision of the will after being enlightened by the intellect. Consent is the will’s agreement to want the real or apparent good presented by the intellect.
The consent may be simple (voluntary simpliciter), if the object is wanted without any reservation, or qualified (voluntary secundum quid), if it is wanted with some repugnance, as a lesser evil. The latter would be the case of a person who decides to undergo surgery in order to save his life, or to join the army because otherwise he would go to jail for evading draft. This is still a voluntary act because to prefer something is to want something.
A voluntary act can be directly willed (direct voluntary act), when the act is wanted in itself in order to obtain a certain end. It can also be indirectly willed (voluntary in causa, or indirect voluntary), when the act is the effect of a directly wanted cause, but the effect is not explicitly wanted or is even rejected. This is the case of a person who eats a lot, but does not want to get fat; of a student who doesn’t study, but still doesn’t want to fail; of a person who uses illicit means to get a job, but doesn’t want to harm other applicants; or of an imprudent driver who doesn’t want to have an accident.
25b) Obstacles to the Decision of the Will
The decision of the will can be affected in different ways by several factors: physical violence, moral violence or fear, passions, habits, and some pathological states. We shall study each one in turn.
(1) Physical violence
An elicited act of a faculty is the act formally and immediately produced by that faculty. The act of wanting, for example, is elicited by the will. A commanded act is the act that a faculty orders another faculty to perform. The act of looking, for example, is ordered by the will and performed by the faculty of vision. With this, we can easily understand the following principles:
· Physical violence cannot affect the proper, elicited acts of the will, such as love or hatred; no one can want something without wanting it.
· Physical violence can affect the acts commanded by the will. A person can be made to perform, through external means, acts that are normally commanded by the will. Someone can be forced to shoot a gun against his will by having his finger involuntarily pushed against the trigger. More complex actions can be forced through more refined techniques. For example, the confession of a secret can be obtained through drugs. In theory, at least, it would be possible to force any act commanded by the will.
A forced act is not imputable to the extent that it does not proceed from the will. It would be imputable, however, if the will consents to a commanded act started under violence.
(2) Moral violence or fear
Besides physical violence, another kind of violence may force an action. Indirect pressure may be applied to make a person decide to perform an act, and so avoid the threat of a future or imminent evil. The disturbance caused by the threat of a future or imminent evil is called fear.
In principle, an action caused by fear continues to be voluntary, since it has been preferred to the evil threatened. To prefer is also to want. Nevertheless, it is evident that the action is much less voluntary than it would be without fear. In order to study this more in depth, we will consider the different degrees of fear.
· As regards its intensity, fear can be light or serious. Serious fear is caused by the threat of a serious evil. It can be absolutely serious if the evil is serious for everybody, like death. It can be relatively serious if the cause is light in itself, but because of the characteristics or situation of the person, it produces a serious fear. Such is the fear of a child of his parent’s anger when he receives poor grades, or of a person locked in a dark room with rats. Light fear is caused by the threat of a small evil, or of a serious but improbable evil.
· As regards its cause, fear is justly caused when the person threatening has the right to inflict that evil. For example, a creditor may threaten to sue the defaulting debtor in court. Someone may threaten to call the police when a neighbor plays music late at night. Fear is unjustly caused when the person threatening has no right to carry out the threat. For example, a creditor cannot threaten to spread calumnies or send poison letters.
· As regards its timing, we distinguish antecedent fear and concomitant fear. Antecedent fear precedes the action, which is accordingly done out of fear. Concomitant fear accompanies the action, as in the case of a thief who, while carrying out the theft, is afraid of being caught. Obviously, the latter does not influence the action, and no further mention of it will be made.
After these distinctions, we can establish the following principles:
· Antecedent fear makes the action involuntary if it is so intense that it prevents the use of reason. Otherwise, it only diminishes its voluntariness. He who prefers something wants it. This diminution would not be enough, for example, to make a mortal sin only venial.
· Positive laws, both human and divine, do not usually bind under serious fear. There is no obligation to fulfill them “at the cost of great hardship”--cum gravi incommodo. Still, they may oblige, in such circumstances as when the omission would cause a serious harm to the common good, God, the Church, or souls.
· Acts or contracts made under serious, unjustly caused fear are valid in themselves, because he who prefers wants. They are rescindable, though, because the victim has suffered an injustice, which can be repaired by making the act or contract void. In some cases, like vows, marriage, or ecclesiastical elections, positive law itself declares the acts invalid.
(3) Passions
The cognitive act of the intellect is followed by a volitive act of the spiritual appetitive faculty, the will. In the same way, sense perceptions presented by the imagination (sounds, visual images, or recollections) are followed by acts of the sense appetitive faculties. These are two: the concupiscible appetite (from concupiscere, “to desire”), which tends to the sensible good, and the irascible appetite, which aims at removing—violently, if necessary—the obstacles to the attainment of the good.
The acts of these sense appetites are called passions.20 The term passion indicates that the subject passively suffers it, being attracted by the object presented.21
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes eleven passions,22 that is, eleven possible types of acts of the two sense appetites:
i) Acts of the concupiscible appetite:
· Love (attraction toward a sensible good) and hate (aversion toward a sensible evil or, rather, privation of a sensible good)
· Desire (caused by the inclination to attain a sensible good), and aversion (disgust toward a sensible evil that is not yet suffered)
· Delight or joy (rest in the possession of a sensible good), and sadness (sorrow caused by the absence of a sensible good that has not been attained)
ii) Acts of the irascible appetite:
· Hope (caused by the knowledge of an absent good, difficult to obtain, but still achievable) and despair (when the same good is perceived as unattainable)
· Courage (rebellion against and rejection of a present sensible evil) and fear (uneasiness toward a future evil that is deemed unavoidable)
· Anger (prompting a wish to revenge a present sensible evil)
Passions are not inclinations or tendencies, but acts. They generally coincide with what we call feelings or emotions.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusions, we should keep in mind that the term passion is commonly used in a different sense, not that of Aristotle and St. Thomas, but that of Plato and the Stoics. In this latter sense, passions are acts, or even permanent inclinations, of the disordered sense appetites. We will have to rely on the context to identify which sense of the term is used. In philosophy and theology, passion is ordinarily used in the former sense.
The term concupiscence has several meanings as well:
· A specific passion: desire
· A synonym for passion in general
· A permanent evil inclination of either appetite—sensible or spiritual—caused by original sin
Passions, just like the senses, are necessary for human life. They are present in every person. Christ himself felt sadness, joy, and anger (cf. Mt 21:12; 26:37; Lk 19:41; 10:21). Passions prepare, accompany, and perfect the acts of the will in the same way as the acts of the sensible knowledge prepare and accompany those of intellectual knowledge. Although the will can direct itself to a singular sensible good without any previous movement of passion, passions facilitate the operation of the will. For example, a sick person who has lost his appetite has to exert a great effort to feed himself. The proper use of passions perfects the voluntary act, making it easier and more intense. This applies both to material and spiritual goods. Moral perfection requires that man be moved, not only by his will, but also by his sense appetite, according to the psalm, “My heart and flesh sing for joy to the living God” (Ps 84:2).23
Sense appetite is at the service of reason. Man can arouse or mitigate sense appetite through the will and through representations and images. Passions can foster or hinder the execution of good actions. Sadness, for example, may fetter a person and lead him to withdraw into himself. But it may also lead him to seek its causes and fight against them. Original sin, however, has introduced a disorder in the sense appetites that personal sins aggravate. Thus, passions can interfere with the exercise of reason and therefore with that of the will.
Adam’s sense appetite was perfectly subject to reason. After he rebelled against God with original sin, his reason was darkened and his appetites were left in disarray. In the present, wounded state of human nature, the appetites can tend to an object against the right order of reason, further darkening the latter. Instead of facilitating the right movement of the will, they can hinder it.
If man does not struggle, personal sins further this degradation of reason and will. Only grace and correspondence to it through ascetical struggle can enable man to recover dominion over his sense appetites. The disorder of the will against God caused the darkening of the intellect and the rebellion of the appetites. In the same way, union with the will of God through charity begets light in the intellect and order in the sense appetites.
It is thus easy to understand that sense appetites work in different ways in the just man and the sinner. Sanctity of life renews the harmony between the spiritual faculties of the soul and those based on matter—although never completely in this life. In a man who seeks sanctity, the sense appetites gradually become subject to reason. Conversely, in an unrepentant sinner, the disorder of the passions worsens, and they become more and more difficult to control.
Keeping this in mind, we will now see to what extent passions affect the voluntariness required for a human act.
· Antecedent passions: Feelings or passions can precede the decision of the will, thus diminishing the voluntariness of the human act. If they incline to evil acts, these are not as evil as when done without passion, and are called sins of weakness. Even then, these sins can be mortal.
· Consequent passions: Passions can also follow the act of the will. This may happen in three ways:
i) The will can provoke the passion in some way, although without seeking a posterior act. The passion would then be voluntary in its cause, and would increase the voluntariness of an eventual act insofar as the act is or should be foreseen.
ii) The will can arouse the passion in order to carry out the act with more energy (consequent passion per modum electionis), as when someone uses the imagination to arouse the desire of something, good or evil, in order attain it more easily. These passions increase the voluntariness of the action.
iii) The passion may also appear while the action is done (consequent passion per modum redundantiae): when the will decides something with energy, feelings usually accompany it. These feelings do not increase the voluntariness of the act, but are a sign of the intensity of the volition.
(4) Habits
Habits are permanent inclinations to act in a certain way.
Voluntary habits, that is, those caused by the repetition of voluntary acts, increase the voluntariness of the act, whether good or bad.
However, if the will is resolved to remove it and there is struggle, the habit becomes involuntary and diminishes the voluntariness of the acts.
(5) Pathological states
Some pathological states may diminish the voluntariness of an act. Such are obsessions and other psychological disorders.
Depending on their seriousness, these states can diminish the voluntariness of some or all actions. In extreme cases, they may even make them completely involuntary.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1994), 20.
2. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
3. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83; I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
4. Cf. CCC, 1730–1748.
5. Cf. ST, I, q. 19, a. 10; 1, q. 59, a. 3.
6. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83, a. 4.
7. Ibid., I, q. 83, a. 1.
8. Cf. DS 1555; CCC, 1730ff; John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor.
9. Cf. G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ.
10. ST, I, q. 59, a. 3.
11. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 32, 34, 84.
12. Cf. CCC, 1733.
13. Cf. Ibid., 1734.
14. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65.
15. Cf. ST, I, q. 83; q. 59, a. 3, ad 3.
16. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 29.
17. Cf. G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ.
18. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 35.
19. Cf. CCC, 1859–1860.
20. Cf. Ibid., 1762–1775.
21. Cf. ST, I, q. 83; q. 22, a. 1.
22. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83; q. 23, a. 4. St. Thomas later studies each passion in qq. 26–48.
23. Cf. CCC, 1770.
16. The Structure of the Human Act
Human acts are those acts that man does as a man, that is, of which he is properly master because he does them with full knowledge and of his own will. Human acts are therefore those acts that proceed from a deliberate will.2 In them, the will is properly enlightened by the knowledge supplied by the intellect.
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When man acts in a deliberate manner, he is—so to speak—the father of his acts. Man is thus responsible for those acts; he can acknowledge that he has done them because he wanted to, and he can explain why he decided to do them. These acts can be morally classified; that is, they are either good or evil.
The intervention of the intellect and the will are not two successive acts, but two elements of every human act. It is not the intellect that knows and the will that decides, but man who both knows and decides, through the simultaneous use of his intellect and will. In a human act, the will directs the intellect to know, and the intellect directs the will to want the object that it proposes.
The only object that necessarily attracts the will is the Absolute Good, perfectly known as such. Partial goods, or even God himself imperfectly known, will not attract the will necessarily.
The will is naturally inclined to the good, but man may deliberately choose something that is morally bad. In this case, the will chooses a partial good that the will itself has commanded the intellect to present as such. Because of its fixed inclination to good, the will can choose something bad only when it is presented under its good aspects. This error of appreciation of the intellect is due to a disordered disposition of the will with respect to its last end, and the means leading to it; therein lies the culpability (guilt) of the choice.
17. Acts of Man
Acts of man, as opposed to human acts, are those acts that man performs without being master of them through his intellect and will.3 In principle, acts of man are not the concern of morals, since they are not voluntary. The acts of man include:
· The natural acts of vegetative and sense faculties: digestion, beating of the heart, growth, corporal reactions, and visual or auditive perceptions. However, these acts become human acts when performed under the direction of the will, as when we look at something, or arouse ourselves.
· Acts of persons who lack the use of reason. Such is the case with children or insane persons.
· Acts of people who are asleep or under the influence of hypnosis, alcohol, or other drugs. In this case, however, there may still be some degree of control by the will. Also, there is indirect responsibility if the cause of the loss of control is voluntary, as we shall see later.
· Quick, nearly automatic reactions, called primo-primi acts. These are reflex and nearly instantaneous reactions, such as withdrawing one’s hand after suffering an electric shock, in which the will does not have time to intervene.
· Acts performed under violence or threat of violence. This includes physical or—in some cases—moral violence.
18. Intrinsic Principles of the Human Act
The intrinsic principles of the human act, that is, the intrinsic causes that produce it, are the intellect and the will acting together.
We will now study how the volition of the will and the knowledge of the intellect should be present for the act to be properly human, that is, for man to be really the master of his act and, hence, fully responsible for it.
19. Freedom
God created man as a rational being and conferred on him the dignity of a person endowed with initiative and self dominion of his acts. God “left him in the power of his own inclination” (Sir 15:14) so that man would seek his Creator without coercion. By adhering to him, man could freely reach his full and happy perfection.4
19a) The Existence of Freedom
We must clarify that we refer here to internal or psychological freedom (the freedom to decide), not to external freedom (the freedom to carry out one’s decision). The latter presupposes the former, and would be meaningless without it. Besides, the latter can be easily impeded by external coercion or by lack of ability or means in the agent.
Internal freedom, or free will, exists when the decision of the will is not necessary and unavoidable.5 It consists in choosing the means for an end.6 This includes the freedom to choose between doing an action or not, and of choosing between two possible actions. The end can also be chosen as a means for an ulterior end. This is particularly clear in the case of large choices of a vocational nature. In deciding, for example, to be a lawyer or to get married, an individual sets out on a path that will demand innumerable choices before he reaches its end.
Obviously, there is a general consensus on the existence of free will; “otherwise, counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.”7 And there is consensus because free will does exist. This is proved by many scriptural texts (cf., for example, Sir 15:14–18). It has also been explicitly defined by the Council of Trent, condemning the error of Luther—who denied its existence—and reaffirmed by the recent Magisterium.8
Some people raise a theological objection to free choice: “God causes everything, including free choices; but if God causes choices, they can hardly be said to be free.” This would be quite true if God’s causality were like any other. In that case, it would be absurd to say that something is both created and free. But God’s causality is not like any other. As we do not understand what God is in himself, so we do not understand what it is for him to cause. The seeming contradiction arises from supposing that we understand how God causes, when in fact we do not.9
19b) Freedom and Truth
The foundation of freedom is the will, the spiritual appetite possessed by spiritual beings. In other words, the will is the appetite corresponding to the spiritual cognitive faculty of spiritual beings—the intellect. The intellect “apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good.”10 When the intellect presents to the will a good that is not clearly known as the supreme and Absolute Good, the will is free to choose it or not.
Hence, if man were purely matter, he would not be free. Choice would be merely the result of many complex, not-well-understood material forces. Internal freedom would be just an illusion. Some people maintain this in theory, but nobody does so in practice, as is shown by the widespread use of advice and exhortations.
Freedom implies knowledge; ignorance is an obstacle to the capacity to choose. Thus, freedom depends on truth. Even more, freedom makes man more capable of loving truth and growing in the knowledge of moral values. Truth is not the same as “opinion” or “one’s own judgment,” but rather an objective reality.11
19c) Freedom and Good
Evil can be wanted only by self-delusion, by deliberately seeing only the partial good aspects of that evil. It is thus obvious that the duty of not wanting evil is not a limitation of freedom. Freedom does not consist in the possibility of choosing evil. This possibility is just a sign of freedom and a consequence of the creature’s imperfection. As man does good, he becomes more free. There is no authentic freedom if it is not at the service of goodness and justice. Choosing disobedience to God and evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to the slavery of sin (cf. Rom 6:17).12 Freedom is not based on the “physical capability” of doing evil, but on the “moral duty” of choosing good.
20. Freedom and Voluntary Acts
A free act is always voluntary, since something is chosen through the will (voluntas), according to what the intellect—also led by the will—concludes and presents. However, in some voluntary acts, there is no choice and, according to the definition given above, no freedom either. Thus, God is not free to know and love himself or not; man is not free to want to be happy or not; the blessed who see God in heaven are not free to love him above all things or not. All these acts are intensely voluntary, and their not being free as regards freedom of choice does not imply any limitation of their freedom.
What happens is that, in the great majority of cases, freedom is a necessary condition for acts to be fully voluntary. Specifically, it is necessary as regards external freedom. In fact, because of its practical importance, people are usually concerned with, and talk about, external freedom. Internal freedom is usually taken for granted (even when its existence is denied). This may lead to confusing the terms free and voluntary if one does not realize that freedom is desirable only as a means to be able to do voluntary acts, which is what really matters.
It is not a limitation for God to be unable to choose evil, or to fail to love himself. Neither is it a limitation for man to be unable to want his unhappiness or to fail to love God above all things once in heaven. The strength of the voluntary act does not stem from the possibility of choice, which is often out of the question. The strength with which a mother says, “I love my child,” does not come from the fact that she could also choose not to love him.
Although, in common language, free act and voluntary act are often synonymous, the emphasis here is placed on voluntary rather than free. The importance that is usually ascribed to the concept of freedom corresponds rather to that of voluntariness.
This can also be clarified if by freedom we understand (rather than the choice itself) mastery over one’s acts: self-mastery and self-determination, which allow man to master himself and to act by himself.
20a) Freedom and Responsibility
Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. The way to acquire and develop one’s freedom is to make good use of responsibility.13
21. Freedom and God
Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of one’s own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately, for or against God.14
Because of their importance, we will review these same concepts in connection with the last end. We will now be in a position to understand them better.
Objectively speaking, man cannot select his last end; it is given to him by nature itself. Because of its imperfection, however, the human intellect can present as last end something different from God. This is a mistake, since it really means choosing to be unhappy; it is a culpable mistake and thus a sin. We could say that man is physically or psychologically free to choose or reject God, but morally free only to choose God. This moral limitation is not really a limitation, just as the duty of not choosing self-destruction is not a limitation.
Rejecting God as last end—either directly or through lesser but still serious concrete infractions—is tantamount to voluntarily taking the road to self-destruction. Thus, conceiving the moral norm as a limitation is an aberration; it is precisely our guide to the last end. It is accurate to consider freedom as the ability to choose God as last end and choose the means leading to him. The ability to reject God and choose evil, moreover, can be rightly defined as a defect of freedom, caused by the bent inclination of our will and made possible by the limitation of our intellect. In a certain sense, it can be said that what is proper to freedom is good actions.
Properly speaking, freedom can neither increase nor diminish. Either one can choose or one cannot.15 However, one may remove the obstacles to the exercise of the will, by fostering love for the truth, seeking to dispel ignorance, and striving to master one’s passions. This facilitates the exercise of the will and, in a sense, increases freedom. For the same reason, sin diminishes freedom.
A person who chooses a last end that is different from God is choosing something that is only relatively good. That partial good is absolutized precisely because of its relation to the person. Thus, the person is actually choosing himself as last end. This last end, loving oneself above all things, is ultimately a hopeless love; no creature is worthy of being thus loved. It is bound to end in frustration and even hatred of oneself.
Choosing God as last end means choosing the objective last end. This entails choosing to follow the norms leading to God, and choosing to obey his will and his laws. These norms are not arbitrary decrees, but elements of God’s wise plan, the observance of which provides for our full and authentic well-being. There is no incompatibility here between obedience and freedom, because one freely chooses to obey. The same can be said of one’s fidelity to freely acquired commitments; acquiring or being faithful to such commitments does not diminish freedom in the least.
God respects human freedom even when man refuses his plan of love and abuses the gift. God’s grace does not annul our freedom, but helps us to make better use of our freedom.
22. Freedom and Self-Determination
There is a profound way in which choice determines a person. In choosing, one both accomplishes and limits oneself. Self-determining choices make him to be the kind of person he is. Through the actions that a person freely chooses to do, he gives himself an identity, for weal or for woe. This is how we shape our lives.
Morality is indeed in the heart (cf. Mt 15:10–20; Mk 7:15–23; Lk 6:45); it resides in the goodness or badness of our choices, which are acts of inner self-determination. By choosing, one places oneself in a new relationship to human goods. Human goods here mean the basic, fundamental purposes on behalf of which human beings can act. In this sense, they constitute a kind of outline of human personhood, the sum total of what human beings are capable of becoming by their choices and actions.
As a result of one’s choice, one has a greater affinity for the good that one has chosen than for other goods that are not chosen. Having made certain large choices (fundamental options), we must follow them up by further choices to implement them. By choosing, I make myself.
Thus, if a person chooses to commit adultery, he makes himself to be an adulterer. Furthermore, choices last. He will remain what—or who—he has made himself by an act of self-determination (an adulterer) until he determines himself otherwise by another, radically contrary choice. Even if he repents, he will remain an adulterer, but now a repentant adulterer, one who has given to himself a newer identity, one who repudiates his former choice and wants—with God’s grace—to amend his life, and be a faithful spouse.16 Free choices are not merely particular events or physical processes, but spiritual realities that persist.
Free choices build not only persons, but also moral communities; that is, choice determines their identity. This applies to a family or married couple as well as to a political society or nation.17
23. Freedom and Law
In the Book of Genesis we read: “The Lord God commanded the man, ‘You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die’” (Gn 2:16–17).
Thus Revelation teaches that the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God alone. Man is certainly free, insofar as he can understand and accept God’s command. And he possesses an extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat “of every tree of the garden.” But this freedom is not unlimited; it must halt before the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil;” it must accept the moral law given by God. In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and complete fulfillment precisely in the acceptance of that law. God, who alone is good, knows perfectly what is good for man, and by virtue of his love proposes this good to man in the commandments.
God’s law does not reduce, much less does away with human freedom; rather, it protects and promotes that freedom.18
24. The Knowledge Required for a Human Act
The knowledge that is required for an act to be “human” extends to the act itself, to its consequences, and to the morality of both. The knowledge can be considered in itself (and then its opposite is ignorance), or as knowledge present in the action (its opposite then is inadvertence).
24a) Ignorance
Ignorance here refers both to erroneous knowledge (error) and to simple lack of knowledge.
The effect of ignorance in human actions can be seen in common expressions like: “I did not have enough data to decide” or “I didn’t know.” In both cases, the implication is that, because of ignorance, one could not do a responsible act, or that the act performed was not a responsible one.
Ignorance may refer to the fact (someone does not know that there is a gas leak in the room, and that lighting a match would cause an explosion), or to the law (somebody thinks that a marriage between non-Catholics can be dissolved, or that he should go to Mass on Monday if he was not able to go on Sunday).
For practical purposes, however, the most useful classification refers to the voluntariness of the ignorance. We can distinguish vincible, invincible, and concomitant ignorance.
(1) Invincible ignorance Invincible ignorance, or antecedent ignorance, is prior to any act of the will to which it refers, and, therefore, it is not under the control of the will. Objectively bad actions done with invincible ignorance are absolutely inculpable.19
(2) Vincible ignorance Vincible ignorance, or consequent ignorance, is posterior to a related act of the will and, therefore, is a direct or indirect consequence of it. It is thus called vincible because it is under the control of the will. There are three types:
i) Simple vincible ignorance. After having doubts about the lawfulness of the intended action, there is some negligence in solving the doubt, or there is a slight negligence in getting to know one’s obligations.
ii) Gross or extreme vincible ignorance. The negligence is serious. Vincible ignorance does not make the action morally involuntary, but it does diminish its voluntariness. Gross vincible ignorance, however, does not diminish the voluntariness enough for a mortal sin to be only venial.
iii) Affected ignorance. Vincible ignorance could also be explicitly wanted, so as not to forego an action in case it happens to be sinful (studied or affected ignorance). Far from excusing, this ignorance accuses the sinner; it stems from the bad will of the agent, who wishes to sin without qualms of conscience, or from his contempt of the law.
(3) Concomitant ignorance Concomitant ignorance (from comitari, “to accompany”) accompanies the action but does not influence it. It is the case of a person who steals a car unaware that it is needed to carry a sick person to the hospital, but who would steal it just the same if he knew. This kind of ignorance does not diminish the voluntariness of the action in any way.
24b) Inadvertence
Inadvertence can be better understood if we compare it with its opposite, advertence. Advertence is the necessary presence of knowledge in the human act. It is necessary because the will cannot move itself unless the light of the intellect is present in it. Forgetfulness is practically equivalent to inadvertence.
Advertence is actual if the light of the intellect is present in the action through an actual consideration of the mind. It is virtual if that light is present because of a previous consideration whose strength (virtus) remains in the action as it is performed. Thus, a priest may be distracted while he says the words of the absolution. Still, it is not the same as saying them in a dream; he actually wants to absolve, and, for this reason, he sat in the confessional.
Virtual advertence is enough for an act to be properly human. Many perfectly voluntary actions are done with virtual advertence. It is enough, for example, to turn a bad action into a sin, or for the valid administration of the sacraments (though, in the latter case, actual advertence would be much better).
Advertence is full if a person with the full use of his reason is completely aware of what he does. It is partial if he only partially realizes what he does or the morality of the act, as happens when one is half-awake.
Advertence is distinct if one is clearly and exactly aware of the act and of its morality. It is confused when the morality of the act is perceived only in an indistinct manner. For example, someone may realize that what he does is wrong without knowing clearly to what extent and which commandment he is violating.
25. The Volition Required for a Human Act
25a) Voluntary Acts
The voluntary act is the fruit of the decision of the will after being enlightened by the intellect. Consent is the will’s agreement to want the real or apparent good presented by the intellect.
The consent may be simple (voluntary simpliciter), if the object is wanted without any reservation, or qualified (voluntary secundum quid), if it is wanted with some repugnance, as a lesser evil. The latter would be the case of a person who decides to undergo surgery in order to save his life, or to join the army because otherwise he would go to jail for evading draft. This is still a voluntary act because to prefer something is to want something.
A voluntary act can be directly willed (direct voluntary act), when the act is wanted in itself in order to obtain a certain end. It can also be indirectly willed (voluntary in causa, or indirect voluntary), when the act is the effect of a directly wanted cause, but the effect is not explicitly wanted or is even rejected. This is the case of a person who eats a lot, but does not want to get fat; of a student who doesn’t study, but still doesn’t want to fail; of a person who uses illicit means to get a job, but doesn’t want to harm other applicants; or of an imprudent driver who doesn’t want to have an accident.
25b) Obstacles to the Decision of the Will
The decision of the will can be affected in different ways by several factors: physical violence, moral violence or fear, passions, habits, and some pathological states. We shall study each one in turn.
(1) Physical violence
An elicited act of a faculty is the act formally and immediately produced by that faculty. The act of wanting, for example, is elicited by the will. A commanded act is the act that a faculty orders another faculty to perform. The act of looking, for example, is ordered by the will and performed by the faculty of vision. With this, we can easily understand the following principles:
· Physical violence cannot affect the proper, elicited acts of the will, such as love or hatred; no one can want something without wanting it.
· Physical violence can affect the acts commanded by the will. A person can be made to perform, through external means, acts that are normally commanded by the will. Someone can be forced to shoot a gun against his will by having his finger involuntarily pushed against the trigger. More complex actions can be forced through more refined techniques. For example, the confession of a secret can be obtained through drugs. In theory, at least, it would be possible to force any act commanded by the will.
A forced act is not imputable to the extent that it does not proceed from the will. It would be imputable, however, if the will consents to a commanded act started under violence.
(2) Moral violence or fear
Besides physical violence, another kind of violence may force an action. Indirect pressure may be applied to make a person decide to perform an act, and so avoid the threat of a future or imminent evil. The disturbance caused by the threat of a future or imminent evil is called fear.
In principle, an action caused by fear continues to be voluntary, since it has been preferred to the evil threatened. To prefer is also to want. Nevertheless, it is evident that the action is much less voluntary than it would be without fear. In order to study this more in depth, we will consider the different degrees of fear.
· As regards its intensity, fear can be light or serious. Serious fear is caused by the threat of a serious evil. It can be absolutely serious if the evil is serious for everybody, like death. It can be relatively serious if the cause is light in itself, but because of the characteristics or situation of the person, it produces a serious fear. Such is the fear of a child of his parent’s anger when he receives poor grades, or of a person locked in a dark room with rats. Light fear is caused by the threat of a small evil, or of a serious but improbable evil.
· As regards its cause, fear is justly caused when the person threatening has the right to inflict that evil. For example, a creditor may threaten to sue the defaulting debtor in court. Someone may threaten to call the police when a neighbor plays music late at night. Fear is unjustly caused when the person threatening has no right to carry out the threat. For example, a creditor cannot threaten to spread calumnies or send poison letters.
· As regards its timing, we distinguish antecedent fear and concomitant fear. Antecedent fear precedes the action, which is accordingly done out of fear. Concomitant fear accompanies the action, as in the case of a thief who, while carrying out the theft, is afraid of being caught. Obviously, the latter does not influence the action, and no further mention of it will be made.
After these distinctions, we can establish the following principles:
· Antecedent fear makes the action involuntary if it is so intense that it prevents the use of reason. Otherwise, it only diminishes its voluntariness. He who prefers something wants it. This diminution would not be enough, for example, to make a mortal sin only venial.
· Positive laws, both human and divine, do not usually bind under serious fear. There is no obligation to fulfill them “at the cost of great hardship”--cum gravi incommodo. Still, they may oblige, in such circumstances as when the omission would cause a serious harm to the common good, God, the Church, or souls.
· Acts or contracts made under serious, unjustly caused fear are valid in themselves, because he who prefers wants. They are rescindable, though, because the victim has suffered an injustice, which can be repaired by making the act or contract void. In some cases, like vows, marriage, or ecclesiastical elections, positive law itself declares the acts invalid.
(3) Passions
The cognitive act of the intellect is followed by a volitive act of the spiritual appetitive faculty, the will. In the same way, sense perceptions presented by the imagination (sounds, visual images, or recollections) are followed by acts of the sense appetitive faculties. These are two: the concupiscible appetite (from concupiscere, “to desire”), which tends to the sensible good, and the irascible appetite, which aims at removing—violently, if necessary—the obstacles to the attainment of the good.
The acts of these sense appetites are called passions.20 The term passion indicates that the subject passively suffers it, being attracted by the object presented.21
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes eleven passions,22 that is, eleven possible types of acts of the two sense appetites:
i) Acts of the concupiscible appetite:
· Love (attraction toward a sensible good) and hate (aversion toward a sensible evil or, rather, privation of a sensible good)
· Desire (caused by the inclination to attain a sensible good), and aversion (disgust toward a sensible evil that is not yet suffered)
· Delight or joy (rest in the possession of a sensible good), and sadness (sorrow caused by the absence of a sensible good that has not been attained)
ii) Acts of the irascible appetite:
· Hope (caused by the knowledge of an absent good, difficult to obtain, but still achievable) and despair (when the same good is perceived as unattainable)
· Courage (rebellion against and rejection of a present sensible evil) and fear (uneasiness toward a future evil that is deemed unavoidable)
· Anger (prompting a wish to revenge a present sensible evil)
Passions are not inclinations or tendencies, but acts. They generally coincide with what we call feelings or emotions.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusions, we should keep in mind that the term passion is commonly used in a different sense, not that of Aristotle and St. Thomas, but that of Plato and the Stoics. In this latter sense, passions are acts, or even permanent inclinations, of the disordered sense appetites. We will have to rely on the context to identify which sense of the term is used. In philosophy and theology, passion is ordinarily used in the former sense.
The term concupiscence has several meanings as well:
· A specific passion: desire
· A synonym for passion in general
· A permanent evil inclination of either appetite—sensible or spiritual—caused by original sin
Passions, just like the senses, are necessary for human life. They are present in every person. Christ himself felt sadness, joy, and anger (cf. Mt 21:12; 26:37; Lk 19:41; 10:21). Passions prepare, accompany, and perfect the acts of the will in the same way as the acts of the sensible knowledge prepare and accompany those of intellectual knowledge. Although the will can direct itself to a singular sensible good without any previous movement of passion, passions facilitate the operation of the will. For example, a sick person who has lost his appetite has to exert a great effort to feed himself. The proper use of passions perfects the voluntary act, making it easier and more intense. This applies both to material and spiritual goods. Moral perfection requires that man be moved, not only by his will, but also by his sense appetite, according to the psalm, “My heart and flesh sing for joy to the living God” (Ps 84:2).23
Sense appetite is at the service of reason. Man can arouse or mitigate sense appetite through the will and through representations and images. Passions can foster or hinder the execution of good actions. Sadness, for example, may fetter a person and lead him to withdraw into himself. But it may also lead him to seek its causes and fight against them. Original sin, however, has introduced a disorder in the sense appetites that personal sins aggravate. Thus, passions can interfere with the exercise of reason and therefore with that of the will.
Adam’s sense appetite was perfectly subject to reason. After he rebelled against God with original sin, his reason was darkened and his appetites were left in disarray. In the present, wounded state of human nature, the appetites can tend to an object against the right order of reason, further darkening the latter. Instead of facilitating the right movement of the will, they can hinder it.
If man does not struggle, personal sins further this degradation of reason and will. Only grace and correspondence to it through ascetical struggle can enable man to recover dominion over his sense appetites. The disorder of the will against God caused the darkening of the intellect and the rebellion of the appetites. In the same way, union with the will of God through charity begets light in the intellect and order in the sense appetites.
It is thus easy to understand that sense appetites work in different ways in the just man and the sinner. Sanctity of life renews the harmony between the spiritual faculties of the soul and those based on matter—although never completely in this life. In a man who seeks sanctity, the sense appetites gradually become subject to reason. Conversely, in an unrepentant sinner, the disorder of the passions worsens, and they become more and more difficult to control.
Keeping this in mind, we will now see to what extent passions affect the voluntariness required for a human act.
· Antecedent passions: Feelings or passions can precede the decision of the will, thus diminishing the voluntariness of the human act. If they incline to evil acts, these are not as evil as when done without passion, and are called sins of weakness. Even then, these sins can be mortal.
· Consequent passions: Passions can also follow the act of the will. This may happen in three ways:
i) The will can provoke the passion in some way, although without seeking a posterior act. The passion would then be voluntary in its cause, and would increase the voluntariness of an eventual act insofar as the act is or should be foreseen.
ii) The will can arouse the passion in order to carry out the act with more energy (consequent passion per modum electionis), as when someone uses the imagination to arouse the desire of something, good or evil, in order attain it more easily. These passions increase the voluntariness of the action.
iii) The passion may also appear while the action is done (consequent passion per modum redundantiae): when the will decides something with energy, feelings usually accompany it. These feelings do not increase the voluntariness of the act, but are a sign of the intensity of the volition.
(4) Habits
Habits are permanent inclinations to act in a certain way.
Voluntary habits, that is, those caused by the repetition of voluntary acts, increase the voluntariness of the act, whether good or bad.
However, if the will is resolved to remove it and there is struggle, the habit becomes involuntary and diminishes the voluntariness of the acts.
(5) Pathological states
Some pathological states may diminish the voluntariness of an act. Such are obsessions and other psychological disorders.
Depending on their seriousness, these states can diminish the voluntariness of some or all actions. In extreme cases, they may even make them completely involuntary.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1994), 20.
2. Cf. ST, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
3. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83; I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
4. Cf. CCC, 1730–1748.
5. Cf. ST, I, q. 19, a. 10; 1, q. 59, a. 3.
6. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83, a. 4.
7. Ibid., I, q. 83, a. 1.
8. Cf. DS 1555; CCC, 1730ff; John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor.
9. Cf. G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ.
10. ST, I, q. 59, a. 3.
11. Cf. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 32, 34, 84.
12. Cf. CCC, 1733.
13. Cf. Ibid., 1734.
14. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 65.
15. Cf. ST, I, q. 83; q. 59, a. 3, ad 3.
16. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 29.
17. Cf. G. Grisez and R. Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ.
18. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 35.
19. Cf. CCC, 1859–1860.
20. Cf. Ibid., 1762–1775.
21. Cf. ST, I, q. 83; q. 22, a. 1.
22. Cf. Ibid., I, q. 83; q. 23, a. 4. St. Thomas later studies each passion in qq. 26–48.
23. Cf. CCC, 1770.