5. Conscience
We are free to choose what we are to do, but we are not free to make what we have chosen good or evil, right or wrong. Our choices are good or bad insofar they conform to God’s divine and eternal law and its “imperatives,” which are made known to us through the mediation of the conscience. Thus, it is necessary for us to understand the role of the conscience in our moral lives and how, through its mediation, we participate in God’s divine and eternal law.1
37. The Notion of Conscience
The Old Testament affirms that God searches man’s conscience (cf. Sir 42:18). Denouncing the corruption of the pagans, St. Paul declares that their consciences are bearing witness against them (cf. Rom 2:15). The New Testament uses the term conscience 30 times. In these texts, man appeals to “conscience” to behave correctly.
In moral theology, the term conscience has a very precise meaning, which does not always coincide with the common understanding. Conscience is the judgment of the intellect on the goodness or evil of an act performed or about to be performed.2 This definition should be kept in mind in order to properly understand the expressions used in moral theology.
Therefore, conscience is not a separate faculty from intellect, because intellect is man’s only spiritual faculty for knowing. Neither is it an inclination or habit of the intellect (this is precisely a widespread meaning of the term conscience). It is an act, a judgment or dictate, the result of applying general knowledge to a specific action.
Conscience is a practical judgment, bearing on something that one has done or intends to do. It is not a speculative assessment, opinion, or judgment on general principles, like the validity of the sacraments or the advisability of being good. It is not, furthermore, a decision about the usefulness or practicality of an action but, rather, a judgment about its goodness or evil. Therefore, it includes a moral assessment of the action intended, or a moral approval or disapproval of the action performed.
St. Thomas opposes the widespread misconception that conscience is a faculty or capacity, or at least a habit. He insists that it is only an act,3 and concretely “a dictate of reason … an application of knowledge to action.”4 Nevertheless, the term conscience has been applied, in a loose way, to the habit of the first principles or synderesis, which “is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil.”5 Through synderesis, we know that we must do good and avoid evil.
In order to avoid this ambivalence, we will deliberately use the terms dictate or judgment instead of conscience, although the latter is much more common. The ordinary, broad meaning of the word could obscure the theological one. However, we should keep in mind that, in moral theology, the usual and proper term is conscience, and not dictate.
37a) Conscience and Law
Conscience, being a judgment, is the result of applying general laws to a specific case—just as an umpire applies the rules of the game to a concrete situation. Since it is a judgment, the laws to be applied are not established by that judgment; the umpire does not create but merely applies the rules. Thus the expression “freedom of conscience” is false if understood as meaning that the so-called conscience is free to create its own laws about good and evil. There are two erroneous concepts of conscience:
i) The heteronomous conscience tied to normative ethics, focusing solely on laws and obligations, commands and prohibitions, in such a way that there is hardly any place for the conscience to evaluate and decide
ii) The autonomous conscience, totally subjective, which ignores the law and determines by itself what is right and wrong
Against these positions, Pope John Paul II maintains:
The judgment of conscience has an imperative character; man must act in accordance with it.… it is the proximate norm of personal morality.… The authority of its voice and judgments derive from the truth about moral good and evil, which is called to listen to and to express. This truth is indicated by the “divine law,” the universal and objective norm of morality. The judgment of conscience does not establish the law; rather it bears witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical reason with reference to the supreme good, whose attractiveness the human person perceives and whose commandment he accepts.6
38. Objectivity and Certitude of the Judgment
Like an umpire’s decision, the intellect’s dictate on the goodness or evil of an intended or performed action may coincide with the (objective) truth (true or right conscience) or not (erroneous conscience).
The intellect may issue that dictate with the certainty of being correct (certain conscience), or may have doubts on what side to take (doubtful conscience).
39. Right Conscience and Erroneous Conscience
Right conscience is the judgment of a person who—on the basis of true principles—decides, in conformity with the truth, that a particular action is licit or illicit.
Erroneous conscience is the judgment of a person who—on the basis of false principles that are thought to be true—mistakenly determines that a particular action is licit or illicit.
39a) Conscience and Truth
Some look upon the moral teachings of the Church as a set of legalistic and arbitrary norms, imposed on persons from without. This is totally erroneous. The Catholic accepts the moral teachings of the Church because he realizes that Christ speaks to him through the authoritative teaching of the Church, which is the bride and body of Christ; she is indeed the pillar of truth.7 Catholics regard the moral teachings of the Church as truths intended to remind us of our dignity as beings made in the image and likeness of God and called to inwardly shape our choices and actions in accordance with the truth.8
Conscience depends on truth. There is the truth about man, about law, about what is really good or bad. Truth precedes conscience; thus, conscience must respect truth. When the truth about the reality of things is not respected, the subsequent practical judgment of conscience is false.
39b) Formation of Conscience
The dignity of the human person implies and demands the rectitude of the moral conscience, that is, its being based on truth. One must seriously seek a right conscience or, in other words, one must try to make sure that one’s moral judgment is right. This can be achieved by:
· diligently learning the laws of the moral life (through spiritual formation), just as the referee must be interested in knowing well the rules of the game,
· seeking expert advice in difficult cases (spiritual direction), just as doctors hold consultations when the diagnosis of a serious illness is not clear,
· asking God for light (prayer),
· removing the obstacles to right judgment, such as habitual moral disorder, or bad habits (ascetical struggle),
· personal examination of conscience.
The expression formation of one’s conscience precisely refers to the careful preparation of that judgment.9 A person is called prudent when he chooses according to that judgment. Among the above-listed conditions for reaching a right judgment, two can especially benefit from a careful preparation: the intellect’s knowledge of moral laws, and the will’s removal of obstacles. Thus, the formation of one’s conscience is a long and comprehensive process that will later facilitate an immediate and right judgment in any concrete situation.
40. Certain Conscience
Certain conscience is the judgment about the goodness or evil of a particular action that is made without fear of being mistaken.
When the intellect judges the morality of a specific action with certitude, that judgment should always be followed. Hence the traditional principle that certain conscience must always be followed. This is a direct consequence of the first moral principle (one must do good and avoid evil), and is likewise self-evident. When the intellect concludes with certitude that something must be done, one must do it, and when it decides with certitude that something cannot be done, one must not do it.
Only certain conscience is a right rule for action, but it need not be based on absolute certitude, which is seldom found in human actions. Certitude in the broad sense is enough. This means that the judgment is based on serious reasons, although there is still the possibility of being wrong, and even some minor reason against it.
As a logical consequence of what was said previously, we can understand that:
Besides being certain, conscience must be right or at least invincibly erroneous in order to be a rule of morality. Since the rule of morality [within natural ethics] is natural law, only that conscience which correctly applies natural law to a particular case (right conscience) can be held as a legitimate rule of morality in the strict sense. Because of human imperfection, however, man can sometimes innocently conclude, after serious and careful consideration, that something is right when in reality it is not. Because of this, invincibly erroneous conscience is also a rule of morality. St. Thomas clarifies that it is a rule only in a relative way (secundum quid), since it only binds for as long as the error lasts, and in an accidental manner (per accidens), since it does not bind because of its being wrong, but because man considers it as true.10
Sins that are committed with a conscience that is both certain and erroneous are merely material sins. This would be the case of a person who does something wrong, but is convinced that it is right. There is no formal sin here, since there is no voluntary separation from God. The sin would be real and imputable, however, if the conscience is erroneous because of a previous fault: for example, because of a previous negligence in acquiring the necessary moral formation. We saw this when we studied the actions that are voluntary in causa. On the other hand, material sins, though not offensive to God, are always harmful. God commands or forbids something precisely on account of its being beneficial or harmful for man.
41. Doubtful Conscience
A doubtful conscience is the suspension of judgment on the moral goodness or evil of an action because the intellect cannot see clearly whether it is good or bad. Actually, the expression “doubtful conscience” is contradictory in that it signifies a non-existent judgment. Moral doubt would be more appropriate.11
It is not licit to perform an action when one does not know whether it is good or bad. A doubtful conscience cannot be followed if it entails the possibility of doing something bad; the doubt must be resolved first. The doubt may refer:
· to the law itself, its contents (like a referee who doubts about the interpretation of some obscure rule of the game), or
· to the action (like the referee who doubts whether a player actually committed a foul or not).
In either case, if there are reasonable grounds for doubt, one may not act until it is resolved. (If one doubts whether there is obligation or not of doing something good, like going to Mass, it can always be done without need to resolve the doubt; there is no risk of sinning in doing it.)
Doubts can be resolved in two ways. If there is time, they can be resolved in a direct way, by consulting a book or an expert, or by checking the facts. If there is no time, they can be resolved in an indirect way, by applying some maxims called reflex principles. These are general rules that help reach a solution based on what is most common and probable, which can be safely presumed to be the truth. Thus, all reflex principles can be summed up as follows: “In case of doubt, what is presumed stands.” The most important reflex principles are the following:
· A doubtful law does not bind.
· In case of doubt, the possessor has a better right.
· A person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
· In case of doubt, the defendant is to be favored.
· In case of doubt, the superior is presumed to be right.
· In case of doubt, one has to judge according to what ordinarily happens.
· An act is to be presumed valid until proven invalid.
· In case of doubt, what is odious should be restricted and what is favorable should be expanded.
However, if the judgment could cause a serious damage, the principle to be followed is:
· In case of doubt, one has to follow the safest solution.
If, after all these efforts, the doubt remains unsolved, and one fears that both the action and its omission could be sinful (perplexed conscience), one may choose any of the two. Neither would be a sin. One cannot offend God necessarily.
42. Scrupulous and Lax Conscience
The intellect could get used to issuing defective, biased judgments on the goodness or evil of actions. We can distinguish two types of biased conscience. (We are not now using the term conscience in the sense of “judgment,” but rather as a “habit of the intellect that inclines it to a certain type of judgment.”) These two types of conscience are:
i) the scrupulous conscience, which tends to see sins when there are none, and
ii) the lax conscience, which fails to see a sin when actually there is one, or tends to minimize its seriousness.
42a) Scrupulous Conscience
The scrupulous conscience—or rather the intellect with a tendency to scruples—decides that an action is sinful based on weak or insufficient reasons. The symptoms of a scrupulous conscience are:
· an excessive anxiety over the sufficiency of good actions and, especially, over the validity of past confessions,
· fastidious scrutinizing of unnecessary circumstances, especially as regards internal sins (thoughts, desires),
· obstinacy in one’s opinion, which leads to mistrust one’s confessor and to go from one confessor to another.
The causes of a scrupulous conscience could sometimes be supernatural, like a trial sent by God. Generally, however, it is due to natural causes, whether physical (sickness) or moral (self-centeredness, dealing with excessively strict persons, or even hidden pride).
The remedies of a scrupulous conscience are:
· removal of its causes,
· strict obedience to one’s confessor,
· orderly work and suitable recreation,
· prayer, which increases light,
· trust in God, who is our Father.
A scrupulous conscience is not the same as a delicate conscience. Nor does a scrupulous conscience rule out committing objectively serious sins. Nevertheless, because of their special situation, scrupulous persons may be excused from the material integrity of Confession. Sometimes, in order to help them, it may be good to ask them whether they are willing to swear that what is troubling them is an objectively sinful action, committed with full knowledge and consent.
42b) Lax Conscience
The lax conscience—or rather the intellect with a tendency to laxity—judges without sufficient reason that a certain action is not, or is only slightly, sinful.
If laxity becomes excessive because of repeated sins, we can speak of a hardened conscience. This does not mean that the intellect is no longer able to distinguish between good and evil. Properly speaking, subjective amorality cannot really exist. The first principle, “Do good and avoid evil,” will always be present.
The so-called pharisaic conscience is characterized by great punctiliousness (stiff correctness) in some things, especially external and often unimportant ones, together with great laxity in matters of far greater importance (cf. Mt 23:24).
The usual causes of a lax conscience are: poor moral education, dealing with depraved people, strong disorderly passions, and living for a long time immersed in vice. Sometimes, it may be due to a reaction against a previous, unresolved situation of scrupulous conscience. Since everything seems to be a sin, one does not care any more whether something is actually right or not.
The effects of a lax conscience are especially harmful. When the awareness of doing something wrong is lost, the possibility of reacting and repenting is minimal.
The remedies of a lax conscience are removing its causes, frequent sacramental confession, and asking light from God.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 25.
2. Cf. CCC, 1776–1802.
3. Cf. ST, I, q. 79, a. 13.
4. Ibid., I-II, q. 19, a. 5.
5. Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 12.
6. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 60.
7. “In forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention to the sacred and certain teaching of the Church. For the Catholic Church is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is her duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ and, at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority the principles of the moral order which spring from human nature itself” (DH, 14).
8. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 32–33.
9. Cf. CCC, 1783–1785.
10. A. Rodríguez Luño, Etica (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982), 102–103.
11. Cf. M. Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis (Barcelona: Herder, 1961), 1:304:3.
37. The Notion of Conscience
The Old Testament affirms that God searches man’s conscience (cf. Sir 42:18). Denouncing the corruption of the pagans, St. Paul declares that their consciences are bearing witness against them (cf. Rom 2:15). The New Testament uses the term conscience 30 times. In these texts, man appeals to “conscience” to behave correctly.
In moral theology, the term conscience has a very precise meaning, which does not always coincide with the common understanding. Conscience is the judgment of the intellect on the goodness or evil of an act performed or about to be performed.2 This definition should be kept in mind in order to properly understand the expressions used in moral theology.
Therefore, conscience is not a separate faculty from intellect, because intellect is man’s only spiritual faculty for knowing. Neither is it an inclination or habit of the intellect (this is precisely a widespread meaning of the term conscience). It is an act, a judgment or dictate, the result of applying general knowledge to a specific action.
Conscience is a practical judgment, bearing on something that one has done or intends to do. It is not a speculative assessment, opinion, or judgment on general principles, like the validity of the sacraments or the advisability of being good. It is not, furthermore, a decision about the usefulness or practicality of an action but, rather, a judgment about its goodness or evil. Therefore, it includes a moral assessment of the action intended, or a moral approval or disapproval of the action performed.
St. Thomas opposes the widespread misconception that conscience is a faculty or capacity, or at least a habit. He insists that it is only an act,3 and concretely “a dictate of reason … an application of knowledge to action.”4 Nevertheless, the term conscience has been applied, in a loose way, to the habit of the first principles or synderesis, which “is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil.”5 Through synderesis, we know that we must do good and avoid evil.
In order to avoid this ambivalence, we will deliberately use the terms dictate or judgment instead of conscience, although the latter is much more common. The ordinary, broad meaning of the word could obscure the theological one. However, we should keep in mind that, in moral theology, the usual and proper term is conscience, and not dictate.
37a) Conscience and Law
Conscience, being a judgment, is the result of applying general laws to a specific case—just as an umpire applies the rules of the game to a concrete situation. Since it is a judgment, the laws to be applied are not established by that judgment; the umpire does not create but merely applies the rules. Thus the expression “freedom of conscience” is false if understood as meaning that the so-called conscience is free to create its own laws about good and evil. There are two erroneous concepts of conscience:
i) The heteronomous conscience tied to normative ethics, focusing solely on laws and obligations, commands and prohibitions, in such a way that there is hardly any place for the conscience to evaluate and decide
ii) The autonomous conscience, totally subjective, which ignores the law and determines by itself what is right and wrong
Against these positions, Pope John Paul II maintains:
The judgment of conscience has an imperative character; man must act in accordance with it.… it is the proximate norm of personal morality.… The authority of its voice and judgments derive from the truth about moral good and evil, which is called to listen to and to express. This truth is indicated by the “divine law,” the universal and objective norm of morality. The judgment of conscience does not establish the law; rather it bears witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical reason with reference to the supreme good, whose attractiveness the human person perceives and whose commandment he accepts.6
38. Objectivity and Certitude of the Judgment
Like an umpire’s decision, the intellect’s dictate on the goodness or evil of an intended or performed action may coincide with the (objective) truth (true or right conscience) or not (erroneous conscience).
The intellect may issue that dictate with the certainty of being correct (certain conscience), or may have doubts on what side to take (doubtful conscience).
39. Right Conscience and Erroneous Conscience
Right conscience is the judgment of a person who—on the basis of true principles—decides, in conformity with the truth, that a particular action is licit or illicit.
Erroneous conscience is the judgment of a person who—on the basis of false principles that are thought to be true—mistakenly determines that a particular action is licit or illicit.
39a) Conscience and Truth
Some look upon the moral teachings of the Church as a set of legalistic and arbitrary norms, imposed on persons from without. This is totally erroneous. The Catholic accepts the moral teachings of the Church because he realizes that Christ speaks to him through the authoritative teaching of the Church, which is the bride and body of Christ; she is indeed the pillar of truth.7 Catholics regard the moral teachings of the Church as truths intended to remind us of our dignity as beings made in the image and likeness of God and called to inwardly shape our choices and actions in accordance with the truth.8
Conscience depends on truth. There is the truth about man, about law, about what is really good or bad. Truth precedes conscience; thus, conscience must respect truth. When the truth about the reality of things is not respected, the subsequent practical judgment of conscience is false.
39b) Formation of Conscience
The dignity of the human person implies and demands the rectitude of the moral conscience, that is, its being based on truth. One must seriously seek a right conscience or, in other words, one must try to make sure that one’s moral judgment is right. This can be achieved by:
· diligently learning the laws of the moral life (through spiritual formation), just as the referee must be interested in knowing well the rules of the game,
· seeking expert advice in difficult cases (spiritual direction), just as doctors hold consultations when the diagnosis of a serious illness is not clear,
· asking God for light (prayer),
· removing the obstacles to right judgment, such as habitual moral disorder, or bad habits (ascetical struggle),
· personal examination of conscience.
The expression formation of one’s conscience precisely refers to the careful preparation of that judgment.9 A person is called prudent when he chooses according to that judgment. Among the above-listed conditions for reaching a right judgment, two can especially benefit from a careful preparation: the intellect’s knowledge of moral laws, and the will’s removal of obstacles. Thus, the formation of one’s conscience is a long and comprehensive process that will later facilitate an immediate and right judgment in any concrete situation.
40. Certain Conscience
Certain conscience is the judgment about the goodness or evil of a particular action that is made without fear of being mistaken.
When the intellect judges the morality of a specific action with certitude, that judgment should always be followed. Hence the traditional principle that certain conscience must always be followed. This is a direct consequence of the first moral principle (one must do good and avoid evil), and is likewise self-evident. When the intellect concludes with certitude that something must be done, one must do it, and when it decides with certitude that something cannot be done, one must not do it.
Only certain conscience is a right rule for action, but it need not be based on absolute certitude, which is seldom found in human actions. Certitude in the broad sense is enough. This means that the judgment is based on serious reasons, although there is still the possibility of being wrong, and even some minor reason against it.
As a logical consequence of what was said previously, we can understand that:
Besides being certain, conscience must be right or at least invincibly erroneous in order to be a rule of morality. Since the rule of morality [within natural ethics] is natural law, only that conscience which correctly applies natural law to a particular case (right conscience) can be held as a legitimate rule of morality in the strict sense. Because of human imperfection, however, man can sometimes innocently conclude, after serious and careful consideration, that something is right when in reality it is not. Because of this, invincibly erroneous conscience is also a rule of morality. St. Thomas clarifies that it is a rule only in a relative way (secundum quid), since it only binds for as long as the error lasts, and in an accidental manner (per accidens), since it does not bind because of its being wrong, but because man considers it as true.10
Sins that are committed with a conscience that is both certain and erroneous are merely material sins. This would be the case of a person who does something wrong, but is convinced that it is right. There is no formal sin here, since there is no voluntary separation from God. The sin would be real and imputable, however, if the conscience is erroneous because of a previous fault: for example, because of a previous negligence in acquiring the necessary moral formation. We saw this when we studied the actions that are voluntary in causa. On the other hand, material sins, though not offensive to God, are always harmful. God commands or forbids something precisely on account of its being beneficial or harmful for man.
41. Doubtful Conscience
A doubtful conscience is the suspension of judgment on the moral goodness or evil of an action because the intellect cannot see clearly whether it is good or bad. Actually, the expression “doubtful conscience” is contradictory in that it signifies a non-existent judgment. Moral doubt would be more appropriate.11
It is not licit to perform an action when one does not know whether it is good or bad. A doubtful conscience cannot be followed if it entails the possibility of doing something bad; the doubt must be resolved first. The doubt may refer:
· to the law itself, its contents (like a referee who doubts about the interpretation of some obscure rule of the game), or
· to the action (like the referee who doubts whether a player actually committed a foul or not).
In either case, if there are reasonable grounds for doubt, one may not act until it is resolved. (If one doubts whether there is obligation or not of doing something good, like going to Mass, it can always be done without need to resolve the doubt; there is no risk of sinning in doing it.)
Doubts can be resolved in two ways. If there is time, they can be resolved in a direct way, by consulting a book or an expert, or by checking the facts. If there is no time, they can be resolved in an indirect way, by applying some maxims called reflex principles. These are general rules that help reach a solution based on what is most common and probable, which can be safely presumed to be the truth. Thus, all reflex principles can be summed up as follows: “In case of doubt, what is presumed stands.” The most important reflex principles are the following:
· A doubtful law does not bind.
· In case of doubt, the possessor has a better right.
· A person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
· In case of doubt, the defendant is to be favored.
· In case of doubt, the superior is presumed to be right.
· In case of doubt, one has to judge according to what ordinarily happens.
· An act is to be presumed valid until proven invalid.
· In case of doubt, what is odious should be restricted and what is favorable should be expanded.
However, if the judgment could cause a serious damage, the principle to be followed is:
· In case of doubt, one has to follow the safest solution.
If, after all these efforts, the doubt remains unsolved, and one fears that both the action and its omission could be sinful (perplexed conscience), one may choose any of the two. Neither would be a sin. One cannot offend God necessarily.
42. Scrupulous and Lax Conscience
The intellect could get used to issuing defective, biased judgments on the goodness or evil of actions. We can distinguish two types of biased conscience. (We are not now using the term conscience in the sense of “judgment,” but rather as a “habit of the intellect that inclines it to a certain type of judgment.”) These two types of conscience are:
i) the scrupulous conscience, which tends to see sins when there are none, and
ii) the lax conscience, which fails to see a sin when actually there is one, or tends to minimize its seriousness.
42a) Scrupulous Conscience
The scrupulous conscience—or rather the intellect with a tendency to scruples—decides that an action is sinful based on weak or insufficient reasons. The symptoms of a scrupulous conscience are:
· an excessive anxiety over the sufficiency of good actions and, especially, over the validity of past confessions,
· fastidious scrutinizing of unnecessary circumstances, especially as regards internal sins (thoughts, desires),
· obstinacy in one’s opinion, which leads to mistrust one’s confessor and to go from one confessor to another.
The causes of a scrupulous conscience could sometimes be supernatural, like a trial sent by God. Generally, however, it is due to natural causes, whether physical (sickness) or moral (self-centeredness, dealing with excessively strict persons, or even hidden pride).
The remedies of a scrupulous conscience are:
· removal of its causes,
· strict obedience to one’s confessor,
· orderly work and suitable recreation,
· prayer, which increases light,
· trust in God, who is our Father.
A scrupulous conscience is not the same as a delicate conscience. Nor does a scrupulous conscience rule out committing objectively serious sins. Nevertheless, because of their special situation, scrupulous persons may be excused from the material integrity of Confession. Sometimes, in order to help them, it may be good to ask them whether they are willing to swear that what is troubling them is an objectively sinful action, committed with full knowledge and consent.
42b) Lax Conscience
The lax conscience—or rather the intellect with a tendency to laxity—judges without sufficient reason that a certain action is not, or is only slightly, sinful.
If laxity becomes excessive because of repeated sins, we can speak of a hardened conscience. This does not mean that the intellect is no longer able to distinguish between good and evil. Properly speaking, subjective amorality cannot really exist. The first principle, “Do good and avoid evil,” will always be present.
The so-called pharisaic conscience is characterized by great punctiliousness (stiff correctness) in some things, especially external and often unimportant ones, together with great laxity in matters of far greater importance (cf. Mt 23:24).
The usual causes of a lax conscience are: poor moral education, dealing with depraved people, strong disorderly passions, and living for a long time immersed in vice. Sometimes, it may be due to a reaction against a previous, unresolved situation of scrupulous conscience. Since everything seems to be a sin, one does not care any more whether something is actually right or not.
The effects of a lax conscience are especially harmful. When the awareness of doing something wrong is lost, the possibility of reacting and repenting is minimal.
The remedies of a lax conscience are removing its causes, frequent sacramental confession, and asking light from God.
Footnotes:
1. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 25.
2. Cf. CCC, 1776–1802.
3. Cf. ST, I, q. 79, a. 13.
4. Ibid., I-II, q. 19, a. 5.
5. Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 12.
6. John Paul II, Enc. Veritatis Splendor, 60.
7. “In forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention to the sacred and certain teaching of the Church. For the Catholic Church is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is her duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ and, at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority the principles of the moral order which spring from human nature itself” (DH, 14).
8. Cf. William E. May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 32–33.
9. Cf. CCC, 1783–1785.
10. A. Rodríguez Luño, Etica (Pamplona, Spain: EUNSA, 1982), 102–103.
11. Cf. M. Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis (Barcelona: Herder, 1961), 1:304:3.